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Notes on Style, Transliteration and Dates
For referencing, this volume follows the Chicago Manual of Style author-date
in-text citation system.
Arabic words and names are transliterated according to the system used in
Brill’s Encyclopaedia of Islam Three, which is also adopted in the Journal for
Islamic Ethics ( JIE):
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“l” of the definite article “al-” is always retained, regardless of whether it is
assimilated in pronunciation to the initial consonant of the word to which it
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Commonwords, like Qurʾan, Muhammad (the Prophet), Sharia, and Sufism,
are not transliterated, unless found so in original citations.
As for the name of the philosopher under study, we spell his name as he
first did when he published in French, i.e. Taha Abderrahmane, without trans-
literation. However, it should be noted that his first name is Abderrahmane, as
appears from letters in Latin script regarding his first published PhD thesis in
French in 1979 andhis second State PhD in 1985; his family name isTaha. InEng-
lish, “Abderrahmane” is used as the family namebywhichhe is referred to in the
text. In the Arabic section, he is often referred to by his first name “Taha,” since
it is common to refer to his thought as “Tahaʾian” (ṭahāʾiyya) instead of “Abder-
rahmanian.” In some publications, however scarce they are, the name appears
as Taha Abdul Rahman, or Abdurrahman Taha. In the bibliography and refer-
ences, we give a full transliteration of his name for his Arabic works, i.e. Ṭāha
ʿAbd al-Raḥmān, in order to match the language of the publication.
The dates given in this volume are Common Era (CE) dates. If two dates are
provided (e.g. 505/1111), the first one is the year according to the Islamic Hijri
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Introduction: Modern Arab-Islamic Scholarship on
Ethics
A Reflective Contextualization
Mohammed Hashas andMutaz al-Khatib
The questionwhether there are theories in Islamic ethics1 does not differmuch
from the similar questionwhether there is an Islamicphilosophy.This issuewas
first raised by some 18th and 19th century European Orientalists—à la Johann
Jakob Brucker (1696–1770),WilhelmGottlieb Tennemann (1761–1819), and Ern-
est Renan (1823–1892) (ʿAbd al-Rāziq [1944] 2011, 8)—and has been revisited by
a number of ongoing studies, particularly since themodern edition and public-
ation of various manuscripts originally written in the classical period (before
the 19th century) by various Muslim and non-Muslim scholars in and from
different Islamic contexts—the Arabic, Persian, Ottoman, Indian and Malay
contexts—where philosophy did not die out as a discipline, as the claim has
gone for some good time (El-Rouayheb and Schmidtke 2017, 1–7). A review of
classicalQurʾanic exegeses shows that neither the exegets havebeen concerned
with building theories of ethics based on the Qurʾan (al-Khaṭīb 2017), nor have
Muslim scholars in general, even though the sacred text is all about ethics (Rah-
man 1982, 154–155). It was the challenge of modernity that required revisiting
the Islamic tradition in search of Islamic philosophy, or Arab(ic) philosophy
as some prefer to call it (Ṣalībā 1989, 9–11). The avant-guardist thinkers of the
so-called Arab-Islamic nahḍa (awakening or renaissance) of the 19th century,
like Rifaʿa Rafiʿ al-Tahtawi (1801–1873), Jamal al-Din al-Afghani (1838–1897) and
Muhammad Abduh (1849–1905), did not deal with this question of ethics as
contemporary scholars do. Intead, they focalized the question of reason and
rationality at the time. The colonial context did not help them to developmod-
ern theories of ethics, nor to delve into the vast heritage of the tradition to find
ethical starting points fromwhere to build and inspire ethical responses to the
challenges of modern times. However, new arguments to consider the Qurʾan
to be a philosophical and ethical text have emerged from themid-20th century
1 We refer to ethics in both singular and plural forms, following the Arabic use: khuluq (sing.)
and akhlāq (pl.). In Arabic, ethics are often in plural formwhen the concept and norms are in
focus, and in singular form when the “character” of someone is described. We also note that
we do not engage here into differentiating between “ethics” and “morality”; “ethics” as used
here refer(s) to both internal and external source(s) of ethical conduct.
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onwards (Rashwānī 2017), most particularly in the Arab world. Efforts in this
direction inWestern scholarship have been meager, as argued Majid Fakhry in
1970, but attempts are being made increasingly (Fakhry [1970] 2004, ix; ʿAṭiyya
1990, j-d).
A scrutiny of the literature written in English on Arab(ic)-Islamic philo-
sophy for instance shows how scarce focused scholarship on Islamic ethics has
been until recently. Up to this point the literature is dominated by the his-
tory of ideas, while more focused studies are still missing. Examples of such
a trend are the works of Henry Corbin (1962), MontgomeryWatt ([1962] 1985),
SeyyedHosseinNasr (2006),Majid Fakhry ([1970] 2004), Oliver Leaman ([1985]
2004), Hans Daiber (1999; 2007), Mohammad Ali Khalidi (2005), Jon McGin-
nis and David C. Reisman (2007), Massimo Campanini (2008), Anna-Teresa
Tymieniecka and Nazif Muhtaroglu (2010), Roy Jackson (2014), Peter Adamson
(2015), Anthony Robert Booth (2017), and Souleymane Bachir Diagne (2018).2
The Cambridge Companion to Arabic Philosophy (2006), The Oxford Handbook
of Islamic Philosophy (2017), The Routledge Companion to Islamic Philosophy
(2016), are not an exception too, though chapters devoted to “ethics and polit-
ics” or “ethics and political philosophy” could be found in Routledge and Cam-
bridge Companions, or in Adams’s and Booth’s work.
This form of dealing with Islamic scholarship in general may have had two
main reasons. First, European Orientalist views—à la Renan—dominated the
18th and 19th century scholarship on Arab-Islamic thought. The idea was that
Arab-Islamic philosophy was merely a transmission and translation of Greek
philosophy. Itwas examinedwith “Greek lenses” ormodernEuropeanperspect-
ives, instead of seeking its originality in sciences not related to Greek thought,
logic and ethics in particular, like theology (ʿilmal-kalām), jurisprudence theor-
ies ( fiqh and uṣūl al-fiqh), and Sufism (taṣawwuf ). The assumption underlying
this typeof scholarship is thatArab-Islamic philosophyneeds to theorize ethics
philosophically first, before or instead of focalizing applied ethics, a topic with
which literature in the tradition abounds. This assumption clearly neglects or
disregards the fact that Arabs and Muslims had sacred texts to take into con-
sideration, i.e. the Qurʾan and the Prophetic sayings, which the Greeks did not
have. It is quite obvious that a religious community will look first at its sac-
red text for ethical teachings and behaviour. This explains why the dominant
typology of ethics was derived from the Qurʾan and the Sunna first, besides lit-
erature and popular teachings of the Arabs themselves and of other cultures
(Persian and Indian in particular). Such type of works on tahdhīb al-akhlāq or
2 Oliver Leaman and Massimo Campanini have, however, directed their attention to reading
the Qur’an as a philosophical text, and to the issue of morality, as will be referred to later in
this introduction.
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tahdhīb al-nufūs [betterment of conduct/ethics, or betterment of souls] can
be traced to Ibn al-Muqaffaʿ (d. c. 139/759), al-Muḥāsibī (d. 243/857), al-Jāḥiz
(d. 255/868), Ibn Abī al-Dunyā (d. 281/894), al-Ṭabarānī (d. 360/918), Abū al-
Ḥasan al-Māwardī (d. 450/1058), IbnḤazmal-Andalusī (d. 456/1064), al-Rāghib
al-Iṣfahānī (d. 422/1108), Ibn al-Jawzī (d. 597/1200), among others. Focus on this
dominant typology of ethical literature leaves aside other disciplines which
aremore systematic in the tradition, like legal theories, philosophical treatises,
theological or Sufi arguments. A scrutiny of the vast corpus of literature of these
disciplines shows that ethics have always been present, sometimes even at the
center, of thought and intellectual production, either as chapters in certain ref-
erence works, or as an implicit worldview of Islam and Sharia, without which
thought andwork (ʿamal, i.e. practice/praxis) are considered imperfect or inac-
ceptable. It is in this sense that scholars like Toshihiko Izutsu (1966), andWael
B. Hallaq (2013; 2019), among others, consider Sharia ethics as a worldview that
characterizes classical Islamic thought, and not understanding it in this way
does immeasurable harm to the objectives of Sharia. It is in these disciplines
that various approaches of Islamic ethics could be decoded and examined (al-
Ṭawīl 1952, 256–387; Qābīl 1984, 7–11; ʿAṭiyya 1990, j-d).
The second reason why scholarship has neglected to focus on Islamic eth-
ics has to do with historical circumstances and the episteme that influences
thought. Ethics has become an important modern discipline of study, grow-
ing more and more interdisciplinary in the secularized contexts of Europe.
This is not to say that the Arab-Islamic context did not witness debates on
ethics in classical periods, based on reason alone, or primarily on reason.
The case of the Muʿtazilīs is more than convincing to prove that even a reli-
giously dominated context could bring about rational tendencies, and bring
forth rational ethicist literary and theological figures like Ibn al-Muqaffaʿ, al-
Maʿarrī (d. 449/1058), Abū Bakr b. Zakariyyā al-Rāzī (d. c. 313/925) and Ibn
al-Rāwandī (d. c. 298/911)—evidently without stating that other theological
tendencies and figures are irrational or less rational. Themain argument here is
that the importance ethics has gained as an independent and interdisciplinary
philosophical field has to do with themodernity paradigm, and with the weak-
ening of the classical dominant religious worldview that used to govern the
entire society. While experiencing and debating modernity which challenges
the worldview of religion, the Arab-Islamic world too is shedding new light on
this vital intellectual and practical discipline of ethics, and is doing so from
various angles and tendencies. Below we refer to some prominent examples
of scholarship on Islamic ethics in both English and Arabic, without claiming
that these references are exhaustive for all the major texts written in these lan-
guages, let alone the other languages of Muslimmajority contexts, like Persian,
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Turkish, Urdu, andMalay. The examples inArabic focalize the Egyptian context
not only because of its productivity on the topic especially in the first part of the
20th century, but also because it draws a picture of the diversity of approaches
on the question of ethics in the age of encountering modernity and debating
ways of reform and renewal. We will also briefly discuss Maghrebi examples
subsequently. As to the examples written in English, they are from the 1950s
onwards, also a period of intellectual search for ways of reading the sacred text
based on ethical concepts.
In this introduction, we refer to two major types of scholarship on ethics
in the Islamic tradition: one examines the sacred text of the Qurʾan, and thus
belongs to what we could refer to as “Qurʾanic ethical system/thought” schol-
arly tendency, and the other examines “Islamic ethical thought” in the tradition
at large, like in legal theory, theology, philosophy, and Sufism, andnot limited to
the Qurʾan. In the English literature we refer to, the works of Daud Rahbar and
Salih al-Shamma belong to the first category, while the works of Majid Fakhry,
George Hourani, Mariam al-Attar, and Amyn B. Sayoo, to name these among
others, belong to the second. General notes on these works will be given below,
before a similar distinction is adopted to discuss Arabic literature on the topic,
mainly in Egypt in the 20th century, before reaching themain topic of the stud-
ied context and the project of the “trusteeship paradigm.”
We start with the Pakistani international scholar Daud Rahbar (1926–2013),
who revisits the ethical message of the Qurʾan in his PhD dissertation pre-
pared at Cambridge University (1949–1953) and published in 1960. In the work
entitled God of Justice: A Study in the Ethical Doctrine of the Qurʾan, he argues
that justice, God’s justice, prevails over His mercy and that the Qurʾan’s ethical
call stems from this cardinal message of justice. It is “God’s Strict Justice” that
instils in the believer’s conscience a sense of fear of being overlooked by God’s
justice andmercy, insteadof fear of God theCapriciousTyrant, as has been clas-
sically interpreted to be one of God’s Ninety-Nine attributes or God’s Beautiful
Names (Rahbar 1960, xiii; Rashwānī 2017, 169–170). Rahbar also revisists theolo-
gical concepts that are dominantly abstract, like the attributes of Essence and
Absolute, to emphasise the direct relation between God and man, as a way of
bringing to the fore the concept and value of justice that human beings need
and cherish (Rahbar 1960, xv). Samir Rashwani refers also to the PhD disser-
tation of the Iraqi Salih Hadi al-Shamma, prepared at Edinburgh University
entitled The Ethical System Underlying the Qurʾan: A Study of Certain Negat-
ive and Positive Notions (1959); Rashwani says that al-Shamma does not take
a clear position in stating whether the Qurʾan provides an ethical system or
not. Al-Shamma, however, argues that Qurʾanic ethics tend to be more prac-
tical than theoretical, and they emphasise obligation (akhlāq al-wājib) (Rash-
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wānī 2017, 182–184). Toshihiko Izutsu’s Ethico-Religious Concepts in the Qurʾan
(1966), previously published as The Structure of Ethical Terms in the Koran, in
1959, can be added to this line of scholarship written in English, but its attempt
is more cultural-linguistic than theoretical-philosophic, though concepts and
their developments do matter in examining the way ethics are presented in a
particularworldview.Overall, Izutsuwas of the view that “Islamic thought at its
Qurʾanic stagemakes no real distinction between the religious and the ethical”
(Izutsu [1966] 2002).
Majid Fakhry, the Lebanese scholar of Arab-Islamic philosophy, published
on ethics in both Arabic and English. First, he published al-Fikr al-Akhlāqī al-
ʿArabī (Arab Ethical Thought) in 1978. The volume ismostly a selection of some
major themes, works and figures that deal with ethical issues. He starts by
dividing Arab scholarship on ethics into twomajor types: adab khuluqī (ethical
literature) and fikr khuluqī (ethical thought). The first is a collection of ethical
and moral teachings from different traditions, as well as personal experiences,
and the second ismore organized in a systematic andphilosophical format. Ibn
al-Muqaffaʿ, Abū al-Ḥasan al-ʿĀmirī (d. 381/992), Abū Sulaymān al-Sijistānī al-
Manṭiqī (d. c. 377/1000), Miskawayh (d. 421/1030), for instance, belong to the
first category (i.e. ethical literature), while some works and treateses of philo-
sophers and theologians like al-Kindī (d. c. 259/873), al-Fārābī (d. 339/950),
Abū Bakr al-Rāzī, al-Qāḍī ʿAbd al-Jabbār (d. 415/1025), al-Māwardī, al-Ghazālī
(d. 505/1111), Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī (d. 606/1210), and Ibn Ḥazm belong to the
second (i.e. ethical thought). Thenheprovides excerpts from theworks of these
scholars as they relate to different ethical issues, like justice, good and evil,
human behaviour and judgement (Fakhry [1978] 1986, 9–10). Later on in 1991
Fakhry published Ethical Theories in Islam in English. Here, he introduces a dif-
ferent and clearer typology of ethics, which he puts in the following order:
1) Scriptural ethics, in which Qurʾanic ethos is underlined.
2) Theological ethics, in which ethical rationalism and ethical voluntarism
theories are discussed, with reference to the Ashʿarīs and Muʿtazilīs.
3) Philosophical ethics, with reference mainly to the works of philosophers
from Aristotle to al-Kindī, al-Rāzī, al-Fārābī, Ibn Sīnā (d. 428/1037), Ibn
Rushd (d. 595/1198), Yahya Ibn ʿAdī (d. 363/974), Miskawayh, Naṣīr al-Dīn
al-Ṭūsī (d. 672/1273), and Jalāl al-Dīn al-Dawānī (d. 908/1502).
4) Religious ethics, which he studies with reference to Ibn Abī al-Dunyā
(d. 281/894), Abū al-Ḥasan al-Māwardī, Ibn Ḥazm, al-Rāghib al-Iṣfahānī,
Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī, and al-Ghazālī (Fakhry 1991).
A more synthetical work on Islamic ethics is found in the collected articles of
George Hourani, published in 1985 as Reason and Tradition in Islamic Ethics.
Unlike the common traditional presentation of ethics in the tradition, which
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often summarizes either certain major works or the ideas of certain influential
figures, Hourani synthesizes Islamic ethical theories into four trends, close to
Fakhry’s typology, but with reference to two lines of argumentation: ontology
and epistemology, i.e. the nature of ethical values, and how humans can know
them inparticular contexts, respectively.More importantly,Hourani focuses on
what he considers the original contribution of the tradition regarding ethics,
that is, in jurisprudence debates on the sources of law and in theology (kalām).
He considers the latter philosophical inmethodologywhen it comes to dealing
with ethics (Hourani 1985, 19). It took a fewmore years for some other interest-
ing works on Islamic ethics to appear in English.
Mariam al-Attar’s Islamic Ethics (2010) also presents Islamic theories of eth-
ics differently, synthetically. After treatingQurʾanic-ḥadīth ethics, pre-Muʿtazilī
and Ashʿarī ethics, she focalises the later Muʿtazilī ethical theory of al-Qāḍī
ʿAbd al-Jabbār, whose twenty volumes work al-Mughnī was found in the 1950s
in Yemen. Al-Attar, through her lenghty presentation of rational ethical the-
ories, argues that there is no clear evidence that “divine command theory” is
what prevails in Islamic thought (Al-Attar 2010, 142), an argument many schol-
arsmay not agreewith. AmynB. Sayoo’s edited volume ACompanion toMuslim
Ethics (2010) takes amoremodern approach in tackling the topic, by examining
applied ethics for concrete challenges, like ecology, art, economy, dispute resol-
ution, tolerance, and nonviolence. Sayoo’s edited volume appears as an explor-
ation of an earlier work of his own, Muslim Ethics: Emerging Vistas (2004), in
which he makes classical ethics, themes and figures talk synthetically to mod-
ern secular challenges.
Besides these recent works, a collective project on this under-researched
subject has been inaugurated by the birth of the Journal of Islamic Ethics,
launched by the Research Center for Islamic Legislation and Ethics in Doha,
Qatar, in July 2017, and it dedicated its first issue to the theme of the Qurʾan
and Ethics; the subtitle of the introductory chapter reflects the point: “A Press-
ing Demand and a Promising Field” (Ghaly 2017, 1–5); a book series Studies
in Islamic Ethics, and an MA programme in Applied Islamic Ethics have been
launched by the same Center as well.
As to modern literature in Arabic on ethics, it cannot be exhausted, nor can it
be thoroughly reviewed or sketched out here. Ahmad Abdalhalim ʿAtiyya has
accomplished this task in his rich text Al-Akhlāq fī al-Fikr al-ʿArabī al-Muʿāṣir
(Ethics in Contemporary Arab Thought, 1990). ʿAtiyya outlines three major
scholarly trends that work on ethics in the Arab world:
1) The first annotates, revises, edits, and publishes classical works andman-
uscripts on Islamic ethics aswell as their relation toGreekethical thought.
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2) The second translates and engages with modern European thought on
ethics.
3) The third, which is still emerging according to him, tries to build Arab
ethical thought that responds to modern challenges in society and life
innovatively (ʿAṭiyya 1990, ḥ-kh).
Because our interest in this limited space is to contextualize, and not fully
analyze, the debate on Islamic ethics, we will adopt the “Qurʾanic ethical sys-
tem/thought” and the “Islamic ethical thought” typology used above and exam-
ine some relevant textsmostly from the Egyptian context, before discussing the
Maghrebi context, since it is the context in which “trusteeship ethics” and the
“trusteeship paradigm” have emerged.
For the Egyptian context, Abdullah Draz’s work is the most representative
of the first type of “Qurʾanic ethical thought,” and the other works could fall,
broadly, in the second category of “Islamic ethical thought,” in which we can
discern two leading figures: AhmedLutfi El-Sayed (1871–1963) andMustafa Abd
al-Raziq (1885–1947). These two figures, in turn, represent two major schol-
arly trends: one that builds on the Graeco-Arab philosophical tradition, in the
light of modern European philosophical schools, and espouses the separation
of religion from revelation to form an independent discipline of ethics in the
tradition. The other trend takes particular sciences of the classical tradition as
the starting point to speak of original sources of Islamic ethical theories that
could nurture modern explorations in the field (see Al-Khaṭīb 2019).
In the first modern Arabic translation of Aristotles’ (d. 323BCE) Nicho-
machean Ethics of 19193—based on the French edition of Jules Barthélemy-
Saint-Hilaire (1805–1895)—,AhmedLutfi El-Sayed4 says that, in order to rehab-
ilitate Arab and Egyptian philosophy, Arab scholars have to study Aristotles’
philosophy again (Lutfi El-Sayed [1919] 1934). Lutfi El-Sayed was inclined
towards utilitarian ethics, as championed by the British philosophers Jeremy
Bentham (1748–1832) and John StuartMill (1806–1873). He influenced a genera-
tion of students and scholars interested in the French andEuropeanphilosoph-
ical model in general, before another generation interested in Arab-Islamic
philsophy grew up in the 1940s (al-Khatib 2019, 164–169). This interest in philo-
sophy could also be deduced from the widespread reception of philosophical
textbooks at the university as well as high school levels. For instance, the lec-
tures of reputed European scholars teaching at the University of Egypt were
published as we will see subsequently, next to texts written by local scholars.
3 First translated from Greek into Arabic by Isḥāq Ibn Ḥunayn (d. 298/910).
4 The first president of Cairo University, which was founded in 1908.
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AminWasif Bek (1867–1928) published his lectures at the Egyptian University
in five short books on major disciplines of philosophy (psychology, aesthetics,
logic, ethics, and metaphysics) as Uṣūl al-Falsafa (The Fundamentals of Philo-
sophy) in 1921. He dedicated to ethics the fourth booklet, in which he uses
neither references, nor any religious citations (Wāṣif Bik 1921). Apparently, it
is the scholastic work of Ahmad Amin (1886–1954) Kitāb al-Akhlāq (The Book
of Ethics), published in 1929, that had circulated more widely. It was adopted
by the ministry of education for high schools in Egypt, and had a more last-
ing impact, according to Ahmad Abdelhalim ʿAtiyya (Amīn [1929] 2011; ʿAṭiyya
1990, d). The bookdealswith topics like conscience (ḍamīr), ethical judgement,
good and evil, the individual and society, rights and duties, the meaning of
obligation, the ethical model, and virtue, which is the last chapter—whereas
classical Arab-Islamic texts would commence with the theme of virtue. Amin
says that human beings can depend on their intuition to find out what is good
and what is evil, and that education, family, and religion only help in that pro-
cess. Intuition is what makes human values shared and universal (Amīn 2011,
32, 43). His three pioneering volumes in modern Arabic scholarship on Islamic
civilization (Fajr al-Islām, 1929; Ḍuḥā al-Islām, 1933; Ẓuhr al-Islām, 1945) refer
to ethics when speaking about Islamic theology and philosophers, and ded-
icates chapter six of the third volume to the topic. In this chapter he writes
that there are generally two kinds of ethical scholarship in the Islamic tradi-
tion: one based on the Qur’an, the Sunna, wisdom teachings andmoral stories,
and the other developed later, when the tradition came in touch with Greek
philosophy. At this point, ethics became more systematic and rationalized in
categories and concepts. Ibn al-Muqaffaʿ and al-Māwardī’s works on ethics, for
example, belong to the first category, while Miskawayh, Abū Bakr al-Rāzī, and
Ikhwān al-Ṣafā’s belong to the second. Al-Ghazālī is put in between the two
categories (Amīn [1945] 2013, 389–400). A similar division is adopted by Majid
Fakhry in Arab Ethical Thought as seen above ([1978] 1986, 9–10).
Up to this point scholars link the study of Arab-Islamic philosophy to Greek
philosophy, without distinguishing certain Islamic disciplines as distinctively
and-or originally philosophical too. Mohammed Abed al-Jabri (1936–2010)
known for his Naqd al-ʿAql al-ʿArabī (Critique of Arab Reason) in four volumes,
names, in passing but with a clear recognition, two modern scholars as the
engines behind the rebirth of the study of Arab-Islamic philosophy after cen-
turies of cultural and philosophical decadence. In his history of ideas, this era
started after the last most important philosopher, the Andalusian Ibn Rushd/
Averroes. Al-Jabri names the Egyptians Mustafa Abd al-Raziq and Ibrahim
Madkour (1902–1996) as the two scholar-thinkers that have genuinely replied
to what he calls “philosophical Orientalism,” a tendency led by a number of
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Eurocentrist scholars of the 18th and 19th centuries (al-Jābrī 1991, 63–64). We
will make a few notes on each of their most important works that are relevant
to the topic of ethics.
It iswithMustafaAbd al-Raziq that the study of ethics inArab-Islamic philo-
sophy takes a new turn. He was a Sheikh trained at al-Azhar, subsequently
obtained his PhD at the Sorbonne University in Paris, where he studied under
scholars like Émile Durkheim (1858–1917), and then taught Islamic jurispru-
dence in Lyon. He became Rector of al-Azhar, and was appointed minister of
Religious Affairs and Endowments eight times, to be the first Azhari to hold
such a position. He is one of the direct students of the famous reformist scholar
Muhammad Abduh (1849–1905). Mustafa Abd al-Raziq started teaching what
came to be known in the curriculum as “Islamic philosophy,” along with Emile
Bréhier (1876–1952) and André Laland (1867–1963), at the Faculty of Arts of the
Egyptian University (later on named King Farouk University and now Cairo
University), where Taha Hussein (1889–1973) was the only other Egyptian pro-
fessor. Before that, “Islamic philosophy” as a subject was part of philosophy
or general philosophy course, and it was taught from a “foreign” perspect-
ive, and often without underscoring its original aspects, by European schol-
ars of the Islamic Orient who were teaching philosophy at the university, like
the Italians Davide Santillana (1855–1931), Carlo Alfonso Nallino (1872–1938),
the English Thomas Walker Arnold (1864–1930), the French Louis Massignon
(1883–1962) (in ʿAbd al-Rāziq 2011, 45, n. 2), and the Spanish Comte de Galarza
(1878–1938) (Reid 1987; ʿAtiyya in De Galarza 1920, 3–4). In Tamhīd li-Tārīkh al-
Falsafa al-Islāmiyya (Introduction to the History of Islamic Philosophy, 1944),
Abd al-Raziq’s argument for “Islamic philosophy” and where to find its origin-
ality would influence some prominent new students and later on professors of
Islamic philosophy, like Ali Sami al-Nashar (1917–1980), and in turn his student
Ahmed Mahmoud Subhi, and the latter’s students, like Abdelhay Qabil, who
also published on Islamic ethics (Qabil 1984, 5).
In his three volumes Nashʾat al-Fikr al-Falsafī fī al-Islām (The Development
of Philosophical Thought in Islam, published in 1966, 1968, 1969, respectively)
Sami al-Nashar defends the originality of Islamic philosophy in its theology,
jurisprudence theories and Sufism (Al-Nashar [1966] 1977, 1:18). His student
Ahmed Mahmoud Subhi continues this line of thought in Al-Falsafa al-Akhlā-
qiyya fī al-Fikr al-Islāmī (Philosophy of Ethics in Islamic Thought, 1969) in
which he presents the Muʿtazilīs and the Sufis as two opposing trends—the
first rational-abstract oriented, and the second work/practice oriented—that
both advanced original theories of ethics. He puts Ikhwān al-Ṣafā and Mis-
kawayh forward as two major examples of schools that theorized ethics in a
conciliatory way, neither purely rational nor purely traditional/metaphysicist
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(Subhi [1969] 2006). Both scholars see that Islamic philosophy is different and
originally spiritual in orientation, and that it does not need to be Aristotelian,
metaphysics-free by default (Subhi 2006, 19–20).
As to IbrahimMadkour, he too is an Azhari graduate who earned his PhD in
philosophy from Paris University in 1934, where he studied under Massignon.
He succeeded Taha Hussein after his death as the diretor of the Cairo Arab
Language Assembly. He revised, edited and wrote on various manuscripts of
Muslim philosophers, and influenced a generation of young scholars of Arab-
Islamic philosophy; his most known work is Fī al-Falsafa al-Islāmiyya: Manhaj
wa-Taṭbīquh (On Islamic Philosophy: A Method and Its Application, in two
volumes, 1947). Even though the table of contents of this work does not use
the word ethics in its chapter headings, it is still not absent from the way he
presents his reading of the tradition. The first volume studies Islamic philo-
sophy based on three major theories or concepts: (1) happiness, (2) proph-
etology, and (3) the soul and its eternity. The second volume centralizes two
concepts: (1) divinity, and (2) free will. Synthetically, in all of these concepts
the idea of ethics does not seem central, but it is present and permeates differ-
ent scholarly disciplines and their concepts.
Madkour argues that Islamic theology, led by Muʿtazilī figures like Abū al-
Hudayl al-ʿAllāf (d. c. 227/840) and Ibrāhīm al-Naẓẓām (d. c. 230/835), was
a philosophy based on a religion that nurtured it, before opening up to al-
Kindī, often considered to be the first Arab-Muslim philsopher. According to
Madkour, Islamic philosophy was born in and by virtue of religion, first and
foremost thanks to debating the notion of tawḥīd (Oneness of God) (Madkour,
[1947] 2015, 2:277–278). This argument goes along with the argument of Henry
Corbin (1903–1978) who says that philosophy in the Islamic context is “essen-
tially linked to the religious and spiritual fact of Islam,” which he sometimes
calls “prophetic philosophy” (Corbin 1962, xiv–xv).
A similar way of approaching ethics as a discipline of study in modern Arab
scholarship is to be found in the work of Muhammad Yusuf Musa (1899–1963),
anAzhari scholar and one of the students of LouisMassignon andMustafaAbd
al-Raziq, referred to above. In his first work History of Ethics ([1940] 1953, 190),
he approaches the theme in a scholarly manner, and does not make Islamic
ethics a unique topic of focus, as it is treated along with ethics in other tradi-
tions (the ancient Orient, the Egyptian, the Greek, Jewish, Christian, Islamic,
and European). His other shorter work Issues in the Philosophy of Ethics (1940)
centralizes both the topic and the way it is studied philosophically, and grants
Muslimphilosophers a voice alongwith their European counterparts. Hismore
important work, clearly a more mature one, goes further and opens new path-
ways for researching not only ethics but Islamic philosophy at large, based on
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its fundamental book, the Qurʾan. The book is entitled The Qurʾan and Philo-
sophy (1958) and can be considered to be a pioneering text on this topic. There
are only a fewworks that recently have started to explore this subject inEnglish,
like Oliver Leaman’s The Qurʾan: A Philosophical Guide, and Islam andMorality
(2016; 2019), and Massimo Campanini’s Philosophical Perspectives on Modern
Qurʾanic Exegesis (2016). Earlier in 1947, Abbas Mahmud al-ʿAqad (1889–1962)
wroteQurʾanic Philosophy, a general text that does not reflect the expected pro-
fundity of the title, to demonstrate that not only does theQurʾan not contradict
reason, but it is also a book that contains concepts that are treated philosophic-
ally, and is thus open to being a text rich of philosophical calls; ethics is among
these concepts, imbued with divine attributes as their guidance for human
excellence, perfection and aesthetics (Al-ʿAqqād [1947] 2013, 23–31).
This period of Egyptian scholarly discussions on ethics gives birth to an
important attempt of reading the Qurʾan using ethical concepts. It is the work
of the Azhari scholar Muhammad Abdallah Draz (1894–1958).5 Draz spent
twelve years studying in France preparing his magnum opus La Morale du
Koran, which was originally his PhD dissertation at the Sorbonne University,
which he defended in 1947, and published in 1950 in French. Its Arabic version
appeared some 13 years later, at the initiative of Abdessabur Shahin (1929–
2010), another Azhari scholar. The English translation appeared only much
later, in 2008. Draz divides his book into a theoretical and practical part of eth-
ics. In the first he studies the concepts of obligation, responsibility, sanction,
intention and inclinations and effort in the Qurʾan, and refers to ancient and
modern theories of ethics in this regard. In the second part he examines per-
sonal ethics, as well as family, society, state, and religious ethics and the way
the Qurʾan speaks about them in a coherent form, unlike the way Qurʾanic eth-
ics have been presented in separately-quoted verses and teachings, a gap in
scholarship for which he blames both Muslim and non-Muslim scholars (Dar-
rāz 1973; Draz 2008; see also Rashwānī 2017, 159–169).
This diversity in approaching Arab-Islamic ethics demonstrates that the
issue is fundamental both in scholarly circles aswell as in political circleswhere
fierce debates are being waged on the question of what kind of ethics should
prevail in the public sphere, should they be religious, secular, secular-religious,
fully rational, or semi-rational? How can changing societies, as in the Arab
world, look back at their ethical tradition to form a more fitting interpretation
to cope with the challenges of the secular-modern world?
5 Around this period of time, Draz’s compatriot the famous Abdurrahman Badawi (1917–2002)
was probing the question of ethics from an existential perspective (Badawi 1953).
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The intense interest in the study and revival of Arab philosophical scholar-
ship on ethics of the 1930s and 1940s, up to the 1960s, as briefly reviewed above,
faded in the 1970s and 1980s mostly because of the phenomenon of Islamic
awakening and the rise of political Islam. For Instance, the “global mufti” Yusuf
al-Qaradawi (b. 1926) wrote Al-Qiyam wa-l-Akhlāq fī al-Iqtiṣād al-Islāmī (Val-
ues and Ethics in Islamic Economics, 1995) and recently he published Akhlāq
al-Islām (The Ethics of Islam, 2017), in the introduction of which he identifies
ethics as the coremessage of Islam, and faithwithout applied ethics as null and
void. While he certainly tackles various themes, he does not conceptualize or
theorize.He rather studies howapplied ethics are fundamental to the tradition,
and supports his argumentationwithQurʾanic verses andḥadīth. In thiswaywe
can put al-Qaradawi’s first work on economics in the “Islamic ethical thought”
category and his second one in the “Qurʾanic ethical thought” category, to use
our generic typology proposed earlier, or “Scriptural ethics” in Fakhry’s typo-
logy.
Returning to “Islamic ethical thought” in the context of the Maghreb,
Mohammed Arkoun (1928–2010) tried to apply socio-linguistic and historicist
approaches not only to the entire tradition and what he centralized and called
“Islamic reason” but most particularly to what he called “Qurʾanic ethicality”
(al-akhlāqiyya al-Qurʾāniyya) (Arkūn 1990, 21–44). However, Arkoun did so as
a “historian of ideas,” from “critical perspectives” as a scholar (Arkūn 1990, 22),
to present the classical Islamic ethics in its past time so as to re-interpret it in
the light of modern historical challenges, and he did not aim at theorizing eth-
ics as a theologian-philosopher. His deconstructivist approach of reading the
tradition did not aim at theorizing an ethical theory to renew Islamic thought,
but to open it up to the “unthought in Islamic thought”, in his words; his “spir-
itual responsibility” was more a pure individual source of moral conduct than
of generally applied ethics; he says, “I am introducing the concept of spiritual
responsibility not to reactivate the idealistic claims for religious spiritualism
but toproblematize the current referencemade to the ‘dignity of man’ ” (Arkoun
2007, 284).
To refer to another prominent Arab thinker and the place of ethics in his
scholarship, the case of Mohammed Abed al-Jabri and his al-ʿAql al-Akhlāqī al-
ʿArabī (Arab Ethical Reason, 2001), the fourth volume of his quadrilogyCritique
of ArabReason, is of paramount relevance. Especially since he andTaha Abder-
rahmane (b. 1944) did not go along well, and took different scholarly paths
at the Mohammed V University in Rabat where they both taught in the same
department of philosophy for about four decades (See the chapter of Hashas
in this volume for more). Al-Jabri was driven by the idea of political change
in the Arab world, and on his reading of the tradition a lot of ink has been
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spilled, either for or against, since he introduced new categories for reading
Islamic intellectual history, fromhis first volumeson the “formation” and “struc-
ture” of Arab reason, passing by Arab “political” reason, to Arab “ethical” reason
(Eyadat, Corrao and Hashas 2018).
Being an optimist Khaldunist in approaching history and its cyclicity, and
Averroest in differentiating between the religious sphere and the philosophical
one, al-Jabri broadly argues that rhetorical (bayānī) and gnostic (ʿirfānī) think-
ing dominated Arab thought, and weakened the flourishing of argumentative-
rational (burhānī) thought à laAverroes (IbnRushd). Specifically on ethics and
acknowledging the lack of theorizing in the discipline, he speaks of five major
sources of influence on the formation of Arab ethical reason. These are as fol-
lows:
1) The Greek influence, which emphasizes the quest for happiness that
some major Arab-Muslim philosophers-theologians integrated in their
works on ethics.
2) The Persian influence, which emphacizes submission to the king or sov-
ereign as the guardian of the faith, which al-Jabri thinks has had immense
impact on Arab political-ethical thought since its fromation.
3) The Sufi andGnostic influence, heavily borrowed from the Persianmystic
and gnostic tradition, which teaches focus on the other-world and disin-
terest in this-world.
4) The Arab influence, which emphacizes magnanimity (al-murūʾa).
5) The Islamic influence, which centralizes the value of public good, and
which, according to al-Jabri, has been ignored in political thought and
ethical practice in Arab-Muslim politics (Al-Jābrī 2001).
Unlike some of the previously mentioned scholars who underscore the origin-
ality of Islamic thought in its theories on the sources of law, theological theories
of ethics and Sufism, like Mustafa Abd al-Raziq and Ibrahim Madkour whom
al-Jabri praises for their important scholarship, he critiques certain legal meth-
ods like the use of qiyās (analogy), which he blames for having distanced fiqh
from the fundamental sources of law, i.e. the Qurʾan and the Sunna, and having
gradually neglected maqāṣid al-sharīʿa (objectives of the Sharia). Most relev-
ant to our discussion here is that al-Jabri states that the Islamic influence that
calls for the public good and for social justice has been minor on Arab politics.
Moreover, al-Jabri is very critical of gnosticism and Sufism, and their cham-
pions Ibn Sīnā and al-Ghazālī, respectively. According to him, Sufism encour-
ages believers to withdraw from worldly affairs. Al-Jabri is also critical of the
theologians, because a lot of their approaches, especially those that relate to
sovereignty, free will and society, were politically driven, and not purely intel-
lectually motivated. This applies to the Umayyads and their use of determin-
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ism against free will theologies to legitimize their authority, and to scholars
like Abū al-Ḥasan al-ʿĀmirī and his friend Miskawayh who both tried to build
an interpretation of happiness that is both Islamic and Platonic-Aristotelian,
an eclecticism that al-Jabri condems. More importantly, al-Jabri contends that
Persian gnosticism as well as Persian literature on obedience to the king, con-
figured as God, were very present in the ethical writings of the two scholars
mentioned above. This endangered the scholarly study of ethics and impacted
its importation to the Arab-Islamic tradition, he says (al-Jābrī 2001, 393–420).
This differs drastically from the positive views two other modern Arab schol-
ars have of Miskawayh in particular, i.e. Costantin Zureiq (1909–2000) and
Mohammed Arkoun. The former annotated and edited Tahdhīb al-Akhlāq in
Arabic in 1966 and the latter translated it into French in 1969 (Arkoun [1969]
2010). Al-Jabri’s representation of the ethical system of Arab thought was not
well received by a number of scholars, especially that Islamic ethics of conduct
as well as Sufi teachings were not centralized in this schematic representation
of al-Jabri (al-Bishrī 2004). Taha Abderrahmane wrote a long methodological
text to reply to the overall Jabirist project of reading the tradition, and criti-
cized him for being reductionist and selective, and not comprehensive in his
approach (ʿAbd al-Raḥmān 1994).
1 Ethics in the Trusteeship Paradigm of Taha Abderrahmane
Having broadly sketched out the place of ethics inmodern Arab-Islamic schol-
arship, we can say that it has gradually moved to the central stage of scholarly
debates, after the political debates of how to govern and what political system
to implement were the first major scholarly concern. Even if the question is
about political reforms—whether to adopt a secular, civil, religious, or secular-
religious system—ethics come into play, since it is indicative of both fidelity to
the tradition, and fidelity to the aspirations of people for a better future. It is
in this context that a major philosopher emerges on the scene: the Moroccan
Taha Abderrahmane, whom this volume aims to shed light on, since he is still
under-researched especially in the English-speaking scholarly community.6
Taha Abderrahmane became aware of the need of philosophy in the Arab
world after the Six-Day War of 1967. After studying logic and the philosophy
of language profoundly, he moved on to engage with especially modern “West-
ern” philosophy, and to theorize commonly debated and discussed concepts
6 His detailed biographical and intellectual sketch is left to the first Chapter of Part One of this
volume.
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from a paradigm of thought he has been developing since the late 1970s and
early 1980s. This paradigm recently has become known as the “trusteeship
paradigm,” and “trusteeship critique” (Hashas 2015, 2019). At the heart of this
paradigm lies the question of ethics. As a pious scholar who belongs to a Sufi
order for his spiritual enrichment, Abderrahmane argues that the core of the
Islamic message is ethics, and it is around ethics that he builds his project, the
trusteeship paradigm. Based on this coremessage, we outline four of his major
arguments that we consider to be original and profound, leaving aside the lim-
itations of his project for now.
First, Abderrahmane has set his aims high. He aspires to reground Arab-
Islamic philosophy on the distinctive feature of ethics. At this level, he directs
double layered critique at most classical philosophers that he considers to be
imitators of Greek philosophy. For him Ibn Rushd is but an imitator of Aris-
totle, since the latter did not try to go beyond the Greek Aristotelean tradition.
Abderrahmane is closer to al-Ghazālī, not only because of their Sufi fusion
of reason and religion, but also because the latter profoundly engaged with
Greek philosophy albeit indirectly, since he lacked command of Greek. Abder-
rahmane argues that most classical Muslim philosophers granted reason the
same place Greek philosophy did and tried to reconcile reason with revela-
tion, whereas they hardly tried to build a paradigmbased on their new religion,
Islam and its worldview. He argues, however, that it is in uṣūl al-fiqh (Islamic
legal theory) and philosophical Sufism that one finds the importance of eth-
ics underscored, which finds its origin in the Qurʾan and the Prophetic Sunna.
Abderrahmane directs a similar critique at almost all contemporary Arab and
Muslim thinkers and philosophers, with the exception of a few figures like
Muhammad Iqbal (1877–1938) and Fazlur Rahman (1919–1988) to whom he
shows more scholarly respect. The others have fallen into the modern trap of
dichotomous thought of reason versus revelation, reason versus religion, reli-
gion versus politics, which is a European import, according to him. From here
he launches his major (third) critique to “Western modernity,” which he con-
siders domineering, hegemonic and utilitarian to the core. It has stolen from
man his liberty to be free, and this has been instilled through the idea of pure
reason as the ultimate reason. For Abderrahamane, reason is only a means
to other more ethical ends in life, and the human rational faculty consumes
itself if it does not have a transcendental element in it for guidance. Hence
the importance of revelation in his paradigm and Islamic revelation in par-
ticular, since it is comprehensive and embraces the other revealed traditions.
Abderrahmane challenges the foundations of philosophical thought in various
volumes, and concludes his project with the ideas we phrase as such: human
beings are ethical beings. They either can be ethical or not. Humanity is defined
16 hashas and al-khatib
by this ethical identity, and not by its rational faculty. Themore ethical human-
ity is the more human it is, and the less ethical it is the less human it is. This is
how he sees the way to fix the predicament of Western modernity. He rejects
its current Western achievements and proposes going back to its “essence” or
“spirit” to correct it. Ethics must be its essence, not reason. He states that the
sublime Sufi worlds of aesthetics and elevation have opened his heart to the
other possible worlds he envisages. He engages with modern and contempor-
ary philosophers in his various works as no other modern Arab scholar has
done. Put differently, originality in Arab philosophy based on Islamic ethics
can be found through these other ways of seeing and doing. If reason remains
the means and the end, then only mimetic ideas would emerge, since this is
already realized in the modernity of the “West.” Multiple modernities are pos-
sible. A philosophy that does not differ is not philosphy, he argues. With this
argument, he is not Ghazalian. He wishes that the Arabs, andMuslims at large,
start developing their own rational philosophy, which will be able to engage
with the world and contribute to it.
Second, Abderrahmane is well versed in both classical Islamic scholarship
and its various disciplines, particularly philosophy, theology, Sufism, Islamic
legal theory (uṣūl al-fiqh), and in modern Western philosophy. His scholarly
command of major languages of philosophy (Greek, Arabic, German, French,
and English) has allowed him direct access to the sources, though his biblio-
graphies are often in Arabic, French, and English only. His mastery and use of
the Arabic language appears to be unique and genuine to the extent that his
works are full of newly coined terms and concepts—causing confusion and
sometimes also repetition of the same meaning in different ways. He always
cites Qurʾanic verses as epigraphs of his books, and also in the footnotes, but
never in the body of the text, as if to convey that his philosophy is Qurʾanic in
spirit and background, without making it a form of intellectual proselytism as
some intellectual preachers and activists do. Of the modern Arab scholars of
Euro-American philosophy he is the most critical, since he does not stop at it,
but engages with it critically by trying to find “ethical” or “biased” loopholes in
every philosophical project he studies. He has grappled with major philosoph-
ers of modernity. He has given hardly any space to modern Arab intellectuals
and philosophers, apart from notes in footnotes, and apart from his major cri-
tique of two big Arab intellectual figures—i.e. al-Jabri and Abdellah Laroui (b.
1933)—whomhe hardlymentions by name though scholars familiar with their
projects knowhe is referring to them. Overall, whether one agrees with his pro-
ject and argumentation, fully or partly, one cannot deny the profundity and ori-
ginality of his writing. It would be wrong to call him the “neo-Ghazālī” because
of his particularly strong defence of the practice and tradition of philosophy.
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Most importantly, one has to bear in mind that he wishes to build a genuine
Arabphilosophical traditionbasedon its élanof ethics and its language,Arabic,
which he has revived and empowered philosophically, as no other Arab philo-
sopher and intellectual scholar has done inmodern times. Abderrahmane aims
to build an Islamic philosophy of religion, which requires a revival of the spirit
of religion, as well as a renewal of its understanding in the modern context,
whereas al-Ghazālī aimed at reviving religion per se. In other words, Abder-
rahmane is Ghazalian, but in his own way. He is more a philosopher than a
theologian, though drawing a sharp line between the two may be too much of
a venture.
Third, Abderrahmane is not a Sufi dervish who contents himself with pop-
ular rituals and supplications. He wants to go beyond that to find new fertile
grounds for philosophy, based on spiritual enrichment and expansion. Besides
the transcendental aspect in being a Sufi philosopher, Abderrahmane emphas-
ises the question of practice (ʿamal), and praxis at large. For him theoretical
ethics are null and void. It is what human beings do with their ethical dis-
course that matters, and not what they say about it. It is only in this way that
change can occur. His Sufism is then traditional, but also heavily modern and
philosophical. It is not a void spirituality based onbelief without action. Abder-
rahmane is a Sufi philosopher; he philosophizes through Sufism, through his
religious background, and he is free to do that. To say that he is too religious,
thus his philosophy is not philosophybut theology in the classical Islamic sense
of kalām, does not encompass his overall project and its scope and ambitions.
This is not to say that the label theologian-mutakallim is irrelevant. He is a theo-
logian as well, for example when he discusses the utility of the attributes of
God to the enrichment of his trusteeship paradigm and the ethics of the indi-
vidual, or when he proposes an innovative reading of the Qurʾan. Still, he does
that through an engagement with “modern” secular philosophy, its concepts
and themes. The boundaries between the two remain a field of academic dis-
cussion when it comes to Arab philosophy, philosophy in Islamic contexts, or
“Islamic philosophy” as it is also called.
Fourth, having said this, it is now opportune to stress another major point of
possible contention in Abderrahmane’s trusteeship paradigm and the Islamic
theory of ethics at its base. Abderrahmane aims to renew Arab philosophy and
Islamic thinking, and in doing so to reformArab-Islamic societies in crisis.With
this aim, he clashes with “mimetic” intellectual projects, as noted above, but
also with political Islam and Islamist movements, which he criticizes harshly
in both Sunni and Shiʿa contexts. It is then difficult to say that he is “Islamist”
in thinking, but certainly he is “Islamic,” in the sense that he strongly clings to
the sacred text and its spiritual teachings, and their legal interpretations in past
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contexts. His critique of political Islam’s search for political power is abundant.
It is also difficult to say that he is “secular” or “liberal” as commonly understood,
since he is critical of both. Still, he is modern and modernist. Intellectually, he
navigates between the traditional and themodern, without acceptingmodern-
ity at face value, unless reformed. The spiritual ethos he puts on the table as a
condition for any reform is hard tomeet by themasses and themajority of intel-
lectuals as well as political stakeholders, whichmakes his project appear either
“utopic” or “individual-centered” and not “society-centered.” However, it is rais-
ing the level of intellectual and spiritual energies of both the individual and
society that he aims at to create a better world for Muslims and non-Muslims
alike. In his project change starts in the heart andmind, in theory but especially
in practice. That is his call for reforming modernity. Without this change from
within he does not see other ways of overcoming the current predicament of
modernity, and of Arab-Islamic societies in particular.
2 Book Content
This volume is divided into two parts, one on theoretical ethics and the other
on applied ethics, though in some chapters theory and practice intertwine. The
first part is composed of seven chapters that trace the intellectual development
of the trusteeshipparadigm, andhow it relates to issues in legal theory,Qurʾanic
hermeneutics, political authority, and Sufism. This part is largely comparat-
ive. It compares the ethical approaches and theories of prominent scholars,
theologians and philosophers, with the theory and philosopher under exam-
ination. The second part comprises six chapters and applies this paradigm to
issues in the social sciences (sociology and anthropology), medical science,
communication theories, global ethics and dialogue. This part too compares
the trusteeship assertions on the topic in focus with other prominent theories
in the field. Next to the chapters in English seven chapters are written in the
Arabic language. These have not been translated to ensure direct access. The
book is organized thematically, and not linguistically, that is why the two parts
contain chapters in the two languages.
In the first chapter of the first part, “The Trusteeship Paradigm: The Forma-
tion andReception of a Philosophy,”MohammedHashas synthesises themajor
intellectual stages that trusteeship has gone through from the late 1970s until
now.The chapter contextualizes trusteeship as a project different from theones
that developed post-1967. It outlines five major themes that Taha Abderrah-
mane delved into before giving a clearer shape to his modern theory of ethics
as the core of the overall project of the trusteeship paradigm, which are:
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1) Logic
2) Philosophy of language
3) Assessing the tradition
4) Spiritual modernity and moral philosophy
5) Political theology and political philosophy.
After giving an account of the way the project was received mostly in the
English and Arabic scholarly community—it met with staunch criticism from
some and received admiration from others—the chapter ends with three
points related to language and renewal, Sufism and ethics, as away of reflecting
on the scope and limitations of the paradigm examined.
In the second chapter, “Taha Abderrahmane andAbū Isḥāq al-Shāṭibī: Com-
parative Reflections on Legal Thought and Ethics,” Eva Kepplinger conducts
a comparative study between the medievalist religious scholar Abū Isḥāq al-
Shāṭibī (d. 790/1388) and his theory ofmaqāṣid al-sharīʿa, and Abderrahmane’s
iʾtimāniyya paradigm. Kepplinger’s chapter relates to the current discussions
among Muslim scholars over the higher objectives of Sharia, and how to inter-
pret them inmodern contexts.What comes first, whether law or ethics, or how
they are linked, and what the role and function of human reason is accord-
ing to the divine, and how Abderrahmane in particular differentiates between
law ( fiqh) and ethics is what this chapter discusses. In so doing, the author,
for example, shows how Abderrahmane is critical of the classical order of
values that Muslim jurists followed (i.e. preserving religion, life, reason, pro-
geny and property). He is also critical of the classical division of the maqāṣid
in ḍarūriyyāt (obligatory/necessary), ḥājjiyyāt (vital) and taḥsīniyyāt (addi-
tional/aesthetic). Ethics was put in the category of taḥsīniyyāt, while he con-
siders ethics to be the core of any legal thought that goes beyond everything.
He adopts a new division: “spiritual values” (qiyam rūḥiyya), and “life-values”
(qiyam ḥayawiyya). This allows him to navigate between the various subdivi-
sions he develops, as a form of making fiqh (law) follow ethics, and not vice
versa.
In the third chapter “Suʾāl al-Akhlāq bayna al-Dīn wa-l-ʿAql al-Mujarrad: ʿAlī
ʿIzzat Bīgūvītsh wa-Ṭāha ʿAbd al-Raḥmān Namūdhajan” (Alija Izetbegović and
Taha Abderrahmane: The Question of Ethics, and Critique of Western Mod-
ernity) Mostafa Amakdouf brings two already close philosophers closer. It is
known that Abderrahmane shows special respect to both Muhammad Iqbal
andAlija Izetbegović (1925–2003). As it claims in the introduction, this compar-
ative chapter is a contribution to linking Islamic philosophical projects that are
modern but also critical of Western modernity as well as of mimetic modern-
ity inMuslimmajority societies, to form a creative Islamic reply to themodern.
Amakdouf outlines these similarities in six points: (1) meaning, (2) ethicality
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(or the essense of ethics) between religion and abstract reason, (3) the forma-
tion of ethics and the limitations of abstract reason, (4) ethics between fiṭra, or
natural disposition, and religion, (5) modernist ethics and the incoherence of
abstract reason, (6) the need for divine ethics. The idea presented here, accord-
ing to the studied philosophers, is that human reason is a means to an ethical
life, and is not an end in itself, and that rational ethics consists of at least
three levels, themost infinite in creativity is supported ethics,which is divinely-
linked and divinely-inspired.
In the fourth chapter, “al-Iʿtirāf fī al-Majāl al-ʿĀmm:Naqd Iʾtimānī li-Mafhūm
Fūkū ‘al-Iʿtirāf wa-l-Sulṭa’ ” (Confession in the Public Sphere: Trusteeship Cri-
tique of Foucault’s “Confession and Power”) Issam Eido takes us to issues
related to the public sphere, power, psychology and political philosophy, using
concepts from Michel Foucault’s (1926–1984) repertoire and the trusteeship
paradigm. Eido brings Foucault andAbderrahmane together because both deal
with the human psyche, the will to power, authority, sovereignty, truth, eth-
ics, and discipline. This chapter problematizes Foucault’s concept of the will
of the self to knowledge, its desires, sexual desires, and its unveiling of the
real authorities, or biopolitics, that influence it, thus unveiling its own author-
ity, liberty, and its limitations. Such unveiling leads to recognition of power
dynamics, internal and external, which, in turn, leads to self-empowerment,
and to the formation of new authority, through surveillance, and not neces-
sarily through direct oppression. The major point Eido takes from introducing
Foucault here is the latter’s idea that power/authority originates from below,
from the selves themselves, and not necessarily from top-down institutions
and external authorities and that oppression, too, permeates and is invisible.
That is, the human self, singular or plural, is the source of power and a means
of oppression. Here starts the role of the trusteeship apparatuses and con-
cepts Eido borrows to counter Foucault. Abderrahmane does not seek power,
or sovereignty (tasayyud) as understood in the secular socio-political sphere,
he seeks profound ethical discipline, explained through different concepts and
levels of self-enrichment and empowerment. His aim is rather to persistently
tame the egoist self and cultivate a moralist one that liberates itself from both
internal and external desires. Eido brings in the different distinctions the trust-
eeship paradigm makes in law (e.g. fiqh amrī versus fiqh iʾtimārī), and the
different worlds it builds its assumptions on (ʿālam al-ghayb and ʿālam al-
shahāda). Put differently, when the other world is being recognized, the self-
disciplines itself to meet its ethical requirements, and its abusive sovereignty
is theoretically non-existent. Not because there are no complexities that nur-
ture the feeling of power and oppression but because there is a recognition
of these complexities, and a recognition that they could be overcome through
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spiritual discipline (tazkiya), and not through mere spirituality. Recognizing
another world is a space of liberty, and not of oppression, neither of the self
nor of the other or society, politically speaking.
In the fifth chapter “al-Mumārasa al-Siyāsiyya al-Diyāniyya: al-Naqd al-Taz-
kawī wa-l-Badīl al-Iʾtimānī” (Religious Political Practice: Spiritual Critique and
the Trusteeship Alternative) Adil Et-Tahiri synthetically engages with the polit-
ical philosophy and theology of Abderrahmane. He first summarizes the trust-
eeship critique of the various schools of Western political philosophy, from
early modern thinkers to the contemporary ones, that defend the idea that
secular democracy ultimately will replace the divine sovereign with the sover-
eign man. Even modern democratic regimes and wealthy societies can return
to totalitarianism, fascism and colonialism, as has happed in the first part of
the twentieth-century in Europe, for one major reason: the lack of profound
ethos that governs the sovereign man. The latter can be rational and modern
but can turn totalitarian, fascist and colonialist, since secularism as a world-
view is merely utilitarian, and does not consider the different other. The same
critique is levelled against modern political Islam and Salafism, since they use
a religious rhetoric without a genuine absorption of the Islamic ethos for per-
sonal spiritual growth (tazkiya) and for public giving and sharing. In brief,
modern politics, be it secular or religious, lags behind an ethical worldview
that the trusteeship concept of “disturbance politics” (siyāsat al-izʿāj) presents.
This concept is spiritual in essence, and starts from changing the individual
profoundly, before any outer or social change. Abderrahmane is not in favour
of revolutions, coup d’états, or rebellions as a means of changing unjust polit-
ical systems. He defends non-violence as a method of trusteeship. “Disturb-
ance politics” remains ethical, spiritual in the first place, individual-centered,
and non-violent when it calls for change. At the end of the chapter, however,
Et-Tahiri questions the feasibility of change through such a method when it
is rooted in Sufi individuality and is radically non-violent. How would social
justice come about if the dictator in a political regime, for example, is very
violent, tyrannical and suppressive of any call for change, be it violent or non-
violent?
In the sixth chapter, “Qurʾanic Values and Modernity in Contemporary
Islamic Ethics: Taha Abderrahmane and Fazlur Rahman in Conversation,”
Ramon Harvey compares Abderrahmane’s interpretation of Qurʾanic ethics,
and how he uses them to strongly critique both Western modern values as
well as the classical classification of major values, with themodern hermeneut-
ics of Fazlur Rahman, influenced by Emilio Betti (1890–1968) and Hans-Georg
Gadamer (1900–2002), who aims at building on modern values, and enrich
them with Qurʾanic ethics. Harvey argues that Abderrahmane’s ethical theory
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remains abstract, metaethical, while Rahman’s builds social ethics that are rel-
evant to practical needs in society. Both scholars agree on the fact that ethics
are themajormotor for renewal, but their ideas about how this should be done
is where they differ. Rahman emphasises themoral impetus for social develop-
ment, not only for Sufi and individual development. He is historicist in reading
the sacred text and its legal prescriptions through the “double movement the-
ory” while Abderrahmane is critical of historicist approaches since they desac-
ralize the sacred, and propose “spiritual modernity” as an outlet. Harvey also
refers to the scholars that adopt these two approaches and apply them to dif-
ferent fields and contexts, as a form of contributing to the debate on ethics in
Islamic scholarship in the present and future, for what he calls an “ethicalmod-
ernity.”
In the seventh chapter, “The Modern Mysticism of Taha Abderrahmane,”
Harald Viersen takes the reader to another theme of no less importance and
relevance, i.e. Sufism in modern secular times. Viersen problematizes spiritu-
ality and Sufism as strongly found in the thought and work of Abderrahmane,
and makes them talk to modern theories of spirituality, with a focus on two
major figures for comparison, Abdurrahman Badawi (1917–2002), and Adonis
(b. 1930), two prominent contemporary Arab thinkers. Badawi is an existen-
tialist philosoper who found in Islamic spirituality and Sufi tradition what
to enrich his existentialist stance with, while Adonis is a poet-thinker who
reads Sufism from a secular perspective. Unlike these two interpretations of
the role of Sufism in change in Arab-Islamic societies, Abderrahmane builds
his whole philosophy onwhat he calls “supported reason” (al-ʿaql al-muʾayyad)
that goes beyond “abstracted reason” (al-ʿaql al-mujarrad), which he associates
withWestern modernity, and “guided reason” (al-ʿaql al-musaddad), which he
associateswith a kindof semi-Islamic interpretation that is not innovative, crit-
ical, and faithful to the ethical core of the tradition. Viersen ends his paperwith
reflecting on the fact that the modern role Abderrahmane gives to Sufism in
the trusteeship paradigmwould influence the epistemological and ontological
apparatus on which it rests, a note that remains open for future research—and
which the other chapters in this volume deal with from various disciplinary
perspectives. On the ontological level, for instance, the chapter of Ourya on
bioethics and euthanasia relate to the ontological questions of the relevance of
being and existence of the individual/patient despite their “paralyzed” physical
status. As to the epistemological level, all the other chapters dealwith this level,
i.e. the nature of knowledge and justification as they relate to particular fields,
like politics, dialogue, socio-anthropology, or hermeneutics and the interpret-
ation of texts based on a particular cosmology, the ontology of the Qurʾan in
this case.
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Part two of the volume comparatively examines how trusteeship ethics could
be applied in different disciplines, in the exact as well as in the social sciences.
If in the introduction of this volume we gave examples of how modern Arab-
Islamic scholarship on ethics has remained mostly theoretical, this part shows
how the trusteeship paradigm has first theorized itself as an applicable the-
ory of ethics, and second how researchers find its conceptual apparatuses and
advances relevant to their various fields of expertise, as in sociology, anthropo-
logy, and medical sciences.
To start with the social sciences, in chapter eight, “The Anthropology of
Islam in Light of the Trusteeship Paradigm,” Amin El-Yousfi engages with the
contemporary debates in anthropology and the study of Muslims and Muslim
societies, basedona secular understandingof reason, self, body, andvirtue.Dis-
satisfiedwith the various trends in the field, including the renowned apparatus
and concepts developed byTalal Asad (b. 1932) and his student SabaMahmood
(1962–2018), El-Yousfi says that their concepts, i.e. “discursive tradition” and
“piety” respecively, remain a product of modern scholars that espouse the secu-
lar versus religious worldview, which the Islamic worldview, as philosophically
re-introduced in the trusteeshipparadigm, doesnot recognize.Throughmatch-
ing various concepts from the field of anthropology—or rather ethnography
at large—and moral philosophy—relying heavily on Alasdair MacIntyre (b.
1929)—with concepts from the trusteeship paradigm and its conception of
the relation between reason and action, typology of reasons, and typologies
of expressing ethical affiliation to tradition, El-Yousfi proposes that trustee-
ship is a more adequate intellectual bank fromwhich to borrow concepts, thus
methodology, in the study of Muslim ethics, agency, piety, and connection to
tradition.
Connected to this debate in anthropology is alsoMohamedAmineBrahimi’s
chapter nine “The Trusteeship Paradigm in the Social Sciences: Moral Agency
as an Islamic Ethical Turn.” Here, the author reviews the so-called “ethical turn”
as initiated by scholars like Elizabeth Anscombe (1919–2001), Philippa Foot
(1920–2010), BernardWilliams (1929–2003), and especially Alasdair MacIntyre
in moral philosophy, and Talal Asad and his disciples in anthropology. Unlike
El-Yousfi, in the earlier chapter, who proposes that the trusteeship paradigm
could be an alternative apparatus to the study of Muslims’ agency and eth-
ics, in replacement of secular versus religious Western dichotomous thought,
Brahimi proposes a dialogue of concepts, though he also thinks that the trust-
eeship is a more fitting and promising apparatus that provides answers to the
scholarly debates around the “ethical turn” and “virtue ethics” in the social sci-
ences. Put differently, Brahimidistinguishes between theEurocentric approach
that explains religiosity through private faith and the “ethical turn” that takes
into account rituals, bodily expressions, and the contexts or spaces in which
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this faith is expressed, and throughwhich amoral character is formed. Brahimi
uses Abderrahmane’s critique of modernity, and the principles of trusteeship
as more adequate explanations of Islamic subjectivity and agency, away from
the secular versus religious, rational versus revelational outlook.
Mohamed Ourya takes us to medical ethics in chapter ten “al-Iʾtimāniyya
Naẓariyya li-Ḥāl al-Muʿḍilāt al-Akhlāqiyya al-ʿIlmiyya: al-Bīʾa wa-l-Mawt al-
Raḥīm Namūdhajan” (Taha Abderrahmane’s Trusteeship’s Response to Eth-
ical Issues: The Environment and Euthanasia in Focus). The author examines
major points related to Abderrahmane’s critique of Western modernity, and
his ethical theory as it engages with environmental ethics, and biomedical
ethics, euthanasia in particular, with a focus on utilitarianist and principalist
theories. He also compares the European critical thought of over technologiz-
ation, examplified by the thought of Hans Jonas (1903–1993), Karl-Otto Apel
(1922–2017), and Jürgen Habermas (b. 1929). More space is given to Abder-
rahmane’s engagement with especially the environmentalist thought of Hans
Jonas and his theory of responsibility, which the former finds incomplete since
it does not use the metaphysical reward and punishment apparatus in sensib-
ilizing humanity of the risks facing nature and environment. Ourya uses some
concepts of the trusteeship paradigm in responding to what Abderrahmane
considers to be lacunae in Western secular ethical theories. These concepts,
developed into theoretical principles, are as follows: mercy (raḥma), trustee-
ship or guandianship (amāna), and requisition (īdāʿ). Overall, Ourya argues
that although Abderrahmane appears to be very dismissive of Western mod-
ernity, his Islamic theory of ethics as it relates to these two research fields
remains open to “Western” ethical theories, like Kantian ethics and to classical
Greek virtue ethics. While the argumentation and details may differ, there are
plenty of similarities and correlations.
In chapter eleven, “al-Taqwīm al-Akhlāqī lil-ʿIlmāniyya bayna Ṭāha ʿAbd
al-Raḥmān wa-Ṭalāl Asad: al-Usra al-Ḥadītha Namūdhajan” (Secularism Criti-
cised from an Ethics Perspective in theWork of Taha Abderrahmane and Talal
Asad: TheModern Family in Focus), AbdelmounimChoqairi, like El-Yousfi and
Brahimi in the previous chapters, applies a number of trusteeship conceptual
apparatuses to the case of the modern family and how it has evolved in the
modern, secular-liberal context. First, Choqairi presents the similarities and
differences in the approaches of Talal Asad and Taha Abderrahmane towards
the secular, before he chooses to centralize their shared use of the secular, i.e.
the secular as an epistemological worldview in opposition to, or at least in
competition with, the religious epistemical worldview. Afterwards, he makes
the anthropological critique of the secular and its effect on the family in the
work of Asad speak to the theoretical advances of Abderrahmane on the same
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theme, family. While Asad explains that the rationalization of ethics through
modern secular laws ended the positive mediation capacities of religion and
religious authorities in society for themaintenance of family coherence and its
rationale, Abderrahmaneproposes a return to the religious ethos to reclaim the
family per se, sincewithout ethics in the nucleus of society—i.e. family—there
could be no ethics at the social and societal level. Family is themirror of society
and its situation.With the globalization of themarket, and the privatization of
ethics, family too has been privatized and in such a process what used to be
a public matter—i.e. the family—is no longer so. The family has fallen prey to
the epistemology of the secular and to the secularization process, driven by the
global utilitarian market. The three principles of magnanimity, happiness and
obligation, that are supposed to govern family ethics, have given way to ration-
alized, privatized and market-oriented ethics defended by global markets and
international institutions for this purpose. Choqairi presents various principles
of the trusteeshipparadigmas a correctionmeans to the loss of family harmony
and ethics to the secularized market-oriented ethics, but wonders at the end if
these principles, rooted in spirituality, will be able to face this growing chal-
lenge successfully.
Hicham El Makki introduces us to the field of the mass media and commu-
nication and how the trusteeship paradigm engages with it in chapter twelve,
“al-Iʾtimāniyya fīMajāl al-Iʿlāmwa-l-Ittiṣāl: al-Imkānātwa-l-Ḥudūd” (TheTrust-
eeship Thought Applied to Media and Communication: Scope and Limita-
tions). Like Ourya in his chapter, El Makki first shows how Abderrahmane
grapples with the major literature in the field of the media, and introduces
trusteeship as a correcting ethical outlet for the current and future crises of
this unprecedented age of technology and communication. In doing so El
Makki then reminds us of Abderrahmane’s proposal of the “trusteeship con-
tract” instead of the common “social contract.” This proposal is based on three
major trusteeship guidelines: philosophic, juristic, and educational. The “trust-
eeship educator”, or “al-faqīh al-iʾtimānī,” plays a major role in guiding indi-
viduals and society for the achievement of ethical awareness in treading the
over-technologized andmediatizedmodern world. Finally, the author outlines
a number of limitations as well as potential energy of the trusteeship paradigm
in the field of the mass media. For example, he says that Abderrahmane, while
showing profound familiarity with major schools and texts on the media the-
ories, he still misses engaging with some, especially the ones widespread in the
Anglo-Saxon world and literature. El Makki also states that while the logical
argumentation of Abderrahmane may be too abstract and hard to penetrate
and engagewith, his trusteeship paradigm as applied to theworld of themedia
is innovative and can open up new spaces of creativity in the field.
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Assia Chekireb contributes the closing chapter, thirteen, “al-Ḥiwār bayna
al-Iʾtimāniyya wa-l-Akhlāq al-ʿĀlamiyya: Muqāraba TaḥlīliyyaMuqārana” (Dia-
logue between The Trusteeship Theory and Global Ethics: A Comparative
Approach) in comparative studies in the fields of religious dialogue, pluralism,
and global ethics. Chekireb brings Hans Küng (b. 1928) and Taha Abderrah-
mane to the same table for discussion. After presenting their similar major
views on dialogue and shared humanity among religious, philosophical and
moral worldviews, and their critique of the limitations of modern human
reason and the Enlightenment project, she goes on to trace out the differences
between the two philosophers. She spends some time recalling the interna-
tionally acclaimed work of Küng on “global ethics” thesis and manifesto, and
the major ideas he defends here, i.e. the defence of possible shared ethics,
based on the “golden rule” found in world religions, for the formation of world
peace, solidarity, tolerance and social justice. According toChekireb,Küngdoes
not see that religion or religions alone, let alone one religion, can solve major
human problems. On the other hand, in introducing the trusteeship paradigm
of Abderrahmane, she introduces critique of Küng’s thesis. Abderrahmane is
critical of Küng’s thesis of “global ethics” for onemajor reason: the latter divests
these ethics of their religious origins, and, subsequently, from their rooted-
ness in practice. Global ethics remain abstract unless tested in practice, and
they cannot be tested in practice since they require genuine ethos that is truly
practiced, hence the need for religion, especially divinely-revealed religion for
genuine global ethics, according to Abderrahmane. Put differently, the trustee-
ship paradigm proposes practical spiritual concepts for ethical renewal, or else
the global ethics thesis remains a rhetoric, a discourse void of substance, like
abstract ethics and abstract reason. In her conclusion Chekireb also wonders,
like Choqairi in the previous chapter, whether the trusteeship concepts could
be effective in such a challenging, globalized and gradually secularized world.
These interdisciplinary excavations into the scope and limitations of the
trusteeship paradigm leave us with three major notes, with which we con-
clude. First, the paradigm is a remarkable field of intellectual energy in the
Arab-Islamic domain, and we, the editors, are happy to have managed to bring
together anumberof scholars and researchers fromaround theworld todiscuss
it fromdifferent angles. Second, trusteeship critique engageswithArab-Islamic
classical andmodern scholarship, and does so toowith Graeco-Euro-American
scholarship. Certainly, it is ambitious and confident, maybe too confident, in
critiquing all of it. The merit of this volume has been to show such claim of
innovative critique and its limitations. Being the first volume that opens such
a door in comparative scholarship, we hope to see more of the kind to be pro-
duced, and we do not doubt that such a project will meet more critical eyes
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in the future. We finally note that such eyes should pay attention to at least
two major fields that this volume has not covered in approaching the trust-
eeship paradigm, i.e. logic, and the philosophy of language. These two fields
of research would give more insight into why and how Taha Abderrahmane,
a staunch defender of philosophy, reason as well as divinely inspired ethics, is
very critical of the current phase of modernity.
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The Trusteeship Paradigm
The Formation and Reception of a Philosophy
Mohammed Hashas
Introduction
The trusteeship paradigm critiques both modernity and the tradition, and in
doing so it navigates between what is commonly referred to as the “religious”
and the “secular.” As a critique, it proposes itself as an alternative to both. This
chapter traces the development of the paradigm by outlining its major themes
and intellectual stages as developed by Taha Abderrahmane since the 1970s.
First, it provides a biographical-intellectual sketch of Abderrahmane. Then it
synthetically outlines the following five stages: 1) logic, 2) philosophy of lan-
guage, 3) assessing the tradition, 4) spiritual modernity and moral philosophy,
5) political theology and political philosophy. Finally, it presents a review of the
scholarly reception of this project. The chapter concludes with three reflective
notes on language, Sufism, and ethics.
1 Taha Abderrahmane: A Biographical-Intellectual Sketch
Taha Abderrahmanewas born in 1944, in the coastal city of El-Jadida,Morocco.
His father was a “faqīh,” or religious teacher, in the pre-schooling system called
“masīd” or “kuttāb,” and he received his basic religious education through
him. He obtained his Baccalaureate in Sciences in Casablanca after which he
enrolled in the Philosophy Department at Mohammed V University in Rabat,
where he received his BA Degree, before pursuing his first French doctoral title
(troisième cycle) at the Sorbonne in 1972, and his PhD (Doctorat D’État) in 1985
on language, logic and philosophy (Abderrahmane 1979, 1985). He joined the
university in Rabat as a lecturer in the early 1970s and retired as a professor in
2005. He introduced the study of modern logic at theMohammed VUniversity,
and other Moroccan universities soon followed suit. Besides Arabic he has an
excellent command of French, and he has also learnt English, German, Latin
and ancient Greek for direct access to philosophical works. He started publish-
ing in Arabic in 1985.
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Abderrahmane loved poetry in his youth. He was one of the youngest and
earliest contributors to theMoroccanWriters Union founded in 1960. However,
the 1967 Six-Day War was a macabre shock to him, to the extent that it made
him trade his youthful interest in poetry for philosophy.To describe this shift he
composed a poetic verse, alluding to a classical line of Imruʾ al-Qays (d. c. 550):
“today poety, and tomorrow thought” (al-yawma shiʿr, wa-ghadan fikr) (ʿAbd
al-Raḥmān 2014, 17). He joined the university when two formidable scholar-
philosophers had just preceded him in publications and fame, i.e. Abdellah
Laroui (b. 1933) and Mohammed Abed al-Jabri (1935–2010). He developed his
philosophical project against the backdrop of the 1967 event and also partly
to contest the scholarly contributions of these two scholars. As a young pro-
fessor at the university with a religious tendency, his focus on the study of
logic, language and philosophy methodologies proved not very appealing in
a context dominated by Marxists and neo-Marxists, recounts Abbas Arhila,
one of his close students, “followers” and a university professor of philosophy
(Arḥīla 2013, 11–40, 111–132). IbrahimMachrouh, another student and professor
of philosophy, narrates that the religious ethos underscored by two promin-
entMoroccan scholars influencedAbderrahmane, i.e. Allal al-Fassi (1910–1974),
a renowned political and religious leader and scholar of al-Qarawiyyin Uni-
versity, andMohammedAziz Lahbabi (1922–1993), the firstMoroccanprofessor
of philosophy at the modern University of Mohammed V in Rabat. Moreover,
Ali Sami al-Nashar (1917–1980), the Egyptian philosopher who was influenced
by Mustafa Abd al-Raziq (1885–1947) and his argument for an “Islamic philo-
sophy” (see the introduction of this volume), was residing in Morocco and
taught philosophy in Rabat, where he died in 1980.1 Abderrahmane was his
student, and it has been reported that the professor was impressed by Abder-
rahmane’s work on language and philosophy before it was published, and pre-
dicted that it would have an impact on modern Arab thought (Mashrūḥ 2009,
27–29).
The religious ethos in Abderrahmane’s project stems from his personal
experience. In the first edition of his book Religious Practice and the Renewal
of Reason (1989),2 which drew the attention of more Arab intellectuals to
1 The fact that al-Nashar defended Islamic philosophical authenticity in uṣūl al-fiqh, logic
and theology might have influenced Abderrahmane who further digged into this strand of
thought and later on rendered the science of uṣūl al-fiqh part of the courses of modern logic
that he introduced at the university.
2 All the works of Taha Abderrahmane are written in Arabic, except his two university disser-
tations referred to earlier. Here reference is to the English translation of the titles for ease of
reference.
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him, he acknowledges the important role in his life of Sidi Hamza al-Qadiri
al-Boutchichi (1922–2017), the spiritual guide of the Boutchichiyya order in
Berkane, Morocco. He omitted this reference in later editions of the book,
maybe for the critique he received for being an intellectual-philosopher and
disciple in a Sufi order (ʿAbd al-Raḥmān [1989] 2006, 11). This acknowledge-
ment would only find its way back to the public in a longer concluding chapter
in the third volume of his trilogy Dīn al-Ḥayāʾ (2017)—of which the literal ren-
dering isTheReligion of Humility orTheReligion of Decency—,which can better
be translated as The Religion of Testimony and Sight (2017), since testimony
and sight impact one’s worldview and ethos, which is the core idea of the tri-
logy.
Abderrahmane has lectured as a visiting Professor at the Al al-Bayt Univ-
eristy in Jordan, in Sfax in Tunisia and Constantine in Algeria. He received
membership of theMoroccanRoyal Academy, besides other international bod-
ies, like the Arab Philosophical Association in Amman, the Society for Inter-
cultural Philosophy in Germany (Gesellschaft für Interkulturelle Philosophie),
Bayt al-Ḥikma in Bagdad, the International Society for the Study of Argument-
ation in the Netherlands, and the International Union of Muslim Scholars. He
was the editor of al-Munāẓara philosophical magazine (1989–1993). He has
presided over theWisdom Forum for Thinkers and Researchers in Rabat since
2002. Abderrahmane received theMoroccanWritersAward in 1988 and 1995 for
his two works, On the Foundations of Dialogue and Renovation of Islamic Theo-
logy (1987), and Renewing theMethod of Assessing the Tradition (1994), respect-
ively. He also received the Islamic Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organ-
ization (ISESCO) Award in 2006, for his bookTheQuestion of Ethics (2000), and
the King Mohammed VI Award in Islamic Thought in 2014 for his overall con-
tributions to Islamic scholarship (Mashrūḥ 2009, 27–32).
Abderrahmane became known to the Arab public through Aljazeera Chan-
nel shows broadcast from Doha. His first appearance was on 03 May 2004, in
al-Sharīʿawa-l-Ḥayāt (Sharia and Life) a famousTV show, at the time presented
by Mahir Abdallah to speak about modernity and religion. Then on 09 March
2005 he figured in the TV programme al-Kitāb Khayr Jalīs (The Book as Best
Company), presented byKhalid al-Harroub, to speak on theArab right to philo-
sophical difference. His most important appearance started on 19 May 2006
in the intellectual TV documentary Masārāt (Trajectories) consisting of six
episodes, presented by Malik Triki, to speak on various aspects of his project.
These encounters are chronicled and published in Dialogue as a Horizon for
Thought (2013). Al-Jazeera Documentary channel also broadacast a document-
ary on him on 15 July 2017, in which he appears speaking and during which
he visits the spiritual leader Sidi Hamza al-Qadiri al-Boutchichi in the city of
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Berkane (Morocco), where the headquarters of the sufi brotherhood are loc-
ated (Aljazeera Documentary 2017).
During the month of Ramadan in 2006 Abderrahmane lectured as part of
the International Lecture Series, known as al-Durūs al-Ḥasaniyya, in front of
king Mohammed VI who is the patron of these lectures in his capacity of “spir-
itual leader,” and “commander of the faithful” (amīr al-muʾminīn). He also lec-
tured in the Carthage Palace in post-Arab Spring Tunisia in 2013, in front of
Mouncef Marzouki who was the president of Tunisia at the time, and vari-
ous Arab politicians and intellectuals. During the last few years, three annual
conferences have been organized successively in his honour at the universities
in Agadir, Marrakesh and El-Jadida in 2014, 2015 and 2016, respectively. Stu-
dents and young scholars interested in hiswork have established variousmedia
outlets and websites to discuss and disseminate his ideas. Despite his health
problems, and preference for writing over public visibility, he appears annu-
ally to give a public lecture in the national library in Rabat organized by the
Maghareb Center for Civilizational Studies, a center consisting of senior and
junior scholars and researchers influenced by his ideas (Hashas 2014, 2019b).
On 21 October 2017, he gave a lecture at the Ibn KhaldunUniversity in Istanbul.
On 19 April 2017 a conference on “Taha Abderrahmane: Views and Horizons,”
was organized by reseachers at the International Institute for Muslim Unity
at the International Islamic University Malaysia (IIUM) in Malaysia. In Janu-
ary 2019, he appeared in the French Le NouveauMagazine Littéraire among the
most influential thirty-five thinkers in theworld. He appeared alongwith Azmi
Bishara, based in Doha, from the Arab world, besides figures like Amartya Sen,
Bruno Latour, Gayatri Spivak, Axel Hanneth, Judith Butler, Richard Dawkins,
Chantal Mouffe, Alain Badiou, and others (Le Nouveau Magazine Littéraire,
2019).
This being said, what is it that makes of Taha Abderrahmane a remarkable
philosopher? Abderrahmane aims not only to be a reformer but also an innov-
ator in the Arab-Islamic philosophical tradition. He is critical of most major
classicalMuslimphilosophers for onemajor reason: theymostly stopped at the
achievements of Greek philosophy, and their reading of it was not innovative
enough. He considers Ibn Rushd (Averroes, d. 595/1198) to be amere “imitator”
of Aristotle, and therefore the future of Arab thought should not be Averroest,
as al-Jabri and many other modern Arab scholars call for (ʿAbd al-Raḥmān
2003, 119). The philosopher-theologians that tried to break away from the the
dominance of Greek Aristotelian logic and that have earned his respect are al-
Ghazālī (d. 505/1111), Ibn Ḥazm (d. 456/1064) and Ibn Taymiyya (d. 728/1328),
not because they were anti-philosophy, but because they mastered it and tried
to propose other pathways based on Arab-Islamic scholarship, particularly
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based on their readings of uṣūl al-fiqh as an authentic intellectual discipline
in the tradition. He is also critical of the fuqahāʾ, the jurists, both in the past
andpresent. He argues that they have focalized legal prescriptions of the Sharia
at the expense of the moral and spiritual ethos behind them. Abderrahmane
speaks of the “Rabat School” of philosophy, which aims at developing a philo-
sophy that is productive, engaging, critical, innovative and ethicist in perspect-
ive (Hashas 2015, 71–74).
At the heart of his philosophical project lies the question of ethics. For him,
the core of the Islamic message is ethical and reason is not a means to achieve
and realize this élan. That is why philosophical and religious reasoning should
make ethics their axis of thought. Human beings are first and foremost ethical
beings, unlike the commonGreek view that they are rational or political beings.
He sees religion as the source of ethics. Revealed religion—and not human
reason or man-made religions—are the ultimate source of human ethics, and
he views Islam as the religion par excellence that champions this core value for
humanwell-being. Human beings are either ethical or not. He puts it as follows
inTheQuestionof Ethics: “there is noman [i.e. humanity]without ethics”, “there
is no ethics without religion”, “there is noman [i.e. humanity] without religion”
(ʿAbd al-Raḥmān 2000, 147–149). For him, and this summarizes his ethical the-
ory as well as his philosophy of religion, “religion and ethics are one; there is
no religion without ethics, and no ethics without religion” (ʿAbd al-Raḥmān
2000, 52). “Ethicality” (al-akhlāqiyya) is the essenceof man,withoutwhichhe is
not human. Ethicality is simply the search for the good per se (ʿAbd al-Raḥmān
2000, 14).
2 The Formation of the Trusteeship Paradigm
Abderrahmane’s project of the trusteeship paradigm can be introduced by
discussing five major intellectual interests and themes, which I list in chro-
nological order, though at times they intertwine, from the 1970s until present
(mid-2019): (1) logic, (2) philosophy of language, (3) assessing the tradition, (4)
spiritual modernity and moral philosophy, (5) political theology and political
philosophy.
First: logic. Abderrahmane immersed himself into the study and teaching of
modern logic, for which he became known at first. Besides his university dis-
sertations published in French in 1979 and 1985, he published Formal Logic and
Grammar (1983), On the Fundamentals of Dialogue and Renovation of Islamic
Theology (1987) and Language and Balance, or the Multiplication of Reason
(1998). In these works, he calls for introducing modern logic and mathemat-
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ics in the study of rhetoric, linguistics, and particularly in Islamic studies, in
the study of uṣūl al-fiqh and the interpretation of the sacred text. His major cri-
tique of Islamic political movements as well as traditional Islamic universities
and seminaries is that they have neglected the study of logic, especially mod-
ern logic; they kept teaching Aristotelian logic at best, and the dialogical logic
of Marxist leanings for socio-political reasons during the heydays of Marxism
in theArabworld. He praises the use of logic by classicalMuslim theologians in
theirmunāẓarāt tradition and reclaims it for amodern ethical communication
theory he calls “ḥiwāriyya,” which can be translated as “entangled or deliberat-
ive dialogue,” in On the Fundamentals of Dialogue.
Most importantly, it is the study of logic that enabled Abderrahmane to
realize the limitations of human reason, and to consider it as an act among
acts, and not as an independent entity or essence, which led him subsequently
to develop his three-level categorization of reason: “abstract reason” (al-ʿaql
al-mujarrad), “guided reason” (al-ʿaql al-musaddad), and “supported reason”
(al-ʿaql al-muʾayyad). Reason is an act like any other act, like the seeing that
the eye exerts, or the hearing that the ear enables. Briefly, abstract reason is an
act that one exercises to explain and justify the act, based on particular proof,
often concrete.3 As to guided reason, it is the rational capacity that takes into
account three conditions in the process of activation: it should abide by Sharia
law, bring benefit and prevent harm, be practical and practiced and not remain
amere thought or call for action. As for supported reason, it explores the capa-
city of knowing the internal identity and meaning of things, acts, or forms. It
explores the objectives of revealed law and intentions beyond abstract rational
and legal or functional explanations. It fuses the other two levels of reason-
ing to form a comprehensive understanding of being and existence. This level
of rational practice that is open to the infinite inspiration from the unknown
world(s) is akin to the world of scholarly—i.e. rational—practice of Sufism.
The Sufis do not only know, and constantly strive to know, but also do practice
what they know, with abundance, excellence, and humility (ʿAbd al-Raḥmān
1989, 17–18, 58–66, 121–156).
In The Question of Practice (2012) Abderrahmane revisits the issue of reason
and its relation to revelation andpractice, anddistinguishes eight relations that
have contributed to the modern emphasis on “abstract reason.” Briefly, these
relations exist in the formof dichotomies: reasonand (1) speech, (2) essence, (3)
3 In an inaugural address entitled “The Pluralism of Values” for the new academic year at the
university in Marrakech, Abderrahmane explains what he means by abstract reason by say-
ing that it disregards revelation and the transcendetal in the study of “things” of the concrete
world; it is descriptive reason (ʿAbd al-Raḥmān 2001, 37, n. 30).
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sense, (4) heart, (5) ethics, (6) sharʿ, (7) revelation, and (8) faith. Abderrahmane
thinks that human reason is not confined to these eight limitations or opposing
definitions. Human reasondoes not limit itself to language, though it is itsmost
expressive form. It is also not the essence of human beings, nor can the senses
alone capture its vast horizon that can be as inspiring as the senses themselves,
which do notworkwithin a limited space or time or in one direction. Opposing
the work of the heart to that of reason, or the brain, is the dichotomymost cri-
tiqued by Abderrahmane, and is also themost important critique in his overall
project. He takes the heart as the center of human rational practice. Rational
expansion happens when the heart is able to embrace a horizon that is infinite
and open to non-concrete inspiration. The heart harbors guidance to ethical
practice. As to ethics, Sharia laws, revelation, and faith, these do not oppose
nor antagonize rational choices if they are guided by the heart, by its indepth,
natural, i.e. fiṭrī, inclinations (ʿAbd al-Raḥmān 2012, 55–110).
Second: philosophy of language. Abderrahmane worked on the philosophy
of language, first of all for his Master’s thesis, published as Language and Philo-
sophy: AnEssay on the Linguistic Structures of Ontology (1979), butmost import-
antly in the following two volumes: The Essence of Philosophy, Vol. 1: Philosophy
and Translation (1996), and The Essence of Philosophy, Vol. 2: On Philosophical
Discourse (1999). In the latterwork he coins the termof “fiqh al-falsafa,” calls for
the study of uṣūl al-fiqh and the sciences it requires, to comprehend ( faqaha)
the philosophical genius in the Arab-Islamic tradition. If the Greek tradition
is kept as a model, no originality would be found in the Arab one. It is also in
these works that he makes a case for creativity in the practice of philosophical
translations, otherwisemimicry and “tasteless” translations result in sterile and
meaningless concepts in Arabic. To illustrate this, he gives examples from erro-
neous translations in classical aswell asmodernArabic translations of Greek or
Europeanconcepts. It is at this stage that he emphasizes the vital role of thenat-
ive language for any philosophical, and consequently cultural, renewal (ʿAbd
al-Raḥmān 1996; 1999). For example, in a lengthy section he argues that each
language structure and logic expresses its rationality differently. He proposes
the Arabic “unẓur tajid” (literally, “See(k), you find”) as the equivalent of the
Cartesian “I think, therefore I am.” This Arabic rendition of modern Cartesian
philosophy of the assertion of the Self (Subject) as a capable existential entity
received harsh critique from the Lebanese thinker Ali Harb. The latter states
that Abderrahmane with this cultural translation “decapitated” the subject-
ive assertion of the modern Cartesian Self, and replaced it with an obedient
Self that “finds” what has already been destined to it, or revealed to it through
orders “See(k)!” (Ḥarb 1996, in Bin ʿAddī 2012, 180–184; I will return to this point
below).
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Third: assessing the tradition. When al-Jabri appeared on the Arab intellec-
tual scene with his project of the “critique of Arab reason” and distinguished
between the rational Maghreb and the mystical Mashreq (Eyadat, Corrao and
Hashas 2018), Abderrahmane responded with a heavy critique of this “reduc-
tionist” and “divisionist” approach of reading the tradition. As a first reply,
he published Renewing the Method of Assessing the Tradition (1994), to be fol-
lowed afterwards by texts that belong to this stage—i.e. assessing the tradition
and critiquing contemporary Arab philosophical projects—The Arab Right to
Philosophical Difference (2002), and The Islamic Right to Intellectual Difference
(2005). It is in these texts already that the contours of his trusteeship critique
begin to show. Major Arab-Muslim theologians-philosophers are critiqued for
being imitative, uncreative, and uncritical of modernity. In The Arab Right
to Philosophical Difference, for instance, he problematizes the modern role of
philosophy and the philosopher. He says that philosophical questioning no
longer needs to seek the “truth”, or to nurture “critique” only, but it has to raise
the “responsible question”, which can certainly be put in plural too. What is
required of the modern philosopher is to remain responsible with his abstract
theoretical questions and productions. That is, s/he has to be accountable for
what he says and theorizes. Here, he underscores the ethical and practical
role of the philosopher. He states that practice is fundamental to the process
of philosophizing, a point with which he challenges the ethical agency and
engagement of the philosopher. Moreover, in the same work he also reverses
the question of universality of reason and philosophy at large and argues that
in modern globalized times, in which one form of philosophy dominates, uni-
versality has to pass through local (i.e. geographical) and cultural questions.
Philosophy has to be local first, and with its local needs and questions the
universal becomes apparent, while starting by claiming universality may be a
form of disregarding local traditions and championing hegemonic ones that
are supported by economic and military means. In the Arab context he says,
“we, the Arabs, want to be free in our philosophy” (ʿAbd al-Raḥmān 2002,
22).
InThe IslamicRight toDifference (2005) Abderrahmane critiques hegemonic
thought, with major reference to the American cultural and political domin-
ion. He presents an Islamic ethical critique of consumerism and the alternative
principles of plural co-existence. In his common way of detailed argumenta-
tion and counter-argumentation, he presents three major principles that cel-
ebrate diversity of thought: the principle of tolerance, the principle of recog-
nition, and the principle of rectification (mabdaʾ al-taṣwīb). He supports these
principles with an argumentative form of the meaning of ethical jihad and the
path to spiritual and ethical excellence (ʿAbd al-Raḥmān 2005).
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Fourth: spiritual modernity andmoral philosophy. It is already with Religious
Practice and the Renewal of Reason (1989) that Abderrahmane’s emphasis on
ethics, and not reason, as the core of his project starts to take shape in his
philosophy. After having produced theoretical texts on the role and tasks of
philosophy and translation and after having seen the development of various
theoretical reformist projects in the Arab-Islamic contexts, he appeared not to
be satisfied. He would synthesize this and launch it in a new line of thought:
ethics. He does this in a twofold manner: first, he deepens his critique of West-
ern modernity and he builds his trusteeship paradigm, or trusteeship critique
as he also calls it, in its aftermath as its replacement or correction.
I present a few notes for each stage of this work on ethics. It is in The Ques-
tion of Ethics (2000) at first that ethics become not only the essence of man,
and of Islam, but also the essence of any human change to a better future, or
what he calls a “civilization of ethos” (ʿAbd al-Raḥmān 2000, 146).
Abderrahmane’s core philosophy is that man is first and foremost an eth-
ical being, and the more he develops his “ethicity” or “ethicality” (akhlāqiyya),
the closer he gets to the level of humanity. Rationality is only a means to this
end. As noted earlier, for him religion is the source of ethics, there is no man
(i.e. humanity) without ethics, i.e. man without ethics is not man, though he
can still be considered to be man if his rationality (ʿaqlāniyya) alone is meas-
ured.The existenceof manparallels the existenceof ethics, andvice verse.They
are not chronologically distinct. Ethics is what renders human beings human.
It is their identity and essence. He differentiates between three levels of eth-
ics, like the categorization of reason above: abstract ethics, guided ethics, and
supported ethics. The first remain functional and utilitarian, at the surface of
what they renderhumanbeings.Guided ethics cling to (religious) laws,without
reaching their spirit, which supported ethics teach and aim at. The latter beget
benefit not only to the self but especially to the other, and to the inanimate
world as well. Supported ethics fuses spiritual teachings with practice, and
expand their benefit to the rest of the world, and this is the message of Islam.
This iswhatmakes Islamic ethics universal ethics, according toAbderrahmane.
Among his various concepts, sub-concepts, principles, and pillars, four prin-
ciples of “supported ethics”—the third and highest stage in Abderrahmane’s
categorization—can be briefly mentioned here. The first is the principle of
obligation (mabdaʾ al-ījāb): thismeans that ethics in this stage are not optional.
They are the core of human identity, without them evil or wrong occurs. The
second is the principle of reproduction (mabdaʾ al-takthīr): that is, ethics do
not have one shape, or one form, or one place. They change according to time,
space, and the consequences they engender. The third is the principle of organ-
ization (mabdaʾ al-tartīb): that is, ethics are infinite in their scope.Themore the
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individual is committed to them, the more ethical attitudes and satisfaction
they engender. This means that ethics do not all have the same value and can
be classified. The fourth is the principle of expansion (mabdaʾ al-ittisāʿ): that
is, the ethicist feels overwhelmed and completely encompassed by the ethical
message he carries. No space of thought or behavior is left uncovered. Ethics
are expansive, comprehensive.Without ethics the individual feels life is mean-
ingless (ʿAbd al-Raḥmān 2000, 81–84).
In the same vein, Abderrahmane develops his modern ethical theory fur-
ther in The Spirit of Modernity (2006), where he presents his possible “Islamic”
modernity, which he also calls “spiritual modernity” (ʿAbd al-Raḥmān 2006,
56–59, 67). Abderrahmane distinguishes between the spirit or essence of mod-
ernity, which in his view can be multiple in accordance with the diversity of
world traditions and how they approach it, and the fact of modernity, or le fait
accomplit of modernity, as itmanifests itself in the Euro-American version. The
vertical man—in contrast with the modern secular-atheist horizontal man—
invokes his creative efforts for a modern modernity from his fields of energy
that are spiritual in the first place. It is also in the samework that he proposes a
modernist and creative reading of the Qurʾan, one that is innovatively (1) “his-
toricist,” (2) “rationalist,” andethically (3) “individualist” (ʿAbdal-Raḥmān2006,
175–206). In this three-level interpretation of the Qurʾanic ethical cosmology,
Abderrahmanepresents adetailed critiqueofWesternmodernity, how it desac-
ralizes the sacred andhowmodernMuslimphilosophers and intellectuals have
followed such desacralizing paradigm of differentiating, which brought them
the opposition of reason and revelation, religion and politics, the individual
and society (Hashas 2013, 2015, 2019a, 2019b).
Second, Abderrahmane charts a new territory for Western modern schol-
arship with critique, as a way of solidifying his proposal of a new paradigm
of thought. He engages with some prominent European philosophers in The
Misery of Secularism (2014) where he especially discusses four approaches of
modern separation of ethics from religion: the naturalist, the critical, the social,
and the humanist, with major reference to Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1712–1778),
Immanuel Kant (1724–1804), Émile Durkheim (1858–1917), and Luc Ferry (b.
1951), respectively. Abderrahmane suspects that secularism—which he trans-
lates in Arabic as dahrāniyya, and which can also be translated back to English
as materialism—is about the separation of religion and politics, or vice versa,
which in his view is/was a European historical problem. He rather considers
secularism to be a philosophical project that separates ethics from religion,
knowing that he sees the latter as the source of ethics. He furthers his cri-
tique in Post-Secular Loss (2016) in which he argues that deserting religion is
the result of the secularism he critiqued earlier. In this book he presents and
the trusteeship paradigm 47
afterwards debunks some fivemajor approaches of man and humanity inmod-
ernity: the sadist man, the superman, the sovereign man, the Oedipus man,
and the neurotic-obsessionist man, with major reference to Marquis de Sade
(1740–1814), Friedrich Nietzsche (1840–1900), Georges Bataille (1897–1962), Sig-
mund Freud (1856–1939), and Jacques Lacan (1901–1981), respectively. Overall,
Abderrahmane argues in detail that the ethics these philosophies defend are
driven by human whims, relativism, and have no central source or authority
for (ethical) guidance, which is why, again, he finds in revealed religion(s) the
answer and the source of his ethical theory and paradigm he calls the “trust-
eeship paradigm,” and the “trusteeship critique.” In these books, and others,
Abderrahmane also engages with other contemporary moral philosophers of
international acclaim, whomay appear close to his views on the importance of
ethics, like Hans Jonas (1903–1993), Emmanuel Levinas (1906–1995), and Hans
Küng (b. 1928), but he critiques their approaches since he considers them “too
secular,” thus unable to truly transform human beings from within.
As noted earlier, the seeds of such a paradigm can already be found in differ-
ent chapters in The Question of Ethics, and The Spririt of Modernity. Two other
major books have bolstered his critical project: The Islamic Right to Intellectual
Difference (2005) referred to above, and The Spirit of Praxis (2012). In the first,
he underlines the fact that ethics equals (good) acts or practice, and that the-
oretical ethics that remain in the abstract are useless. Ethics are intended for
this world, to be lived and practiced, and not only preached or theorized. In the
second, he defends the “Islamic culture(s)” in general against the hegemony of
modern consumerism and self-gratification.
In 2017, Abderrahmane published the trilogy of The Religion of Testimony
and Sight (2017), or literally The Religion of Decency. Here he wraps up his eth-
ical theory in new concepts and foundations, which have appeared earlier in
various texts. He devotes the first volume to the sources of this paradigm of
trusteeship, the second to studying the case of the new media and techno-
logy in the light of this critical paradigm, and the third to the case of what the
veil (ḥijāb) connotes and denotes in modernWestern philosophies and what it
connotes and denotes in this Islamic ethical paradigm. Apart for some minor
digressions, only some relevant notes on the first volume will be made here.
Abderrahmane restates the Qurʾanic cosmology that is behind his project. He
refers to two worlds: ʿālam al-malakūt, and ʿālam al-mulk, or simply put, the
metaphysical world and the physical world. The second is the space where
humans are responsible vicegerants, and the first is the original world from
which humans obtain their values, and afterwhich they quest. Three sources or
concepts bind human beings to this metaphysical world: shahāda (testimony),
amāna (trust), and tazkiya (self-critique, or, more literally, self-purification).
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Testimony is the first pact humans have had with the divine, and it is based
on the Qurʾanic story (al-Aʿrāf, Q 7:172–174) wherein the human being (insān)
not only testified (shahida) but also saw (shāhada) the moment in which they
pledge allegiance to God that He is the Lord of all worlds. This act of visualized
testimony makes humans responsible on this physical world to this ancient
pact made in the metaphysical world, and preserved in human memory, thus
human’s constant search for the divine and connection with the transcendent.
Trust, as a second principle in this paradigm, is essential too for the main-
tenance of human contact with a higher source of values and ethics. It is based
on a Qurʾanic verse (al-Aḥzāb, Q 33:72–73) wherein man willingly accepted
the divine message of belief and being a vicegerent on earth. For Abderrah-
mane, thismakes human beings free to believe or not, and also free tomaintain
the responsibility over the cosmos, and earth in particular. In all cases, they
have to be accountable for their choices, since they are originally free, and
they have the capacity of reason to judge. Failing to be responsible means that
man either falls in treason (khiyāna) or possession (ḥiyāza) of that which is
not his/hers. For Abderrahmane, modern man has betrayed the original pact,
the “pact of trust”, and has thus fallen prey to the curse of excessive posses-
sions, i.e. excessive consumerismwithout ethics, at the expense of sharingwith
“others”—sharing, a great value of “excellence”, or iḥsān, and belief. The “pact
of trust” has a positive impact on the individual, society, and the world at large.
It seeks goodness per se, hence the earlier equasion of belief = ethics = practice.
As to self-critique, or self-purification, the third principle of this ethical
paradigm, it is a means either to boost the benefits of doing good, and being
good, or a means to correct wrongs. It is a principle that emanates from a
Qurʾanic verse (al-Baqara, Q 2:151–152). It stands between the world of “wit-
nessing” or “testimony,” and the world of “seeing,” i.e. between the metaphys-
ical and the physical. Self-purification is a discipline that incites humans to
restrain their desires, wishes, and appetites. It is a mode of self-critique, self-
elevation, and self-realization. This discipline cannot be ethical if it does not
take a higher example for good behavior. The divine names (al-asmāʾ al-ḥusnā)
are themajor source of such a discipline for Abderrahmane. It is through them
that human beings can be creative, innovative, and open to newness. Their
teachings are infinite. They liberate human beings from themselves and from
their peers.
Fifth: political theology and philosophy. Abderrahmane has also written on
politics, political theology and political philosophy. The first work that traces
this strand of writing in his overall project goes back to The Arab Right to Philo-
sophicalDifference (2002). The bookwas published after the second Palestinian
Intifada of 2000 and used this political event to speak of the dire need for an
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“Arab philosophy,” based on its socio-political status quo, needs, and aspira-
tions—as referred to above in “assessing the tradition” section. It was already
noted that to defend the plurality of philosophical practice and worldviews,
Abderrahmane argues that it has to start locally, however cosmopolitan or
universal it becomes. It is here that he speaks of the Greekization, European-
ization, Judaization, and Germanification of philosophy, and calls for Arab
philosophers to build their freedom based on their own domain, language,
and tradition. He speaks of a “philosophical awakening” (qawma falsafiyya).
Next, Abderrahmane speaks of a “political awakening” (qawma siyāsiyya) and
he introduces different levels of this awakening, based on ethical empower-
ment. He also introduces the concept of “awakend youth” to speak of different
humanity levels—i.e. insāniyya (humanity), rujūla (wo-manhood), andmurūʾa
(magnanimity)—based on ethical enrichment and the ability to give to the
other. It is this ethical element that can impart Arab philosophy a universalist
perspective again (Hashas 2019b). In the same book, he pays special attention
to the Palestinian cause and argues for resitance at all levels, philosophic and
political, including physical resistance against Israeli dehumanization of the
Palestinians and their rights to freedom and liberation. He speaks of different
levels of the “awakening” and the different reactions of Arab political regimes
to the Palestinian Intifada and its youth awakening. He does also engage with
these concepts and the Palestinian cause in another shorter book, entitled
Modernity and Resistance (2007).
In The Spirit of Religion (2012), a voluminous work, the political theology
and philosophy of Abderrahmane starts to take clearer theoretical grounds,
based on a critique of both modern secularism that takes the place of religion,
according to him, and the Islamic use of religion in politics exemplified by the
theorists of Sunni and Shia political Islams. He launches his critique of polit-
ical Islamic Salafists and their superficial understanding of Sharia law, their
inability to pay attention to the overall ethicalmessage of Islam, and their inab-
ility to fathomwhat secularismmeans, i.e. submission of the religious ethos to
utilitarian ethics that can endanger human collective flourishing. He argues
that the religionists (i.e. practitioners of political Islam) and the secularists do
in the end use the same means of reaching power, clinging to it, and subdu-
ing to it, one through fiqh law and the other through democratic means that
does not take the spiritual dimensions of human beings into account. Both
versions of practicing politics seek power (tasayyud). It is in this work that
he introduces the two dimensions of fiqh: one purely legal, thus rigid, ( fiqh
iʾtimārī), based on rituals and obligations, and the other ethicist ( fiqh iʾtim-
ānī), based on the general ethics of Islam, thus changeable according to human
needs, but in the end still within Sharia limits. These differences he develops
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especially in the first volume of his trilogy referred to earlier, The Religion of
Testimony and Sight (2017).
Hismost recent Posts of Resistance (2018) is an engaged critique of especially
SaudiWahhabism and Shiʿi Khumeinism, this time not only because they have
usurped what fiqhmeans in politics, but also because with their failures they
have given space to Western hegemony in the region, especially to the US and
Israel, have manipulated their defense of the Palestinian cause, and have, con-
sequently, weakend national Arab and Islamic societies at large. This work can
be considered to be the most direct and critical of state regimes among his
overall writings. With this work he challenges the stereotype that Sufis or Sufi
scholars are “silent” in the face of state institutions and regimes. Even though
he was criticized for “Salafising philosophy” [from Salafism], for the remark-
able emphasis on religion in his project, he published two works in defence
of dialogue, and in refutation of violence: Dialogue as a Horizon for Thought
(2013), and The Question of Violence (2017). Some of his ideas, originally short
lectures on education, youth, and renewal, are published in a booklet in simple
language for the wider public: From Sterile to Generous Humanity (2017). At the
heart of these texts, internal ethical jihad is given the credit for any desire for
change, be it socio-political or intellectual.
3 The Reception of Trusteeship Paradigm
Despite his many publications (25 books so far, in the beginning of 2019),
Abderrahmane is hardly known in the international scholarly community in
the field of Arab-Islamic studies. Notable edited volumes and anthologies ded-
icated to contemporary Arab and Islamic scholarship hardly refer to him and
his project in European languages (English, French, German, and Italian, to
name only these) (Hashas 2015). Reference to his project has emerged only
since the 2000s (Lahoud 2005; Hallaq 2013, 2019; Hashas 2013, 2014, 2015, 2019a,
2019b;Moosa 2014; Kigar 2015; Bevers 2016, 2018; Borik 2016;Mimouni 2016; Bel-
haj 2018; Tais 2018). As to the works that study his project in Arabic, they too
are not many, and are mostly synthetical so far, written by his students or aca-
demics influenced by his ideas (Mashrūḥ 2009; Bū Zabra 2011; Bin ʿAddī 2011;
Arḥīla 2012; Humām2013; Ḥarī 2014; al-Naqqarī 2014; ʿAbd al-Raḥmān andMar-
ḥūm (intr.) 2015; Maqūra 2015; al-Shabba 2016; Balʿaqrūz 2017; Amaqdūf 2018;
Ḥabbāsh 2018).
Despite his wider readership in the Arab world, only a fewwell-known Arab
philosophers and scholars have commented on his thought in some journal
articles or newspaper articles, instead of fully engaging with him in a scholarly
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exchange. For instance, al-Jabri did not reply to the harsh critique levelled at
him especially in Religious Practice and the Renewal of Reason (1989), and in
Renewing the Method of Assessing the Tradition (1994). The two philosophers
never participated in the same events or at the same table, with the exception
of one conference that dates 21–23 April, 1978, in the Faculty of Letters at their
university in Rabat. The conference was a celebration of the 800th anniversary
of IbnRushdandhis legacy. It is there thatAbderrahmane startedhis critiqueof
al-Jabri and his reading of Averroes and the tradition in general (Ḥarī 2014, 7).
Despite their intellectual disagreement, cooperation between the two philo-
sophers is not non-existent. At least there is one trace that is found: al-Jabri
contributed a chapter to al-Munāẓara magazine that Abderrahmane edited
between 1989 and 1993, precisely to issue n. 6, of 1 December 1993 (Al-Jābrī 1993,
9–24). Abdallah Laroui did not engage with him either, apart from his critical
notes in some of his memoirs in which he accuses Abderrahmane of introver-
sion, of refutation of any idea that is “Western” and “modern”, and of being
harsh in critiquing modern and classical Arab-Muslim philosophers. Laroui
believes that using the tradition and its classical methods for modern renewal
is not the path to follow. An epistemological break is needed, which, according
to him, Abderrahmane does not seek (al-ʿArwī 2005). Kamal Abdellatif, who
generally pursues the line of thought of Laroui, joins the critique, and thinks
that Abderrahmane’s spiritual ethos does not serve historicist studies nor Arab
changing societies (ʿAbd al-Laṭīf 2018). As to Abdelilah Belkeziz, a political the-
orist and Arabist à la al-Jabri, his disapproval of the project of Abderrahmane
made him not mention him at all in his thick volume on critical Arab thought
(Balqazīz 2014).
In theMashreq (Levant), some renowned contemporary Arab scholars have
engaged with Abderrahmane in various journal and newspaper articles. For
example, in reaction to Abderrahmane’s two volumes on philosophy, in which
he tries to theorize the practice of both philosophy and translation, the
Lebanese Ali Harb accuses him of misusing philosophy and logic to simply
refute whatever is not “originally” Arabo-Islamic. He also refuses the way
Abderrahmane translates the Cartesian cogito into Arabic, as seen ealier (Harb
1996; 1999). His compatriot Ridwan al-Sayyid, too, shows great respect for the
scholarship of the philosopher, and the profound ethical weight he has put
in his project. However, commenting on Abderrahmane’s The Spirit of Reli-
gion, published in 2012, a delicatemoment in the Arab Spring revolts, al-Sayyid
expressed his fear in a newspaper article against the staunch critique the
author levelled especially against the notion of the modern state, be it secular
or religious. In the article, al-Sayyid warned that focalizing individual ethics,
and refuting the notion of the state that Arab societies need for change can
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pave the way for violent extremists to emerge as an alternative for a sovereign
authority (al-Sayyid 2012). Al-Sayyid continued his critique of the philosopher
when he published Posts of Resistance (2018), since the book launches another
strong refutation of alliance with hegemonic powers (American and Israeli)
in the region, using religion in politics. Al-Sayyid took this as an introvert and
isolationist attitude towards the world from an important Arab philosopher,
an attitude the troubled Arab world does not need (al-Sayyid 2018). The Jord-
anian Fahmi Jadaan does not stand far from this critical reception of Abder-
rahmane. In an article on ethics and politics, he thinks that the religious ethics
of the studied philosopher does not respond to the complexity of societies
and their differing, or opposing, moral views (Jadʿān 2014, 13–23). The Maur-
itanian scholar Abdellah Seyyid Ould Bah, however, makes a different note in
his scholastic book about influential Arab scholars of the second half of the
20th century. Out of 33 figures, to whom he refers as “thinkers”, it is only Taha
Abderrahmane that he refers to as “philosopher” (Sayyid Wald Abāh 2010, 71–
79).
4 Reflective Closure
This chapter has synthetically chronicled the development of Taha Abderrah-
mane’s philosophical project of the trusteeship paradigm. Besides the intel-
lectual stages synthetically outlined above, three further points will be made
below as a form of closure: on language, “spiritual self-criticism,” and ethics.
First, TahaAbderrahmane’s philosophical language is unique. In every book,
he develops various new concepts and sub-concepts that are originally Arabic
or derive from an Arabic root, to the extent that a whole dictionary devoted
to his philosophy could be collected. He argues for each concept in a logical
manner. He often presents three arguments of a certain idea that he wishes to
critique, then he presents his own replies to them. Often each of them consists
of three other sub-arguments, and each sub-argument is often further sub-
divided. This makes his argumentation unprecedented among contemporary
Arab philosophers and scholars. He states that he does not wish to be a histor-
ian of ideas as most contemporary scholars are. His background in the study
as well as teaching of logic must have had this lasting influence on him. It is
true that it is an excessive dictionary that he has accumulated over the years,
that many of his concepts overlap and at times bear the same meaning put in
different words, but this is justifiable if we bear in mind that one of his pro-
jects is not only to propose a new and argumentatively sophisticated ethical
theory in Arab-Islamic philosophy but also to revive Arabic as a language of
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philosophy. For him, philosophizing and practicing philosophy freely, can only
happen within a rich linguistic tradition. With his over-argumentation in his
books he wishes to raise the level of philosophical practice in the Arab and
Islamic world at large, and to coin terms that belong to this linguistic tradition
and its worldview. With this feature of his work he stands as a genuine philo-
sopher of his time.
Second, and this relates to the private sphere and to the meaning of spiritu-
ality in modern times, applied ethics in the trusteeship paradigm are rooted in
the tradition, however rationally expounded. Ethics without consistent prac-
tice are null and void in Abderrahmane’s project. Being a philosopher of logic
and at the same time a devoutmanwho belongs to the Boutchichiyya Sufi path
has been received with critique from some Arab “secular” thinkers, as referred
to above. The personal life of Abderrahmane may be a manifestation of his
philosophy, but he also says this is his personal life and choice, and it does not
bind his “readers” or “disciples.” What could be deduced from this is that he
rejectsmodern spirituality that is individualist, bound by no tradition or limits.
For him, Sufism is a connexion to the ethical limits taught by the tradition. The
future homo moralis knows the self and its powers and desires, and knows on
what grounds it stands as well as its limits, before he can “save” the future. This
is a form of liberation theology in the trusteeship paradigm, but the challenge
facing it, especially in the Arab-Islamic context it focalizes, is that belonging
to the tradition now has diverse manifestations. While it could remain a chal-
lenge at the abstract level, for the realization of the “perfect being” or “perfect
modern wo/man,” on the ground, with which the trusteeship project remains
bound, it may be too challenging. Being Muslim and being Islamic has been
disrupted by the Euro-modern secularist paradigm for over the last two cen-
turies, and reclaiming it now with such a highly complicated Sufi philosophy
may not be embraced by the Islamic worldviews whose belonging to the tra-
dition takes different paths. Al-ʿamal al-tazkawī, or “spiritual self-criticism” as I
translate it, is too demanding to be adopted by everyone in society for renewal
forMuslims, and for reformingmodernity in non-Islamic societies, for a shared
better world. Spiritual paths have always been diverse in Islamic history. In
modern times they have also taken different political and apolitical attidudes.
However, it should be understood that Abderrahmane’s Sufi dose for internal
renewal, before any external change, challenges popular, and at times folkloric,
Sufism, as well as modern individualist spirituality that is self-centered, and
praxis-less. The trusteeship’s use of “spiritual self-criticism” is learned, philo-
sophic, as well as pietist. It navigates between the secular and religious, the
public and the private, to create a third worldview that is neither secular nor
religious as commonly understood.
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Third, the trusteeship paradigm seeks the formation of a modern Islamic
theory of ethics that keeps the core of the tradition alive, i.e. practical faith, in
the age of modernity inwhich faith and practice have generally been separated
due to the secular versus religious dichotomous thought. Trusteeship seeks the
restoration of faith to themodern issue of ethics and its varigated theories and
tendencies, mostly the secular or atheist ones. Here, Abderrahmanemoves the
debate on ethics and religion in general to a new focus, which is already tra-
ditional but based on the modern context and needs, i.e. that Sharia’s core
message is ethics, and not law, without justifying the disregard of law ( fiqh)
because modern times requires it, as a number of other modern Islamic pro-
jects of reform aim at. Abderrahmane rather turns Islamic legal theories, and
Sharia objectives in general, into fields of energy for genuine philosophical
thought about modernity challenges and the future of humanity at large. He
does this with confidence from an Islamic perspective, which critics of religion
in the public sphere of the modern liberal-secular state may find traditional,
archaic, and may then just ignore it without further ado. Spiritual modern-
ity as presented in the trusteeship paradigm is a staunch critique of what has
become common and dominantWestern modernity, and a staunch critique of
Arab-Islamic thought that does not think differently and creatively from this
“Western” modernity. The trusteeship paradigm tries to overcome the status
quo by reinvigorating what it means to be free, human, rational, ethicist in atti-
tude and ethical in practice. If there is a role for religion to play in the future, it
is to fix some modern arrogance through applied ethics.4
However, while this is a well grounded argument, it does not solve the pre-
dicaments of modernity, either in the Islamic majority contexts or in mod-
ern contexts with which the trusteeship paradigm struggles intellectually. The
interpretation of Islamic ethics differs. That is, freedom of thought and the
rational faculties human beings enjoy do allow for a variety of appropriations
of what it means to be ethical and ethicist, and what it means to be Islamically
so (see, for instance, Shahab Ahmed,What is Islam?, 2015). To put it differently,
if Abderrahmane critiquesmost classical Islamic philosophical scholarship for
being mimetic of Greek thought, and critiques most modern Islamic intellec-
tual scholarship for being mimetic of Euro-American (i.e. Western) thought,
why would he propose his interpretation of Islamic thought not only as the
most faithful to the core of religion, but also as the most capable of resolving
4 There is no need to mention that religion has its own forms of arrogance, and modernity has
played a major role in addressing some of them, like the abolition of slavery, and equality of
all before the law, despite one’s religious or moral beliefs, ethnicity and appearances.
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its modern crises? And why would hemake the whole classical “Islamic civiliz-
ation” and current question of “Arab renewal” in particular bound to religious
ethos, at a time when religiosity in modernity has transformed and has taken
new forms that are different, if not unfaithful, to the classical tradition, even in
the same domain he wishes to reform (i.e. the Arab world)?
Put otherwise, one would say that Abderrahmane is not pluralist, since a
religious ethos does not give space to other “secular” forms of being and doing.
While this argument could be understood, it is not tenable if the whole project
of Abderrahmane is taken into account. His trusteeship paradigm, as I under-
stand it, especially if read in the secular-liberal contexts of Europe for example,
is anchored in religious ethos, and in Islam, but there is space for the other in
it. Ethics, however Islamic they appear, are humanist, and universalist, as the
different concepts and levels of spiritual elevation he speaks of show. The dif-
ferent other is part and parcel of this ethical paradigm of trusteeship.
Abderrahmane moves from the particular to the universal, and in this way
he actually dismisses his own critique of “mimicry” since he cannot be uni-
versalist without founding his approach on the thought of his classical as well
as modern predecessors. Systematic thought starts somewhere, and his starts
locally before it moves to theorize for the future of humanity universally. This
engagementwithmodernity and theorization for a future “civilizationof ethos”
as he calls it is what colours his project with universality. He goes beyond the
local to the universal, unlike a lot of his contemporaries who do the opposite.
They start universally then go local, and in doing so they lose contact with the
local they wish to reform. Their universal discourse remains lost in abstraction,
deprived of praxis. It is easy to talk of ethics but hard to apply them, that iswhat
the trusteeship paradigm simply reminds us of. This proposed paradigm is a
fertile scholarly endeavour, linguistically and argumentatively rich, spiritually
profound. Itwill reverberate for generations to come, especially as change takes
place in Arab societies, because of gradual secularization, industrialization,
and technologization. Further critical study will unveil its scope and limita-
tions.
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Taha Abderrahmane and Abū Isḥāq al-Shāṭibī
Comparative Reflections on Legal Thought and Ethics
Eva Kepplinger
Introduction
The number of voices which call for reforms in different areas of modern
Islamic thought is massive. Reforms are deemed as necessary in order to create
an Islamic thinking and understanding that fits the needs of Muslims in today’s
world, and that is able to address the challenges of modernity from an Islamic
perspective. Scholars, such as Khaled Abou El Fadl (2006, 269), opine that in
order to be able to respond adequatly to the challenges of modernity, a new
ethical thinking is necessary, and this thinking should be the fundament for
other disciplines such as law. This chapter aims to study the ethical concept of
iʾtimāniyya (trusteeship) which was developped by the Moroccan philosopher
Taha Abderrahmane. The notion of the iʾtimāniyya refers to the term amāna
(trust, responsibility) which, according to many Muslim theologians, refers to
the idea that before life on earth began God offered to the entire creations to
accept the responsibility of living according to God’s will on earth. They all
declined to bear that burden except for the human species that accepted it
(ʿAbd al-Raḥmān 2012, 449).
In this chapter, Abderrahmane’s ethical ideas regarding human beings, their
relationship with God and their ethical responsibility will be compared with
the ideas of a scholar whose contribution is today regarded as indespensible
in the contemporary legal-ethical thinking, i.e. the maqāṣid-thinking of the
Andalusian scholar Abū Isḥāq al-Shāṭibī (d. 790/1388). The two scholars have
in common that in their thinking they deal both with ethics as well as with law.
Therefore, the ideas of the ethicist philosopher Abderrahmane, who also holds
certain opinions in the discipline of Islamic legal theory, will be comparedwith
the ideas of the jurist al-Shāṭibī, who focuses on legal theory but who also has
ethical considerations.
Therefore, the chapter first aims to compare the ethical aspects of the reli-
gious-philsophical concept of iʾtimāniyya with ethical aspects of themaqāṣid-
ideas of al-Shāṭibī, for the purpose of detecting commonalities and differences
in the thinking of the two reformers. It also aims to compare their legal and
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maqāṣid-thinking, and finally aims to present reflections for the current debate
on the role of ethics in law, andmore precisely in legal thinking, to avoid equat-
ing Sharia law with modern positive law. This outcome will be achieved after
having followed this structure: first the biographies of Abderrahmane and al-
Shāṭibī will be presented. After that a short outline of the theory of iʾtimānīya
and of the maqāṣid-thinking will be given. This will be followed by a discus-
sion of iʾtimāniyya-theory regarding humankind and their relationship with
God, which will be subsequently commented by al-Shāṭibī’s ethical considera-
tions. Finally, legal aspects in Abderrahmane’s thinking will be compared with
those of al-Shāṭibī and commonalities of the two scholars in the fields of legal
thought and themaqāṣidwill be outlined.
1 Taha Abderrahmane and Abū Isḥāq al-Shāṭibī: A Biographical
Sketch
1.1 Taha Abderrahmane
As an ethicist philosopher, Abderrahmane calls for a moral and spiritual
renewal in the Arab-Islamic world. This renewal should consequently be ex-
panded to the globalizedworld (Hashas 2015, 72). He is convinced of theworld-
wide need formore solidarity between religions, peoples, philosophies and cul-
tures. In order to realize his vision to formulate an ethical project of thinking,
he has beenworking on the elaboration of a theory he calls iʾtimāniyya (trustee-
ship paradigm), or al-naqd al-iʾtimānī (trusteeship critique), since 2000. Cent-
ral points in his thinking are his critique of Western secular modernity, the
spirit of religion, and its practice (Hashas 2015, 73).
For an adequate understanding of the iʾtimāniyya-theory, a particular fact
seems central: Abderrahmane’s affiliation with the Morrocan Sufi-order of the
Boutchichiya. This affiliation might be the reason for certain Sufi motives in
his personal convictions and writings, such as the motive of the heart, purific-
ation, sincerity of intention, and a binary division of existence into the world
of the seen and the unseen (Ben Driss 2002, 203). To express his conviction of
the latter Abderrahmane speaks of al-ʿālam al-marʾī (the world of the seen)
und al-ʿālam al-ghaybī (the world of the unseen). Also the purification of the
soul and the character is a recurring motive in his thought, which he seems to
regard as a prerequisite for any fundamental and positive change. For instance,
when he speaks of the heart he says that there are things in the universe that
can only be conceived with the baṣīra (spiritual farsightedness) and not with
the baṣar (eyesight). In order to train the baṣīra, human beings need spiritual
training and education (Ben Driss 2002, 47). This Sufi element is also found in
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Abderrahmane’swritings, aswhenhe speaks about an educator (murabbī)who
should accompany people in their spiritual and personal development.
1.2 Abū Isḥāq al-Shāṭibī
The Mālikī scholar Abū Isḥāq Ibrāhīm b. Mūsā b. Muḥammad al-Lakhmī al-
Shāṭibī al-Gharnāṭī was born in Granada, the capital of the dynasty of the
Nasrids, where he was taught by great scholars such as Ibn Lubb (d. 782/1380),
and Abū ʿAbdullāh al-Maqqarī (d. 759/1358). It is reported that he acted as
a preacher (khaṭīb) and as an Imam in a mosque and that he also taught at
the madrasa (university) in Granada. Already during his lifetime he was con-
sidered a famous scholar known for his profound knowledge in the disciplines
of Islamic jurisprudence and language.
Inmodern times, al-Shāṭibī’s reclaimed fameprimarily goes back to his book
al-Muwāfaqāt, considered an unprecedented work that attempted to concep-
tualize the intentions of the Sharia.
It is particularly his contribution in the field of maqāṣid which is adopted
intensively today. Today his approach is regarded as a reaction to certain legal
practices of jurists that do not look at the possible intentions behind divine
legal prescriptions. Hismaqāṣid-ideas are seen as exemplary and necessary in
order to respond to the challenges of modernity in a flexible way. Besides his
advances in legal thought, his interest in social developments and changes are
apparent in his works as well. For instance, in his book al-Iʿtiṣām he mentions
certain Sufi practices which he critisize for not having a theological basis and
explanation for their specific spiritual convictions and rituals.
2 Iʾtimāniyya and Maqāṣid-Thinking: An Overview
2.1 The Concept of Iʾtimāniyya
This paradigmatic concept represents a late development of Abderrahmane’s
thinking, and many of his early interests and engagements are found in this
concept. His criticism of Western hegemony, its influence on local intellectual
developments, Western materialism, secularism, his attempt to elaborate an
Islamic philosophical-ethical concept, his interest in language, are all themes
and topics that lie at the background of the iʾtimāniyya theory in some way or
another.
The idea of this concept is built on the Qurʾanic conviction that human
beings accepted the amāna (trust or responsibility) to be vicegerants on earth
from God, which He had offered to all creatures and were not able to hold it
or carry it out. By accepting it, humans also accepted the consequences of the
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decision: the responsibility to act according to God’s will on earth. The concept
is also grounded in the idea that this life and the world of the unseen (al-ʿālam
al-ghaybī) are connected and human beings are conntected to it through their
spiritual needs as well as acts. Abderrahmane concludes that due to the inter-
connectedness between this world and the world of the unseen no separation
is supposed to be drawn between worldly matters and spirituality (ʿAbd al-
Raḥmān 2012, 449).
With the iʾtimāniyya Abderrahmane intends to present a philosophical
counter project to the Western secular and materialistic worldview. He crit-
isizes the dichotomies that characterize Western thought, such as religion vs.
politics, divine vs. secular, physical vs. metaphysical. Abderrahmane aimes to
overcome this dichotomy (Hashas 2015, 67). According to him this categoriza-
tion and reductionist way of thinking lead to a moral dilemma and to several
forms of injustice. He understands his philosophy as comprehensive and it
includes four components: revelation, reason, ethics and doing (or practice). In
order to work on the elaboration of a contemporary Islamic philosophy, these
components are not supposed to be separated and their centripetal force is
essentially ethical (Hashas 2015, 67).
Against the globalisation of theWestern dichotomous thought, he regards it
as essential that each and every culture should be allowed to generate their own
philosophy (see ʿAbd al-Raḥmān 2005). The iʾtimāniyya should be the philo-
sophy produced by the Arabic-Islamic world. The aspiration of iʾtimāniyya is a
life philosophy that is suitable for every person and which can be practised by
everyone. On the global level, it is hoped that through the iʾtimāniyya a peace-
ful, respectful and just society can be established (Hashas 2015, 104).
2.2 TheMaqāṣid-Thinking of Abū Isḥāq al-Shāṭibī
The complex juridical and social circumstances at al-Shāṭibī’s time deman-
ded a new approach in order to find profound answers to questions of the
time. Al-Shāṭibī was of the opinion that it was necessary to reflect on new
approaches in the discipline of jurisprudence and to try to capture the aim(s)
of the divine orders. Once unveiled, the law should be formulated according
to these findings. Questions that were of importance for his reflections were
as follows: “What are God’s intentions when revealing the Sharia?”, and “Can
human beings know with certainty what the Sharia wants from them?” After
he had studied the Islamic sources he was convinced that God aims to realise
the interests of human beings and that the Sharia intends to protect the fol-
lowing values, which earlier scholars of Islam developed. Once the aims of the
Sharia are recognized, any further ijtihād must be according to this principle
and the law must be formulated according to them (Rifāʿī 2004, 238). If this is
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not done, the interpretation of revelation will be restricted to the text, and will
therefore be separated from the reality of human affairs (Rifāʿī 2004, 32).
Al-Shāṭibī presented his conceptualized ideas on the law in his multi-
volumedworkal-Muwāfaqāt. One volume is entitledKitābal-maqāṣid inwhich
he speaks of two main categories of maqāṣid: those of God and those of the
mukallaf, i.e. the religiously responsible (rational and adult) person (al-Shāṭibī
2006, 7 f.). He divided the first main category again into four subcategories, but
he did not categorize the secondmain category. He called the first subcategory
the intention of the divine legislator when revealing the Sharia (qaṣd al-shāriʿ fī
waḍʿ al-sharīʿa). The second intention of the devine legislator is that it may be
understood by people (qaṣd al-shāriʿ fī waḍʿ al-sharīʿa lil-ifhām). The third one
is the intention of the obligation towards the commandments of the Sharia
(qaṣd al-shāriʿ fī waḍʿ al-sharīʿa lil-taklīf bi-muqtaḍāhā). The fourth intention is
the subjugation of themukallaf under the rules of the Sharia (qaṣd al-shāriʿ fī
dukhūl al-mukallaf taḥt aḥkām al-sharīʿa).
In the second main category, al-Shāṭibī speaks about the intention of the
mukallaf regarding the taklīf (qaṣd al-mukallaf ). Al-Shāṭibī’s treatise on the
maqāṣid has become highly appreciated in modern times, and is considered
a theory by some scholars like Aḥmad al-Raysūnī (1428/2007), and a central
theme in the currentmaqāṣid and legal discourse.
3 The Ethical-Philosophical Concept of Iʾtimāniyya: A Dialogue
between Abderrahmane and al-Shāṭibī
3.1 Humankind in the Paradigm of Iʾtimāniyya
The concept of iʾtimāniyya assumes that human beings are a special creature
which differs fundamentally from the rest of creation. The reason for that is
that they consist of two existences: of a created, mortal body and of an immor-
tal soul. It is the mortal body that connects human beings with this life (or: the
life of the seen, al-ʿālam al-marʾī). In this world, body and soul get connected.
The other world, the world of the unseen, al-ʿālam al-ghaybī, human beings
have access to through the soul only (ʿAbd al-Raḥmān 2017, 34).1 Different from
Abderrahmane, al-Shāṭibī does not use terms such as al-ʿālam al-marʾī, but he
1 While Abderrahmane does not seem to be very clear what hemeans by ghayb and he himself
declares that unlike other scholars regarding this term he does not refer only to the here-
after but to everything that exceeds an immediate experience.Whereas al-Shāṭibī is very clear
whenhe speaks about ideas of this life and the hereafter. Hementions the existence of reward
and punishment in the hereafter and he speaks about Allah’s mercy due to which people can
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uses common notions such as this life (dunyā) and the hereafter (ākhira). He
believes that this life is fading and that the hereafter lasts forever. Unlike his
soul, the human body is mortal. People must be conscious of the fact that this
life does not last forever and that they therefore better spend their time wisely
and follow their religion to be happy in this life and in the hereafter (al-Shāṭibī
2006, 32).
Because the human being unites two realities: the mortal-sensible (i.e. the
body) and the immortal and non-sensible (i.e. the soul), Abderrahmane calls
human beings a being of existence with double dimensions (muzdawaj al-
wujūd). But even when human beings live their life in this fading world it is
possible for them to keep the connection with the unchanging world. This
is possible because, according to Abderrahmane, human beings were created
with a fiṭra. While this Islamic concept is usually translated as God-given nat-
ural nature of human beings, Abderrahmane interprets it as an expression of a
particular memory (dhākira sābiqa) of human beings. This particular memory
means that people, in a way or another, remember that they not only consist of
a body but also of a soul and that their true homeland is not this world. Since
Abderrahmane assumes that human beings aremore thanmatter but that they
also have the God-given fiṭra, he concludes that religion is a fundamental and
indivisible component of human life (ʿAbd al-Raḥmān 2012, 52).
On the one hand, Abderrahmane is convinced of the existence of this par-
ticular memory, but he says, on the other hand, that human beings are highly
oblivious beings who forget who they owe their existence and sustenance to.
Furthermore, the philosopher says that human beings often tend to forget the
particularity of their creation. This happens because of people’s lust, egoism,
and thirst for power and sovereignty (ʿAbd al-Raḥmān 2012, 14).
To protect people from their forgetfulnes, the iʾtimāniyya offers to human
beings a way of life that differs from the Western materialistic worldview. It
helps people to remember their extraordinary position in creation and reminds
them that, according to the Islamic worldview, progress and true productiv-
ity are not represented by the accumulation of goods and by the realisation of
worldly interests; this life should be first and foremost about striving for moral
improvement (ʿAbd al-Raḥmān 2012).
If people’sworldview is narrowbecause of the exclusivelymaterialistic dom-
inant view, the iʾtimāniyya is supposed to expand people’s view of themselves
and of the world in general. Because this life and the world of the unseen
enter paradise (al-Shāṭibī 2006, 54). He also explicitly says that this life was created so that
human beings take the opportunity to provide for their hereafter (al-Shāṭibī 2006, 62).
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are connected by the life philosophy of the iʾtimāniyya and because a connec-
tion beween worldly activities and spirituality and the relationship with God
is established through this ethics of amāna, Abderrahmane declares his inter-
pretation of Islam as an encompassing philosophy, which comprises all aspects
of human life (Abderrahmane 2008, 87).
Different fromAbderrahmane, al-Shāṭibī does notmention a particular eth-
ical concept. But the scholar does speak of the Islamic idea of the nafs (appetit-
ive soul) of people which needs to be controlled. If this is not done, they follow
their desires and lust, deviate from Allah’s path, and harm their life in the two
worlds (al-Shāṭibī 2006, 292). To avoid this, the dunyā (life) should be under-
stoodas ameans to gain salvation in thehereafter andnot as apurpose to satisfy
all fleeting needs (al-Shāṭibī 2006, 63). Although Abderrahmane and al-Shāṭibī
have different approaches to the issue, they do arrive at the same conclusion:
it is clear that the nafs needs to be controlled and religion, spirituality and sal-
vation are what human beings need to strive for in order to enjoy happiness in
this world and in the hereafter.
3.2 Human Beings and God: An Extraordinary Bond
As it is common in the Islamic-religious thinking, Abderrahmane, too, believes
in the existence of a creating God who holds the privilege of being worshiped
by human beings (ʿAbd al-Raḥmān 2012, 479). Human beings differ from the
rest of creation andwere given the freedom to choose the way to live. This free-
dom entails responsibility. With this initial freedom, the existence of devine
orders implies that human beings are capable to implement them (ʿAbd al-
Raḥmān 2012, 450). Al-Shāṭibī, too, follows this religious assumption, and the
existence of a creating, all-knowing God (al-Shāṭibī 2006, 168). The Andalusian
scholar asserts that God does not require from human beings more than they
are able to accomplish. This is a central point in al-Shāṭibī’s legal thinking and
he stresses it by mentioning that the Sharia considers the human nature and
does not require from human beings to, for example, refrain from food. Also if
the body is deformed or incomplete, human beings are not required to correct
or beautify what cannot be changed. However, as long as they prevent their
appetitive souls from doing what they are forbidden to do human beings are
allowed to enjoy and to make use of what has been allowed to them, within
certain limits (al-Shāṭibī 2006, 175).
If Abderrahmane argues that it is God’s right to be worshiped, al-Shāṭibī
says that human beings were created to worship God, and that people should
always return to God and should implement His prescriptions. This is the true
meaning of worship, al-taʿabbud li-Llāh (al-Shāṭibī 2006, 289f.). Worshipping
Allah is the direct opposite of an uncontrolled surrender to lust, and the two
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can never meet. Doing the one is correct, doing the other is wrong, and both
decisions/choices have consequences: either they receive reward or punish-
ment in the hereafter (al-Shāṭibī 2006, 290f.). A central aspect in al-Shāṭibī’s
concept of God is his conviction that God wants what is best for His creation.
Hehas revealed the Sharia toprotect humanbeings fromblindly following their
appetitive choices and to preserve their interets for this world and the next (al-
Shāṭibī 2006, 291 f.). Conntectedwith this thought is al-Shāṭibī’s conviction that
Allah has made this Sharia easy so that people love it. This love is connected
with the human conficence that they receive a reward for having accepted reli-
gion (al-Shāṭibī 2006, 233).
Although Abderrahmane and al-Shāṭibī express their views differently it is
obvious that in their opinionworshippingGod leads to thehappiness of human
beings in this world and in the hereafter. Abderrahmane says that iʾtimāniyya
intends to prevent people fromworshipping themselves. He says that this wor-
ship happens in one of two ways: either people think that they are sufficient
unto themselves (al-istighnāʾ bi-l-dhāt) or that they become tyrannical (ʿAbd
al-Raḥmān 2012, 482). Al-Shāṭibī raises a similar point, i.e. the consequences if
peope start to worship their appetitive choices: they set no limits to their lusts,
which causes evil and injustice (al-Shāṭibī 2006, 292). According to Abderrah-
mane, this can be avoided by adhering to religious ethics and, thus, violence
in wordly affairs can be avoided (ʿAbd al-Raḥmān 2017, 18). However, says al-
Shāṭibī, if Muslims cause injustice they have to expect punishment for their
evil deeds (al-Shāṭibī 2006, 282).
Differently from al-Shāṭibī, Abderrahmane speaks in his concept about the
origin of humanbeings before they existed on earth. In theworld of the unseen,
human beings gave Allah the promise to act on earth according to His will.
Unlike a civil contract, this promise has a spiritual basis and contends that
humankind is not primarily connected with this world but with the world of
the unseen. If people are conscious of the fact that they are not the real owners
of this world and that they only steward it, they develop a responsible beha-
viour with creation. If human beings, after they have taken the responsibility
in the world of the unseen, behave immorally, then it needs the iʾtimāniyya
paradigm so that they remember who they really are and what their respons-
ibility is.
In order to knowwhat actions and behavior concordwith God’s will, human
beings, and believers in the lead, presumably, have as a reference model the
attributes and names of Allah (asmāʾ Allāh al-ḥusnā), considered absolute
ideals and morals to follow in practice. Al-Shāṭibī mentions the names-
attributes of God, but he does not mention exactly whether and which les-
sons human beings should take from them. (al-Shāṭibī 2006, 141). However, his
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notion of morals gets clearer when he speaks of the noble character (makārim
al-akhlāq). He says that teachings on the noble character were the contents
of the first revelations and that these are the contents which can mostly be
found in the Meccan suras (al-Shāṭibī 2006, 122). He mentions some immoral
acts which are spoken of and critisized in the Qurʾan, like the prohibition of
polytheism and lying about affairs of the afterlife, drinking alcohol or gambling
(al-Shāṭibī 2006, 123). The Sharia was revealed so that human beings strive
through it to improve their character (al-Shāṭibī 2006, 124).
3.3 Spirituality, This Life and the Hereafter
According to Abderrahmane, human beings have a special relationship with
God: even if someone only thinks materialistically, his soul remains in a way
connected to the world of the unseen, even when he is not aware of it. He
calls this unconscious person “a dead person”; an enlivement of the person’s
heart can only happen if that person tries to improve his character and intern-
alize certain virtues. The most important value human beings can internalize
is decency (ḥayāʾ) (ʿAbd al-Raḥmān 2017, 20). According to Abderrahmane,
decency is the highest and best virtue. Once human beings have internalized
it, it is possible for them to embrace iʾtimāniyya (ʿAbd al-Raḥmān 2017, 25). A
person’s heart can only be “alive” after the soul is purified through certain deeds
or processes of purification (al-ʿamal al-tazkawī). After the soul is purified, this
should be followed by positive changes in a person’s behavior. Abderrahmane
compares that to the state of a person that is reanimated (after death). If a
person strives to change for good, Abderrahmane hopes that this can impact
society positively as well. The key for this to happen is the purification of the
soul by love for creation over hunger for power; by this purification the veil that
covers the soul can be lifted. Only then a person reaches love for Truth, and the
True (al-ḥaqq, i.e. God) (ʿAbd al-Raḥmān 2012, 503).
Al-Shāṭibī does not speak about the “death of the hearts” but he warns that
even if people are religious there is still the danger of being seduced by this
wordly life andpeople can still go astray (al-Shāṭibī 2006, 281); hementions that
the Qurʾan confirms that property and children can be very demanding and
maycausepeople to forget about their religiousduties and the afterlife.Thenhe
remarks that the Prophet Muḥammad allowed his companions to enjoy what
is allowed in the dunyā, up to a certain limit, and that he did not command
them to live an ascetic life (al-Shāṭibī 2006, 284). As indicated, he seems to
think that people should strive to find a balance between their involvement in
world affairs and religion’s expectations. One way so as not to sink into world
affairs is to perform good deeds. Thus a person’s heart expands and becomes
enlightened (al-Shāṭibī 2006, 150).
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Even if it seems that al-Shāṭibī and Abderrahmane address the same issue,
it has to be said that there is a difference in their perspectives. Abderrahmane
holds the opinion that in order for the heart to be alive it needs the iʾtimāniyya,
so that it does not become completely unconscious in this “dead” dominantly
Western materialistic way of life. Indeed, al-Shāṭibī says that there are seduc-
tions in this world and that it can happen that human beings are tempted and
abandon religious ethics. But he does not say that a certain concept is needed,
which has to be internalized so that people are saved. He does not say either
that for the salvation of a person someone else who acts as an educator is
needed. Abderrahmane, however, does say that a certain educator, who he calls
“al-faqīh al-iʾtimānī” [the trusted faqīh/educator], is needed for the improve-
ment of character. This person is called a murabbī [educator/teacher] (ʿAbd
al-Raḥmān 2017, 23). It is the duty of themurabbī to care for the spiritual devel-
opment of the individual; he is also supposed to help to solve problems on the
social level (ʿAbd al-Raḥmān 2017, 25).
One issuewhichboth scholars speak about is the centrality of the sincerity of
intention, and the question of when acts are accepted by God. Abderrahmane
argues that no reinvigoration of ethics happens if the intention is not sincere.
Humankind should therefore always take Allah as their witness for all their
deeds; decency (ḥayāʾ) stems from this fundamental point (ʿAbd al-Raḥmān
2008, 88). Al-Shāṭibī does not speak about the spiritual aspect of the sincerity
of intentions but about the conditions so that acts get accepted by God from
a legal perspective. He mentions that if the mukallaf does not know in detail
about the aims of the Sharia or about the ranking of the maqāṣid within the
law, it is sufficient for him to know some of the maqāṣid and act according to
them for Allah to accept them (al-Shāṭibī 2006, 160).
4 Ethical-Legal Reflections between Abderrahmane and al-Shāṭibī
A comparison of the legal reflections of Abderrahmane and al-Shāṭibī shows
that they both speak about Sharia law, fiqh, but in a different manner. While
Abderrahmane is the ethicist who also writes about legal thought (al-fiqh and
uṣūl al-fiqh), al-Shāṭibī is the faqīh who writes about legal concepts, but in
whose thought ethics also does play a great role. For instance, he discusses
whether God asks more from human beings than they are actually able to do;
he asks about the intentions of the Sharia. The aim of the Sharia according to
al-Shāṭibī is the protection of humankind from blindly following their whims
and lusts, so that they become true servants of God (al-Shāṭibī 2006, 264). His
idea of the Sharia is clear: it is balanced and does not require frompeoplemore
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than they are actually able to accomplish. If a person chooses religion, he will
be rewarded. If he chooses the opposite he will be punished (al-Shāṭibī 2006,
280). Abderrahmane also says that after human beings got to know God and
His names it is their duty to find out what God requires them to do (ʿAbd al-
Raḥmān 2017, 40).
Both scholars speak about the ḥudūd (the punishments for particular deeds
which are mentioned in the Qurʾan) but again in quite different ways: Abder-
rahmane critisizes the jurists for having used the Qurʾanic term “ḥudūd Allāh”
in an exclusively jurisic manner. He suggests that ḥudūd should be understood
as an ethical idea, which should be connected with asmāʾ Allāh al-ḥusnā and
their moral teachings and implications. Also al-Shāṭibī mentions the ḥudūd in
one passage of his Kitāb al-Maqāṣid and it is clear that he speaks about juristic
aspects (al-Shāṭibī 2006, 72). Itwould be interesting to knowwhether al-Shāṭibī
would be amongst those jurists who Abderrahmane critisizes for their exclus-
ively juristic approach, because the former, al-Shāṭibī, does not speak about
the ethical aspects of the ḥudūd but only mentions them from an exclusively
legal perspective without drawing any ethical conclusions. Despite their differ-
ences, there are similarities in their understanding of the ḥudūd: both scholars
understand them as revealed by God and they are not supposed to enslave
people. While al-Shāṭibī contends that the ḥudūd protect people from their
whims Abderrahmane stresses their ethical aspect and argues that the ḥudūd
help people to return to the idea of iʾtimāniyya (ʿAbd al-Raḥmān 2017, 135).
4.1 The Role of the Faqīh
Abderrahmane distinguishes between al-faqīh al-iʾtimārī and al-faqīh al-
iʾtimānī. He critisizes the first and accuses him of focusing only on the rules or
religious orders (sing. amr, pl. awāmir) since he does not look at the law from
an ethical perspective, whereas the second cares about morals in the divine
orders, and thenoble character they teach (ʿAbd al-Raḥmān 2017, 21). Al-Shāṭibī
does not use particular terms when he suggests or critisizes a particular beha-
vior or understanding of scholars. But from his elaborations on the maqāṣid,
one can understand that he strongly recommends jurists to build their legal
thinking on an ethical basis. Regarding the role of the faqīh, both scholars are
of the opinion that the jurist or scholar has a high religious and social respons-
ibility. In Abderrahmane’s opinion the faqīh should ideally be a faqīh iʾtimānī
who educates people and helps them to improve their character and to develop
their spirituality; the faqīh should feel responsible to help in solving problems
in society. Al-Shāṭibī is also of the opinion that the faqīh has a great respons-
ibility. In his book al-Iʿtiṣām he critisizes the jurists of his time. He writes that
some of them issue legal opinions that do not have a strong juridical basis, and
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are issued only to please changes in society (al-Shāṭibī 2005, 17 f.). However, in
al-Muwāfaqāt his idea of a responsible faqīh gets clearer when he speaks of a
group of scholars of whom he says that Allah has chosen them to reflect, study
and defend religionwith strong evidence. He calls this group “soldiers of Allah”
and “defenders of religion” (ḥumāt al-dīn) (al-Shāṭibī 2006, 94f.).
5 Abderrahmane’s Discussion of the Maqāṣid and His Reference to
al-Shāṭibī
Although Abderrahmane does not debate themaqāṣid as a part of the iʾtiman-
iyyahepays attention to this concept; andbecauseof his reference to al-Shāṭibī,
his opinions will be discussed here. In his book tajdīd al-manhāj fī taqwīm al-
turāth he discusses themaqāṣid and critises their traditional classification. His
debate of themaqāṣid is preceded by his statement that traditional Islamic sci-
ences were characterized by the interconnectedness of disciplines. Therefore,
when these disciplines are studied separately from each other no researcher
can get a full understanding of that particular discipline. He calls this inter-
connectedness tadākhul dākhilī. He states that the best andmost perfect proof
of his claim is found in the understanding of al-Shāṭibī (ʿAbd al-Raḥmān 1993,
92). Abderrahmane is of the opinion that al-Shāṭibī was as much concerned
with the tadākhul as he was concerned with the establishment of the universal
aims (kulliyyāt qaṭʿiyya) of the Sharia, and that this engagement is clear in al-
Muwāfaqāt (ʿAbd al-Raḥmān 1993, 95). In the book, Abderrahmane refers once
again to al-Shāṭibī when he speaks about the traditional categorisation of the
levels of themaqāṣid into necessities (ḍarūriyyāt), needs (ḥājiyyāt) and luxur-
ies (taḥsīniyyāt).
Abderrahmane raises two points of criticism. First, he regards it as wrong
that the maqāṣid represent merely one domain amongst many others within
uṣūl al-fiqh. Another point of criticism is that he does not agree with the levels
of maqāṣid and the way they were established by the uṣūlīs in the past. Abder-
rahmane expresses his astonishment especially about the traditional classific-
ations of ḍarūriyyāt, ḥājiyyāt and taḥsiniyyāt. Usually the ḍarūriyyāt concern
five values or aims: religion (dīn), life (nafs), reason (ʿaql), offspring (nasl) and
assets (māl). The philosopher critisizes that these aims are restricted to this
number. He says that there is no reason why this restriction should be con-
tinued. Also there is no reason why other aims should not be added to the
traditional ones. At this point of his argumentation the reader would expect to
find reference to currentmaqāṣid-debates which discuss vivedly the necessity
to add further values and to overthink the traditional classification, but Abder-
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rahmane does not do that. He does not consider developments and efforts
of modern scholars and intellectuals in this point, such as those led by the
renowned scholar Muḥammad al-Ṭāhir ibn ʿĀshūr (d. 1394/1973) in his fam-
ous publication Maqāṣid al-Sharīʿa. Abderrahmane states that all the three
levels, and therefore not only the ḍarūriyyāt, aim to protect the five traditional
values/aims. Therefore, there has to be something that stands above the three-
level-categorisation, which he calls the highest, universal aims (al-ghāyāt al-
kulliyā al-quṣwā) (ʿAbd al-Raḥmān 1993, 111).
As for the aims which are ascribed to the taḥsīniyyāt, many uṣūlīs (uṣūl
scholars) mention “good character” (makārim al-akhlāq). Regarding this norm,
Abderrahmane raises the following poins of criticism:
1. To ascribemakārimal-akhlāq to the taḥsīniyyāt implies that they are only
seen as complementing aims, which, therefore, are dispensable and the
mukallaf is free to act according to them or to dismiss them.
2. The expression “makārim al-akhlāq” is taken from the prophetic tradi-
tion “Verily, I was sent to perfect the good character” (innamā buʿithtu
li-utammimamakārim al-akhlāq). Abderrahmane argues that it is simply
implossible that the Prophet’s mission is restricted to something that is
complementary and only supports what is necessary (ḍarūrī) (ʿAbd al-
Raḥmān 1993, 112).
The philosopher says thatmakārim al-akhlāq encompass all benefits (maṣāliḥ)
within the Sharia. He states that al-Shāṭibī ascribedmakārim al-akhlāq only to
the taḥsīniyyāt because he followed a tradition which was already established
at his time, without necessarily sharing the opinion of former uṣūlīs on that
classification (ʿAbd al-Raḥmān 1993, 112). This point needs a pause: Abderrah-
mane claims to knowwhat al-Shāṭibī’s intentionwas on this point, which is not
tenable especially because al-Shāṭibī does not discuss this point and does not
mention critical comments on the issue.
Abderrahmane’s points of criticism on the traditional classification of the
maqāṣid lead him to think of a new classification that is primarily ethical.
1. The values of benefit and harm (qiyam al-nafʿ wa-l-ḍarar), which he also
calls al-maṣāliḥ al-ḥayawiyya. These can be identified by feelings such as
pleasure (ladhdha) when experiencing benefit, and pain when experien-
cing harm. Aimswhich are assigned to these values are benefits (maṣāliḥ)
which are related to life (nafs), health (ṣiḥḥa), offspring (nasl) and assets
(māl). Abderrahmane does not mention an example which would clarify
how his suggestion could be implemented and practised, for example, by
a jurist. This is also noticed by EbrahimMoosawho assumes that perhaps
Abderrahmanewould leaveother scholars to accomplish this task (Moosa
2014, 187).
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2. The values of good and evil or beauty and ugliness (qiyam al-ḥusn wa-l-
qubḥ) (Abderrahmane 1993, 113). Feelings bywhich these canbe identified
are: joy ( faraḥ) when experiencing something positive and sadness when
experiencing loss. Benefits that fall under these meanings are values like
safety, freedom and peace.
3. The values of righteousness (ṣalāḥ) and depravity ( fasād).2 Feelings
which identify these categories are: happiness (saʿāda) when experien-
cing a benefit and misery (shaqāʾ) when experiencing adversity. Feelings
which belong to these values are spiritual aspects of religion such as com-
passion (raḥma) and love.
According to Abderrahmane, the benefits of this categorization are as follows.
First, the increase of values (takāthur al-qiyam): a juridical judgement (ḥukm
sharʿī) is not grounded on one value or is not only justified by one benefit
(maṣlaḥa) any longer. Abderrahmane gives the example of the prohibition of
murder (al-qatl). Several values are protectedwith this prohibition: life, society
and the “divine breath” (nafḥa rabbāniyya).3 Second, the primacy of spiritual
values (qiyam rūḥiyya). He argues that until now jurists and scholars focus on
“life-values” (qiyamḥayawiyya) such as life, offspring,whereas spiritual benefits
(maṣāliḥ rūḥiyya) are regarded as part of the taḥsīniyyāt. Thesemaṣāliḥ rūḥiyya
are now raised to the highest level because they are the most capable to pro-
mote the good character (akhlāq), and influence the other two value-levels, i.e.
life values and rational values respectively. Abderrahmane says that after the
true attitude of al-Shāṭibī on ethics is clarified, the claim of some uṣūlīs that
ethics in uṣūl al-fiqh is a restricted field can be rejected (ʿAbd al-Raḥmān 1993,
114).
Conclusion
Comparing Abderrahmane’s and al-Shāṭibī’s thought reveal communalities
and differences which can enrich today’s reflections on ethics and Islamic law.
First, it should be mentioned that both scholars share a “classical” under-
standing of religion. Both believe in the existence of one God the Creator.
Human beings are different from the rest of creation and they have the rational
faculty and freedom to decide how they want to live. Either they decide to
accept God’s will or not to. In both cases, they are responsible for their actions.
2 Or, as it is mentioned in his book Suʾāl al-Manhaj: The values of good and evil (qiyamal-khayr
wa-l-sharr) (ʿAbd al-Raḥmān 2015, 85).
3 That is, the divine spirit (rūḥ) that is in human beings.
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However, what makes the two scholars differ from one another is that Abder-
rahmane with his iʾtimāniyya elaborates a whole paradigma and creates new
terms and gives in-depth explications of his ideas, as it is the case with ‘al-
faqīh al-iʾtimārī ’ and ‘al-faqīh al-iʾtimānī.’ This distinction cannot be found in
al-Shāṭibī’s work, although both scholars share the same ground regarding the
essential teachings of Islam.
Second, ethics plays a major role in both of their thinking. Although they
have different approaches about how they tackle the subject, it certainly is of
decisive importance in their thought.
Third, in both their understanding, ethics is considered an aspect only, but
is seen as the very basis of Islamic law.
Fourth, the figure responsible to produce a correct understanding of Islamic
law and to erect it on ethical foundations is the jurist. In addition to his main
scholarly function of the production of knowledge, he also carries the respons-
ibility of guiding and educating people and contributing to the establishment
of ethics in society. A practical implementation of this idea today is that schol-
ars, besides their scholarly activities, upheld this responsibility oft he jurist.
Fifth, strongly linked to ethics is the field of themaqāṣidwhich in the opin-
ion of both scholars should be the very basis of legal thinking. However, it
shouldbementioned that their approaches differ fromoneanother.One aspect
concerns systematization. While al-Shāṭibī lays down an ethical basis for a
meaningful legal thinking he does not do it in the very systematized approach
of Abderrahmane. Furthermore, what makes the two scholars differ from one
another is that al-Shāṭibī works with the five classical values of religion, life,
reason, progeny and property that should be protected by the Sharia, whereas
Abderrahmane critisizes this classification and suggests a new and different
order that ismore ethicist, according tohim.WhatmakesAbderrahmane’s view
alsodiffer fromal-Shāṭibī’s is his critiqueof the classical divisionof themaqāṣid
in ḍarūriyyāt, ḥājjiyyāt and taḥsīniyyāt. He asserts that scholars in the past used
to count ethics under the category of taḥsīniyyāt and argues that ethics should
form the basis of any legal considerations.
The comparison of the thought and contributions of the two scholars
showed that despite their very different historical and social contexts and the
different approaches they took in their scholarship they arrived at similar con-
clusions. These can be taken for today’s scholarship and inspire the debate on
topics that need a new outlook on ethics and their role in the discussion on the
maqāṣid and on the premisses of contemporary Islamic legal thinking.
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اهلةلباقملاةيطناكلاةلوقملا ةينيدلاةيقالخألاةلوقملا اهللباقملاةيطناكلاةلوقملا ةينيدلاةيقالخألاةلوقملا
نوناقلامارتحا هلالاةبحم لقعلا ناميإلا
تاذللناسنإلاعيرشت ريغللهلإلاعيرشت ةيناسنإلاةدارإلا ةيهلإلاةدارإلا
ىمسألاريـخلا ميعنلا ةدارإللقلطملانسحلا هلإللقلطملاناسحإلا
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Qurʾanic Values andModernity in Contemporary
Islamic Ethics
Taha Abderrahmane and Fazlur Rahman in Conversation
Ramon Harvey
Introduction
Islam, like other religions, looks back to an early sacred time, in which its
primary scripture, the Qurʾan, was given to the Prophet Muhammad who dir-
ectly instructed the people in religious and ethical guidance. Believers are in
no doubt about the importance of this founding moment for the development
of the community. Yet, time does not stand still. As century upon century has
passed, Muslims live far from the society initially transformed by revelation. A
question that forces itself upon us is, in the words of Ebrahim Moosa: “How
do the norms and values of revelation have an enduring relevance to religious
communitieswithout becoming anachronistic?” (Moosa 2000, 15). Thus, one of
the compelling unresolved problems of our day is how to live at a remove from
the time of revelation without a mere nostalgic re-enactment of the outward
form of the religion, but also without abandoning it, or unthinkingly forcing it
into the parameters of modernity.
Two major figures that have sought to provide theoretical frameworks to
address this conundrum are the Moroccan philosopher Taha Abderrahmane
(b. 1944) and the Pakistani émigré thinker Fazlur Rahman Malik (1919–1988).
While each of them stakes out an original position, they are united by pla-
cing the category of the ethical at the centre of their thought, and by seeing
its retrieval as the basis for a contemporary renewal of the Islamic tradition
and its legal thought. These parallels between their projects lead naturally to
the hypothesis that there is a great deal to gain by closely comparing their
works on this key question, as well as major recent attempts to utilise their
ideas.
Abderrahmane’s scholarly career beganwithhis entry into theMohammedV
University in Rabat to study philosophy, after an initial interest in poetry before
the 1967 Arab-Israeli war. He received further graduate degrees in philosophy
from the Sorbonne in Paris, culminating with a doctorate in 1985. From the
1970s, Abderrahmane worked as a professor of logic and philosophy of lan-
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guage at Mohammed V University until his retirement in 2005. He remains a
prolific author with a shift in recent decades to a focus on ethics and Islamic
renewal. Abderrahmane has referred to his reconstructive intellectual project
as the “Rabat School” (Hashas 2015, 71–74). The ethical and spiritual dimen-
sions of his thought must also be viewed in the light of his membership of the
Morocco-based Boutchichi Sufi ṭarīqa (order) (Mashrūḥ 2009, 32–33). Despite
Abderrahmane’s knowledge and engagement with themes of logic, language
and ethics within the Western philosophical tradition, his work has neither
featured in major works on modern Islamic thought (Hashas 2015, 70), nor
received engagement from major Western ethical thinkers with similar con-
cerns (Bevers 2018, 78–79).Hehas beenmore celebrated in theArabic-speaking
world, especially within Morocco (Hashas 2015, 72). However, there is still a
sense that his work has not received the attention it deserves within circles
of contemporary Arabic philosophical thought, possibly due to its difficult lin-
guistic and logical foundations (Bū Zabra 2011, 18).
In the case of Fazlur Rahman, an initial grounding in traditional Islamic edu-
cation from his father in the Indian subcontinent was followed by the study of
Arabic at Punjab University and a doctorate on Ibn Sīnā (d. 428/1037) at the
University of Oxford. His subsequent career was primarily based in the British,
Canadian and American universities of Durham, McGill and Chicago. A form-
ative interlude in his academic career was a stint at the head of the Central
Institute of Islamic Research in Karachi during the 1960s before being forced
to leave the country due to opposition from traditional ulema to his theo-
logy of revelation (El-Affendi 2009, 32). His experience in Pakistan coincides
with a shift in his thought from studying the history of Islamic philosophy to
increasingly focus on theQurʾan and core ethicalmessage of Islam, theMuslim
tradition as a means for its transmission through history, and the prospects for
reviving it in the modern world (Moosa 2000, 23). Fazlur Rahman’s ideas have
been very influential in Western academia, in Turkey and to some extent in
Indonesia, with less influence in the Arab world and the Indian subcontinent
(Koç 2012, 16–17; El-Affendi 2009, 32–33).
I have divided this chapter into two main sections. In the first I will dis-
cuss the approaches of Taha Abderrahmane and Fazlur Rahman to reading
ethical values within the Qurʾan. I will argue that while both focus on the relev-
ance of the Qurʾan’s context in order to uncover extrahistorical ethical values,
their thought differs markedly in emphasis. Abderrahmane concentrates on a
theoretical account of Sufi virtue ethics, which allows him to make targeted
modifications to the classical theory of maqāṣid al-sharīʿa, or the purposes of
legislation. The ideas of Fazlur Rahman challenge this approach by stressing
the development of a genuine theory of social ethics from the Qurʾan able to
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deal with legal reform for the benefit of the community. Fazlur Rahman’s work
also shows a proclivity for thinking about hermeneutics, which he illustrates
with applied examples.
The second section will turn to the two thinkers’ application of Qurʾanic
ethics to the contemporaryworld. Again, while their overall project of the cent-
rality of the ethical in modernity is shared, each has particular characteristics
that open up new avenues for thought. Yet, both betray points of potential
critique. In the case of Abderrahmane, his ideas challenge the Western hege-
mony of modernity, and seek to articulate an alternative conception in which
Qurʾanic values can be ethically relevant. Fazlur Rahman is more appreciative
of modernity and enlightenment universal reason, and sees the potential for
Muslims to generate a beneficial synthesis between them and the timeless ulti-
mate values of revelation. I will also discuss in this section some of the major
figures who have received and developed each of the two scholars’ bodies of
work, before concluding with the prospects that lie ahead for the coming cen-
tury of Islamic ethics.
1 Seeking Qurʾanic Values
Both Taha Abderrahmane and Fazlur Rahman hold that the renewal of the
Islamic tradition within modernity can only be sought through a discourse
of ethics. More precisely, permanent ethical values must be sought within the
primary document of revelation, the Qurʾan. It is in the theoretical explication
of how this may be done that their thought can be contrasted and their rela-
tionship to debates of ethics, hermeneutics and the Islamic tradition can be
assessed.
Abderrahmane proposes that religious dispensations begin in a natural, or
fiṭrī, state and then enter into a time-affected, or waqtī, state. The accretions
of history that lead to such a deviation from the original ethical nature of the
religion may occur at a slower or quicker rate, depending on various factors.
Moreover, the waqtī and fiṭrī states may be closer or further apart due to the
historical accidents suffered by various religions (ʿAbd al-Raḥmān 2014a, 102).
Eventually, each dispensation is abrogated by the one following it. Abderrah-
mane refers to each religion as having two eras, an ethical and a historical one.
He defines the ethical era as “the period of time between its revelation until
it is superseded by the revelation of a new religion”, and the historical era as
“the period of time between its revelation and the time it is brought to an end
by people who no longer believe in it” (Abderrahmane 2008a, 16). As Islam—
by which Abderrahmane here means the religious dispensation brought spe-
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cifically by the Prophet Muhammad—is the final revealed religion, it is the
only one whose ethical and historical eras are one and the same. Nevertheless,
while Abderrahmane believes that Islam is the only contender for a religious
dispensation still in its ethical phase, it has undergone historical corruption,
such that it needs renewal in order to return to its fiṭrī state (ʿAbd al-Raḥmān
2014a, 102).This requires “rooting ethics” (tarsīkhal-akhlāq) in the values of rev-
elation, as appreciated through their initial historical setting (ʿAbd al-Raḥmān
2006, 202).
Abderrahmane is intensely critical of what he sees as a modern historicist
approach to scripture that attempts to desacralise the Qurʾan and cut off its
link with the divine (Hashas 2019, 188). He makes a number of criticisms of
the methodology followed by those he calls “modern conformist readers” (ahl
al-qirāʾa al-ḥadāthiyya al-muqallida): they seek to deny that the Qurʾan came
with established eternal rulings (aḥkām), which would be a hindrance to their
agenda, and claim instead that they aremerely contingent upon particular his-
torical circumstances (ʿAbd al-Raḥmān 2006, 184); they go beyond the limits
established by jurists and exegetes in interpreting Qurʾanic rulings (ʿAbd al-
Raḥmān 2006, 185); and they apply historical criticism to issues of belief and
worship, and not simply to transactional and penal matters (ʿAbd al-Raḥmān
2006, 186).
For Abderrahmane, the Qurʾan cannot be relegated to a past historical era,
because as the final revelation, it is foundational to every time that follows it.
The verses containing rulings have both a legal (qānūnī) and ethical (akhlāqī)
dimension. These ethics are not merely for the perfection of actions but are
essential for the human being and are the reason for the ProphetMuhammad’s
mission (Abderrahmane 2006, 203). In fact, Abderrahmanemakes a break from
the Aristotelian philosophical heritage by asserting that the core feature dis-
tinguishing human beings from animals is their ethical rather than rational
(ʿaqlāniyya) nature (ʿAbd al-Raḥmān 2000, 13–14). He conceptualises ethical
values (qiyam akhlāqiyya) as extrahistorical: they can “affect time but are not
affected by time” (ʿAbd al-Raḥmān 2006, 204); he defines “value” as follows:
Value is an abstractmeaning thatMan holds in his heart but cannot grasp
with his senses. Yet, and despite this abstraction, this meaning is what
guides him in his life and enhances his humanity. In fewer words, values
are innate and lofty meanings that guide Man to righteousness.
Abderrahmane 2014b, 111
Preservation of such ethical values within the context of modernity is key to
Abderrahmane’s programme of renewal and this can only be done by link-
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ing the values to the contextual atmosphere (waṣl al-ẓarfī wa-l-siyāqī) of the
Qurʾanic verses (ʿAbd al-Raḥmān 2006, 203).
Moosa provides an insightful analysis of how Abderrahmane’s concept of
value intersects with his efforts to reinterpret al-Shāṭibī’s (d. 790/1388) theory
of maqāṣid al-sharīʿa. Abderrahmane sees this legal theory as insufficiently
ethically grounded and seeks to rectify this by building on the idea of al-
Juwaynī (d. 478/1085) that thewordmaqṣad (purpose) has different conceptual
registers that can be pegged to different moral aspects of human action. Thus,
whilemaqṣad can refer to an outcome, in the sense of the action ( fiʿl) itself, it
can also refer to its intention (niyya) and to its end, or value (qīma) (Moosa 2014,
183). The overall picture is teleological, for though each action is preceded by
an intention, it has as its end a distinct value (ʿAbd al-Raḥmān 2015, 87; Moosa
2014, 184–185). Furthermore, these internal ethical categories correspond to
three external legal ones: intention, action and value correspond to cause (ʿilla),
legal action (qaḍiyya) and legal rule ( jiha) respectively (ʿAbd al-Raḥmān 2015,
88). Abderrahmane’s definition of value within the framework of virtue ethics
leads him to redesign its typology for the theory ofmaqāṣidal-sharīʿa. Although
the traditional five necessities (ḍarūriyyāt) of maqāṣid theory—religion, life,
reason, family and property—appear as values of beneficence (maṣāliḥ) and
malevolence (mafāsid), a classification redolent of ʿIzz al-Dīn b. ʿAbd al-Salām
(d. 660/1262), Abderrahmane prioritises spiritual values, then rational values,
followed by life values (Abderrahmane 2015, 86; Moosa 2014, 185–186).
Abderrahmane’s project within legal theory can be seen as an effort to give
Aristotelian and Sufi virtue ethics, as understood through his own philosophy
of the trusteeship paradigm (al-iʾtimāniyya), a regulative function in the law. It
is also interesting to see thismove througha longerhistorical lens.The concepts
from which he draws inspiration have a rich history in the Muslim intellectual
tradition, in the field of Sufism through figures such as al-Muḥāsibī (d. 243/857),
al-Rāghib al-Iṣfahānī (d. 422/1031) and al-Ghazālī (d. 505/1111), rather than in
legal theory. Abderrahmane’s entry into the discourse of the legal tradition
seems to be a strategic choice based on his diagnosis of the malady of outward
law dominating ethics in Muslim thought (ʿAbd al-Raḥmān 2015, 90). This, in
turn, arguably, reflects his analysis of modernity in the Islamic world replicat-
ing the West in making morality follow, rather than lead, materiality (Bevers
2018, 164).
The intervention in ethical theory proposed by Abderrahmane remains at
the level of metaethics andnormative ethics anddoes not providemanydetails
of how, in practice, specific moral principles would be extracted from the
Qurʾan (Moosa 2014, 187). Abderrahmane’s emphasis on adding Sufi virtue eth-
ics to legal theory leaves it unclear whether he has given much consideration
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to applied social ethics that could be derived from the Qurʾan beyond the very
general categories found within the maqāṣid al-sharīʿa literature. As noted by
Monir Birouk, the focus on individual ethics and piety inAbderrahmane’swork
at the expense of social ethics and the discourse of justice may undermine his
broader project (Birouk 2017).
A focus on the social aspect of the Qurʾan’s ethical message is one of the dis-
tinguishing features of Fazlur Rahman’s oeuvre. He takes issue with what he
sees as the grafting of the Sufi system of spiritual purification onto the legal
tradition, which he thinks replaces a genuine moral philosophy that could dir-
ect reform of the law in the public sphere (Rahman 1971, 94). The point of
departure for Fazlur Rahman’s contribution to contemporary Islamic ethics
is, instead, the assertion that central to the Prophet Muhammad’s religious
missionwas themoral development of human society in its communal dimen-
sion (Rahman 1982, 5). However, he shares with Abderrahmane the aim of
retrieving objective moral values from the Qurʾan, highlighting the difference
between the historical and the normative in Islam (Koshul 1994, 406). In his
words:
All values that are properly moral—and it is these with which we shall
be concerned—have also an extrahistorical, “transcendental” being, and
their location at a point in history does not exhaust their practical impact
or, one might even say, their meaning.
Rahman 1982, 5
These values can only be appreciated by their place within the unity of the
Qurʾan’s Weltenschauung and thus require an integrated approach in order to
be extracted from the divine response to the immediate socio-historical con-
text of the revelation (Rahman 1970, 329; Rahman 1982, 2–3). Fazlur Rahman
highlights the complexity of the Qurʾan and the need to distinguish between
its macro-background, which can be gleaned from a general knowledge of the
conditions of society at the time of the Prophet Muhammad, and the specific
situations surrounding the revelation of verses known as the asbāb al-nuzūl
(Rahman 1980b, 241). He pays special attention to distinguishing between a
Qurʾanic ruling (ḥukm) and its ratio legis (ʿillat al-ḥukm), which is the purpose
for its pronouncement (Rahman 1980b, 242). This leads him to criticise the
commonly drawn distinction between ʿilla as cause and ḥikma as purpose, in
effect arguing for the determination of the ḥukm by its ḥikma (Rahman 1979,
219–221; cf. Harvey 2018, 41–42). His most significant methodological proposi-
tion is the development of what he terms a double movement theory. In the
first step of the first movement, the purposes of the Qurʾanic injunctions are
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considered in the light of their socio-historical contexts; in the second step, a
coherent system of general ethical principles is extracted. The second move-
ment actualises these ethics within the contemporary world (Rahman 1982,
6–7; Rahman 1980b, 244).Moosa argues that this embrace of historical analysis
after his early focus on thework of Muslim philosophers represents a definitive
turn away from comprehensivemetaphysical systems to the interplay between
revelation and history (Moosa 2000, 23). This is substantiated by Fazlur Rah-
man’s declaration: “[t]he theologians have been too much preoccupied with
God and His nature; they have ignored the nature of man and his function”
(Rahman 1971, 97).
Fazlur Rahman’s reflection on the specifics of the interpretive task and its
problematics, as well as his reference to prevailing twentieth-century debates
within Western philosophy, means that his hermeneutics can be more easily
determined than those of Taha Abderrahmane. Though he affirms that with
the exception of fully detailed matters “all interpretations and approaches to
truth are subjective” (Rahman 1970, 330), when it comes to the purposes of
Qurʾanic injunctions, he uses the hermeneutics of Emilio Betti (1890–1968) to
argue that the divine intent can be objectively uncovered (Rahman 1982, 8).
Betti, as described byMoosa, developed four canons to be used in the hermen-
eutic act, which would allow the interpreter to “reverse engineer” the original
creative impulse of the author: first, to understand the author’s point of view;
second, to understand the unity of their thought; third, to retrace the creative
process and inevitably add a degree of subjectivity; fourth, to reduce that sub-
jectivity as much as is feasible (Moosa 2000, 18–19).
According to Felix Körner, Fazlur Rahman adjusts Betti’s canons in two
respects: considering the communication of the divine mind with reference
to a specific historical situation as part of his first movement; and returning
to the present day in order to apply the value in modernity, which is his addi-
tion of a second movement (Körner 2005, 115). Körner argues that Gadamer’s
(1900–2002) criticism of Betti’s reconstructive approach as Romantic psycho-
logism (seeGadamer 2013, 533) is cogent as he does not supply enough grounds
to adequately determine the original intentions behind a text. However, Betti
does provide a defined text-oriented method upon which Fazlur Rahman can
build his own system (Körner 2005, 115). For his part, Fazlur Rahman is aware
of the debate between Gadamer and Betti. Siding with the latter, he presents
Gadamer’s phenomenological approach as constraining the interpreter by the
shackles of their historical consciousness. This, he thinks, leads to an interpret-
ive subjectivism that cannot recover theobjectivemeanings of a text andwould
thereby rendermeaningless his doublemovement theory (Rahman 1982, 9; see
Bektovic 2016, 162–163).
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Arguably, Fazlur Rahman hasmisunderstood the nature and implications of
Gadamer’s position. Gadamer’s acknowledgement that any interpreter is cir-
cumscribed to some extent by their own being and their relationship to the
past does not predetermine how they will interpret a historical text (Körner
2005, 118). Körner shows how the Gadamerian position is able to defend itself
and land some blows against Fazlur Rahman’s theory. Though Fazlur Rahman
claims tobe able to cut through the tradition to return to aholisticQurʾanic eth-
ics, he asks the quintessential question of Muslim ethical thought, “how should
we act?” Furthermore, though he argues that the lawmust have (a) purpose(s),
he ultimately accepts whatever purpose he discovers in theQurʾan because it is
the will of God, which makes Fazlur Rahman a “revelation-positivist” (Körner
2005, 119–120). Note that if Körner is right on this point, it would partially
undermine Fazlur Rahman’s own criticism of Ashʿarī voluntarism (see Rahman
1982, 3). Finally, Gadamer’s idea that our interpretive vantage point on the past
constantly shifts may challenge Fazlur Rahman’s confidence in an objective
method (seeGadamer 2013, 301–302), but does notmakehis project of Qurʾanic
ethical recovery impossible. Rather, he should recognise the requirement of
the hermeneutic circle and the constant need to return to the object of inter-
pretation in the light of new experiences (Körner 2005, 120; see Caputo 2018,
104–105).
Körner goes on to argue that FazlurRahman’s search for anobjectivemethod
to uncover God’s designs for human beings in all time periods not only fits
well with Betti’s psychological hermeneutics but possibly also reflects a dis-
tinctively Qurʾanic theology of revelation. He contrasts this with Gadamer’s
perspective which he sees as more suitable for the Biblical (Christian and Jew-
ish) foregrounding of God’s self-expression as the unfolding of events in his-
tory ahead of revealed communication (Körner 2005, 121). It is ironic that this
point arises from critique of Fazlur Rahman, perhaps themost famousmodern
Muslim exponent of a participative, as opposed to a stenographic—or purely
receptive—theology of revelation (Rahman 1976, 33; for this terminology, see
Sommer 2015, 2).
Yet it does not seem at all clear that the authoritative communication of
the Qurʾan must be an ill fit with the philosophy of Gadamer. Körner’s own
study of the Turkish theologian Mehmet Paçaci shows that Gadamer’s idea of
constant interpretation can be synthesised with Fazlur Rahman’s first move-
ment (Körner 2005, 79; and see below).My recent book,TheQurʾan and the Just
Society, has shown how a key aspect of Fazlur Rahman’s project, the search for
specific valueswithin theQurʾan, can be embedded in a natural law theological
framework that is indebted toGadamerian hermeneutics (Harvey 2018, 194). In
mymodel, which constructively builds on theMāturīdī theological school, God
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reveals Hiswisdomboth throughHis speech in theQurʾan and throughHis cre-
ative act within the progression of history, such that the human ethical agent
must continually reconcile the two (Harvey 2018, 36, 41–42). Overall, it would
seem that the key consideration is the theological approach toGod’s acts of rev-
elation and creationwithin any given tradition, rather than the inherent nature
of the Biblical and Qurʾanic dispensations.
How successful was Fazlur Rahman in applying his methods for extracting
values from the Qurʾan? He certainly did not attempt to carry this proced-
ure out in any systematic way. Nonetheless, over the course of his career, he
made many forays within individual thematic areas. While he had published
a number of relevant articles before he made his double movement theory
fully explicit, these earlier publications obviously provided him with some of
the evidential groundwork to propose his more developed theoretical claims.
Aspects of the Qurʾanic discourse that Fazlur Rahman attempted to look at
through an ethical lens include the following: slavery (Rahman 1963, 212–214),
ribā (usury) (Rahman 1964), ḥudūd (limits; prescribed punishments) (Rahman
1965), family law (Rahman 1980a), shūrā (consultation) (Rahman 1981), īmān
(faith), islām (surrender to God), and taqwā (piety) (Rahman 1983). These dis-
cussions are insightful, yet often all too brief and do not provide the sustained
holistic analysis required by his double movement theory.
2 The Ethical in Modernity
The two thinkers explored in this study devote a significant proportion of their
intellectual labour to considering modernity and the conditions for successful
Islamic ethics within it. Both argue that an appreciation of the effects of mod-
ernity on Muslim thought combined with profound ethical reflection on the
Qurʾan can lead to renewal. Nonetheless, there are some important differences
in their analysis of modernity and their proposals for an ethical response to
it.
Abderrahmane argues that the question of modernity is inseparable from
that of ethics. He distinguishes between the mere “fact of modernity” (wāqiʿ
al-ḥadātha), understood as the current Western hegemonic reality, and the
“spirit of modernity” (rūḥ al-ḥadātha), which represents general characterist-
ics with the potential for alternative applications (ʿAbd al-Raḥmān 2006, 19;
Hashas 2015, 85). WhileWestern modernity is built upon the rejection of mor-
ality in the name of productivity (Abderrahmane 2008b, 89), an alternative
modernity can be conceived, in which the basic ethical nature of the human
beingbecomes the central fact andbreaks theharmful dominationover nature,
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society and the individual (Hashas 2015, 85–86). Though largely framing his
approach within his own tradition of Arab-Islamic philosophy, Abderrahmane
promotes his conception of the spirit of modernity as one that is more open
to the real diversity of the modern world than classical Western universals
(Hashas 2015, 76, 86). Heproposes, in thewords of Michael Bevers, that, “Islam’s
answer to the question of ethics in the 21st century can contribute to the form-
ation of a pluralist civilization of ethosworldwide” (Bevers 2018, 197).
Interestingly, in the light of the preceding discussion concerning Fazlur Rah-
man, the theoretical posture that Abderrahmane takes towards tradition has
some similarities to that of Gadamer, whose Truth and Method he read in
French translation (see ʿAbd al-Raḥmān 1995, 110–111). Abderrahmane argues
that the connectionwith tradition is not amatter of choice that can be entered
and left at will. If one does not work from one’s own tradition, the only altern-
ative is to draw from another. Furthermore, he explicitly states that it is im-
possible to cut all connections to the present, return to the past and livewith its
values like one’s grandparents (ʿAbd al-Raḥmān 2011, 15–17). What Islam needs
in modernity is to wipe away inappropriate historical accretions and return to
the fiṭrī ethical form of the religion.
Abderrahmane argues that the embedding of ethics requires removing each
ossified rule that in the context of today harms foundational human values
(ʿAbd al-Raḥmān 2006, 202). The reason for this is that a Qurʾanic ruling may
not realise the same value at a later period of history as it did at the time of
revelation. What is required is a study of the Qurʾanic verses within the con-
text of the world today with a view to making their divine guidance relevant
to the present and future (ʿAbd al-Raḥmān 2006, 204). Mohammed Hashas
explains this point: “the sealing of revelation then goes beyond the time of its
appearance; each era becomes its possible age of realization. The historicity of
revelation becomes “futuristic,” and it should be always modern” (Hashas 2018,
190). Again, Abderrahmane’s theoretical discussion outstrips his applied aspir-
ations and he does not provide a clear sense of what his ideas would mean
in practice. He mentions in passing that the ossified rulings to be abandoned
include those concerning slavery andmutual interaction with pagans (ʿAbd al-
Raḥmān 2006, 203–204)—issues that have long beenmarginal tomostMuslim
societies—but prefers to remain on the level of theory, rather than its applica-
tion.
One of the ironies of Abderrahmane’s thought is his call for practice-based
solutions through the medium of an extremely abstract theoretical discourse.
Thus, he argues that the transformation fromwaqtī (time-affected) to fiṭrī (nat-
ural) religion cannot be completed through theorywhich engages onlywith the
thinking of its own time:
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Theory within the transmitted texts, as they are examined critically and
comparatively, or explanatively and figuratively, or in terms of excavation
and deconstruction is not what connects to the natural form of the reli-
gion. This is true even if it unveils part of its realities, because this theory
is compelled to connect with the thinking and theorising that is appro-
priate to a time other than that of this religion.
ʿAbd al-Raḥmān 2014a, 102–103
His point is that theoretical insight is not enough on its own and must be
completed with praxis, as the natural disposition can only be recovered with
specific spiritual practices. This is how the human being can engage in trust-
eeship and connect to divine witnessing (ʿAbd al-Raḥmān 2014a, 103). Again, it
seems that Abderrahmane places spiritual purification through the Sufi path at
the heart of his conception of social ethics. It is possible that either his assumed
method to reconcile the gap between individual and social ethics, or the reason
that he does not see any gap in the first place, derives fromhis ownbackground,
namely his affiliationwith the Boutchichi ṭarīqa. This, however, raises the ques-
tion of howmuch his project of ethics for modernity relies on social functions
of Sufism that may have survived into modernity better in certain countries,
like Morocco, than in others (see the discussion in Van Bruinessen 2009, 134–
136).
As an extremely prolific writer, Abderrahmane has himself been more act-
ive in building upon his ethical work than any other thinker. Nonetheless,
it is useful to highlight those who have sought to utilise his analysis of the
contemporary world in interesting ways. Wael Hallaq positively cited Taha
Abderrahmane in The Impossible State and Restating Orientalism. His interest
in Abderrahmane’s philosophy is centred on his critique of the ethical failure
of modernity, as it supports his argument that ethics was the central domain
of Muslim civilisation and is incompatible with the modern nation state (Hal-
laq 2013, 12, 175 n. 49; Hallaq 2018, 74, 290 n. 15). He further engages with
Abderrahmane’s ethics in his forthcoming work Reforming Modernity (Hal-
laq 2019). Mohammed Hashas takes a different approach to the reception of
Abderrahmane, using his ideas as a framework to examinewhat he calls “voices
of European Islam.” In the section of his book most pertinent to the current
study, he discusses how three of four identified thinkers line up with Abder-
rahmane’s idea of reading the Qurʾan historically without historicising it: Tariq
Ramadan, Tareq Oubrou, and Abdennour Bidar (the exception is Bassam Tibi)
(Hashas 2018, 197). Hashas argues that, in general and leaving aside the differ-
ences between the studied “voices”, the work of these figures is consonant with
Abderrahmane’s approach in three ways. First, they treat the lifetime of the
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Prophet Muhammad as exemplary for matching the ideals of revelation to his
particular society. This implies his second point which is the prioritisation of
ethical values over the outward forms of law and the possibility of legal change.
Finally, this approach makes the intent of revelation, at this level of analysis,
benefit of the world in terms of social justice and public good without thereby
stripping it of itsmetaphysical connection to the divine (Hashas 2018, 198–199).
It is interesting to add that each of these points is held in common with Fazlur
Rahman.
The second movement of Fazlur Rahman’s theory provides the framework
for his attempt to read the Qurʾan as speaking with its ethical values to the
present age. Just as his first movement requires a holistic appreciation of the
Qurʾan as a textwithin its socio-historical context, the second oneneeds a com-
plete view of the contemporary situation. This calls for the “instrumentality” of
the social scientist, but the “effective orientation” and “ethical engineering” of
the ethicist (Rahman 1982, 7). As these phrases indicate, Fazlur Rahman adopts
modern technical language as his chosen metaphor. He places himself within
a tradition of Muslim modernism from the middle of the nineteenth century,
which he credits as follows:
It was theMuslimModernist, not the fundamentalist or the traditionalist,
then, who recovered the integral Islamic legacy of the earliest days, and,
having adopted certain key modern Western institutions and integrated
them with Islam as being Islamic par excellence, offered Islam as a suc-
cessful substitute for and the only viable alternative to the secularWest as
this Secularism began to show grave cracks in its moral and human struc-
ture.
Rahman 1980, 243
Despite these achievements, Fazlur Rahman critiques the modernists for fail-
ing to apply the ethical vision of Islam comprehensively enough and for relying
too heavily on a Western model that provoked a severe reaction from a resur-
gent conservatism (Rahman 1980, 244). His own project is not an unnuanced
embrace of the modern world, but an attempt at an ongoing process of syn-
thesis that he refers to as neo-modernism (Rahman 1980, 246; Bektovic 2016,
170).
In his ethical thought, Fazlur Rahman combines confidence in the discov-
erability, universality and applicability of extrahistorical Qurʾanic values to the
presentwith full acceptanceof the social changes that themodernworldbrings
to Muslim societies and the necessity of religious rules undergoing modific-
ation as a result. While Abderrahmane seeks the right of Arab and Muslim
162 harvey
exceptionalism from modernity as a Western-driven construct, Fazlur Rah-
man—who fled from the critique of traditionalist ʿulamāʾ in Pakistan to settle
in theWest—sees potential in reading the Islamic scripture withWestern uni-
versal reason (Bektovic 2016, 160–161). This does leave him open to the critique
that, in the search for definite and objective values, he ultimately abandons
themultivariate diversity of interpretation within theMuslim tradition, which
returns philosophically to his choice to favour Betti ahead of Gadamer (see
Moosa 2000, 21).
Fazlur Rahman is aware of the controversial nature of his ideas in the light
of prevailing Muslim understandings of the finality of the law and the eternal
nature of God’s speech. On this point, he distinguishes between the moral and
legal planes and argues that the latter can change with the passing of time, as
it is “a transaction between the eternity of the Word and the actual ecological
situation of seventh-centuryArabia” (Rahman 1970, 331). Importantly, the alter-
ation in society that Fazlur Rahman thinks provokes a change in law is not just
one of material conditions but can include a shift in cultural values that, as
opposed to Qurʾanic moral values, are historically bound (Rahman 1970, 330).
The difficulty that Fazlur Rahman, or any modern thinker, finds in contend-
ing that certain provisions from the Qurʾan for social matters are not perman-
ent is that this very position cannot be found within the text (Koç 2012, 17).
Fazlur Rahman implicitly addresses this by widening his historical lens slightly
with a concept of the “living Sunna”, especially throughexamples of the reforms
of the second caliph ʿUmar b. al-Khaṭṭāb (d. 23/644). These occurred during a
period in which the nascent Muslim society experienced rapid upheaval due
to its expansion into newly conquered lands and an influx of new community
members. For Fazlur Rahman, this initial period of change is the closest par-
allel that modern Muslims have to understand how to adapt the provisions of
scripture to their social reality (Rahman 1963, 205–207).
As is the case for his proposal to develop a moral theory from the Qurʾan,
Fazlur Rahman does not provide a concrete method for systematically analys-
ing the contemporary world (Moosa 2000, 24). Instead, he discusses various
questions in an ad-hoc fashion to illustrate his general approach. His remarks,
often concerning the encounter with modernity in Pakistan—the Muslim-
majority country he knew best—showcase his incisivemind and characteristic
blend of idealism and pragmatism. An example is his discussion of zakāt, in
which he argues that the inflexibility of traditionalist ulema contributes to the
rise of secular solutions to modern welfare needs:
The Qurʾān, in order to fulfil its fundamental objective of social and eco-
nomic justice, had ordered the levying of a tax known as zakāh. From the
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uses, enumeratedby theQurʾān, of the expenditureof this tax, it is evident
that it was a social welfare tax in thewidest possiblemeaning of “welfare.”
Further, this was the only tax levied by the Qurʾān. Now, the Prophet had
fixed a certain rate, which leads one to believe that, for the normal needs
of that society, he must have judged this rate adequate. The needs of a
modern society, however, have expanded immensely. Education, commu-
nications and other developmental schemes are now considered to be
among the necessities of modern welfare. This would, therefore, argue
for a readjustment of the rate of zakāh tax to modern needs. The Ulamaʾ,
however, forbid any change in the rate of zakāh and assert that if zakāh is
inadequate to meet the larger welfare needs of the Muslim society, then
Muslim Governments can levy other taxes. It is at this critical juncture
that the administrator tells the Ulamaʾ, “You say that here is only one
Islamic tax which is zakāh. When this proves inadequate, you forbid any
change in the zakāh-rate but you say that I can levy other taxes. You are,
thereby, introducing adualismwhich I findunworkable. If I can levy other
taxes, I shall levy them and fulfil the needs of my society and your zakāh
is superfluous.” This is the essence of secularism.
Rahman 1966, 119
Although Fazlur Rahman argued forcefully and consistently for legal reform
based on a holistic approach to Qurʾanic ethics and a critical appraisal of
the social needs of Muslim societies, he developed through personal experi-
ence an awareness of the difficulty of getting a hearing for his ideas. Looking
back on his suggested changes to the rules of zakāt in Pakistan, he noted that
he not only received opposition from the ʿulamāʾ for his advocacy of a shift
fromestablished legal views but frommodernists for his comprehensive, rather
than piecemeal, solution (Rahman 1970, 328). He recognised that the prospects
for the popular acceptance of his approach were bleak and saw that, rather
than adopting neo-modernism, the failures of modernism in theMuslimworld
would push the populations towards both conservatism and secularism (Rah-
man 1970, 331).
Such secularism, however, is not necessarily the end of the story. Fazlur
Rahman gave the example of Turkey as a secularised Muslim country that,
through a strong attachment to Islam, may be able to infuse an Islamic ethos
within its secular structures (Rahman 1970, 332–333). The recent rise of ilahiyat
(theological) faculties in Turkey and their blend of Islamic values and modern
administration may indicate Fazlur Rahman’s prescience in this observation
(see Pacaci and Aktay 2006, 140).
It is interesting to note that someof themost importantwork done to extend
Fazlur Rahman’s ethical thought has taken place in Turkey. Prominent among
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this are members of the “Ankara School”, so called because of their association
with the theological faculty of Ankara University. Adil Çiftçi, a graduate of the
university, has translated works of Fazlur Rahman into Turkish, and worked
to extend the method of his ethical framework (Körner 2005, 109). He com-
ments that Fazlur Rahman’s first movement is inductive, while his second one
is deductive, which qualifies it as scientific (Körner 2005, 125; see Rahman
1979, 221); he supplies additional criteria for checking that the ethical prin-
ciples extracted are correct (Körner 2005, 125); and he overcomes the arguably
static nature of Fazlur Rahman’s engagement with the Qurʾan by invoking the
hermeneutic circle, in which each engagement with the text provokes new
questions that require new responses (Körner 2005, 124). On the other hand, he
seems to uncritically side with Fazlur Rahman’s interpretation of Betti against
Gadamer and does not seriously address the shortcomings within his prede-
cessor’s theory (Körner 2005, 130, 133).
A second member of the Ankara School is Mehmet Paçaci who completed
his doctorate at Ankara University and subsequently became a professor in
the theological faculty. He makes a more significant break from Fazlur Rah-
man’s theory than Çiftçi by fully adopting the hermeneutic circle of Gadamer
and acknowledging that every interpretation takes placewithin the framework
of the interpreter’s pre-existing situation and concerns (Körner 2006, 808).
This perspective allows him to raise the same existential question of the gap
between the contemporary reader and revealed text with which I began this
study. Furthermore, somewhat like Abderrahmane, he interrogates the power
relations that contribute to the difficulty of bringing the Qurʾanic text into the
present world:Western hegemony makes Muslims the objects, and not agents,
of history (Körner 2005, 76). While diagnosing the fear that holds many back
from contemplating a new synthesis of Islam and modernity along the lines
that Fazlur Rahman proposes, Paçaci rejects it as a mistake. His adaptation of
Gadamer lets him propose that Qurʾanic interpretationmust start from the liv-
ing Muslim interpreter in history, no matter how difficult their circumstances
may seem (Körner 2005, 77; Körner 2006, 808).
Within English-language scholarship, an important reception of Fazlur Rah-
man’s ethical ideas can be found in the work of the Australian-based academic
Abdullah Saeed. He draws from Fazlur Rahman’s theoretical ideas as a major
source for his project of contextual interpretation, or contextualism, as he calls
it (Saeed 2006, 24–25; Saeed 2014, 23). Saeed develops Fazlur Rahman’s parti-
cipative theology of revelation into a four-levelmodel, of which his fourth (and
final) level is most relevant to the present study. It refers to a continuing stage
of revelation after the closing of the Qurʾanic text in which, guided by God,
the Muslim community continues to add through praxis to a common store
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of wisdom (Saeed 2006, 41). In effect, he here unifies Fazlur Rahman’s ideas
of prophetic revelation and the living Sunna into a single schema. A similar
interest in systemisation is apparent in Saeed’s four-stage model of Qurʾanic
interpretation (Saeed 2006, 150) and his discussion of a hierarchy of Qurʾanic
values: obligatory, fundamental, protectional, implementational and instruc-
tional, which exist in a continuumof greater to lesser universality (Saeed 2006,
130–143). Though the former model is basically a restatement of Fazlur Rah-
man’s doublemovement theory, the latter is genuinely interesting as it amounts
to an attempt to move beyond ad-hoc discussion of individual values towards
a normative theory, though it does share some notable similarities with dis-
courses of maqāṣid al-sharīʿa.
As a point of comparison, I have outlined a specific hierarchy for the import-
ant Qurʾanic value of societal justice (qisṭ), consisting of political, distributive
and corrective spheres, followed by subjects, topics, principles and rulings in
each, which correlates to the thematic structure of my book (Harvey 2018, 43).
I have also attempted a more comprehensive and unitary extraction and clas-
sification of ethical values within each sphere, such as discussing principles of
just governance in the sphere of political justice. However, so far, I have not
attempted to perform an equivalent to Fazlur Rahman’s second movement of
application to the contemporary world.
Conclusion
A succinct overview of the continuities and divergences between the thought
of TahaAbderrahmane andFazlur Rahman in the chosen area of study remains
useful as a way of closure. Both thinkers conceptualise values as abstract extra-
historical entities that must be sought within the Qurʾanic discourse and then
realised in each time period. They agree that the ethical dimension of the rev-
elation is more central than the legal and must take priority. Each emphasises
that these ethics can only be understoodwhen intimately related to the contex-
tual situation of the historical society led by the Prophet Muhammad. Finally,
they share an inclination to adapt existing models of legal theory for their
respective renewal projects while remaining open to radical reinterpretation
of these earlier models.
The two also have some significant differences. Theoretically, Abderrah-
mane seems to highlight the ethical role of the Qurʾan as the final revealed
dispensation to humanity more than Fazlur Rahman. He also focuses on per-
sonal, or virtue, ethics ahead of those pertaining to the social sphere, while
Fazlur Rahman has the opposite tendency. This ties into their differing recep-
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tions of Sufism and its place within Muslim ethical thought. Abderrahmane,
himself a member of the Boutchichi ṭarīqa, puts Sufi ethics at the heart of his
philosophy of the trusteeship paradigm. Fazlur Rahman, while recognising the
importance of the spiritual dimension in Islam, is extremely critical of any sub-
stitution of Sufi practices for social ethics, aswell aswhat he sees as ecstatic and
superstitious excesses, especially those of later Sufism (Rahman 1962, 19–22).
The last identified point of contrast is that Fazlur Rahmanhas a greater inclina-
tion thanAbderrahmane to illustrate his theoretical ideaswith specific applied
examples of Qurʾanic legislation and ethics, though he still often provides only
a summary treatment, stopping short of carrying out his first movement sys-
tematically.
In looking at modernity, the central position that each thinker gives to
Islamic ethical renewal demonstrates the closeness of their ideas, as does their
convergence on the three points identified by Hashas: the exemplary nature
of the initial period of revelation for recovering values, the priority of the
ethical over the legal aspect of Qurʾanic rulings, and that they must benefit
people in this world without being desacralised. However, here too there is a
notable divergence over their stance towardsmodernity in its currentWestern-
dominated form. In works written in the twenty-first century, Abderrahmane
seeks to realise what he calls the spirit of modernity in a new ethical formula-
tion enriched by connection to the divine through the Qurʾan. Fazlur Rahman,
a pragmatically inclined twentieth-century thinker more at ease with the idea
of enlightenment universal reason, looks instead towards a neo-modernist syn-
thesis between the existing framework of modernity and Islamic ethics.
Thework of contemporaryMuslim ethical thinkers who have built upon the
ideas of Taha Abderrahmane and Fazlur Rahman demonstrates that further
constructive development and reconciliation between their positions is very
possible. In the case of Fazlur Rahman, whose ideas have had a longer period
of time to be absorbed, the writings of Çiftçi and Paçaci in Turkish (with the
excellent critical commentary of Körner making them accessible to a wider
audience), as well as that of Saeed and myself, have already shown how a pro-
cess of refinement and the overcoming of identified shortcomings can take
place in a contemporary Muslim ethical tradition. The same is starting to hap-
pen to Abderrahmane with scholars, such as Hashas, Birouk and Hallaq, and
will continue to gather pace as his work becomes better known. An obvious
direction that could be explored is to combine Abderrahmane’s more critical
outlook towards theWestern form of modernity and his spiritual themes with
Fazlur Rahman’s focus on social ethics and appliedQurʾanic hermeneutics. The
preceding discussion indicates that this is likely to be a fruitful endeavour in the
aspiration for a meaningful Islamic contribution to an ethical modernity.
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TheModernMysticism of Taha Abderrahmane
Harald Viersen
Introduction
Over the last forty-odd years Taha Abderrahmane has produced a vast oeuvre
in which he interweaves modern logical methods and philosophy of language
with a deep knowledge of the Islamic intellectual heritage to produce a philo-
sophy for the modern Muslim and his society. An important thread that runs
throughout his writings is his Sufi orientation. Since at least the publication
of his book Religious Practice and the Renewal of Reason (al-ʿAmal al-Dīnī wa-
Tajdīd al-ʿAql), in 1989, Abderrahmane has made it clear that he views the
(re-)appreciation of its mystical heritage as central to the renewal of Islamic
society. Sufi practice, he argues, is fundamental to a particular way of viewing
the world, a particular reason (ʿaql). The form of reason associated with Sufism
Abderrahmane dubs ‘supported reason’ (al-ʿaql al-muʾayyad). This most per-
fect form is distinguished from two other forms of reason, namely ‘abstracted
reason’ (al-ʿaql al-mujarrad), which he associates withWesternmodernity, and
‘guided reason’ (al-ʿaql al-musaddad), which is associatedwith Islamic practice
insofar as it is not guided by Sufi principles. This three-tiered structure returns
in later works, such as The Renewal of Method in the Reevaluation of Heritage
(Tajdīd al-Manhaj fī Taqwīmal-Turāth),TheQuestion of Ethics: AContribution to
the Ethical Critique of WesternModernity (Suʾāl al-Akhlāq:Musāhama fī al-Naqd
al-Akhlāqī lil-Ḥadātha al-Gharbiyya) and The Spirit of Modernity: The Portal to
the Establishment of Islamic Modernity (Rūḥ al-Ḥadātha: al-Madkhal ilā Taʾsīs
al-Ḥadātha al-Islāmiyya).
As is the case for all his writings, Abderrahmane’s command of Sufi heritage
and his knowledge of Sufi texts is thorough. His acquaintance with Sufi dis-
course is, moreover, amplified by his personal involvement in its practice. He
does not use Sufi literature only as a source of inspiration for his own writings,
or as a way of providing an authentic Islamic license for a modern philosoph-
ical project. His intellectual relation to Sufism is clearly rooted in livedmystical
experience.1
1 The first edition of The Religious Practice included an introduction in which Abderrahmane
discusses the role of Sufism in his life. This section was left out in subsequent editions. (See:
Mashrūḥ 2009, 33, n. 1).
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Notwithstanding the classical Sufi spirit of his writings, TahaAbderrahmane
remains a philosopher whose life straddles the turn of this millennium. He
may refer to al-Ghazālī (d. 505/1111), Ibn ʿArabī (d. 638/1240), or al-Qushayrī
(d. 465/1073), but the kinds of questions that he faces are not those faced by
a philosopher at the court of Niẓām al-Mulk (d. 485/1092) in 11th century Bagh-
dad. This, it should be stressed, is no mere triviality. As the British intellectual
historian Robin George Collingwood reminds us, questions are as important in
understanding a thinker as his answers to these questions. “A body of know-
ledge”, he writes, “consists not of “propositions,” “statements,” or “judgments,”
but of these together with the questions they are meant to answer … a logic in
which the answers are attended to and the questions neglected is a false logic”
(Collingwood 1939, 36–37).
Taking this insight to heart, we ought to treat Abderrahmane’s philosophy
in light of the distinctly modern questions that animate it: the confrontation
between different cultures and value systems, critical reflection on philosoph-
ical translation, the tenets ofWesternmodernity, the refutation of Salafism and
the politicization of Islam, and the formulation of an alternative, Islamic mod-
ernity. All of these problems belong to a modern context. Even if one were
to point out that concerns about correct philosophical translation or the con-
frontation between value systems are not limited to our age, it is undeniable
that they have become more central to a modern consciousness. Questions of
identity, authenticity, and intercultural relations take on a distinct character in
the modern world. They are treated differently in a technologically advanced
age, in which people are on the one hand more often confronted with differ-
ent ways of viewing the world, while on the other hand they experience the
pervasive universal influence ofWestern ideas as a rival to local views and prac-
tices.
Approaching Abderrahmane’s writings from the side of the questions that
he is trying to answer will, in the first place, shed new light on his intricately
fashioned philosophical system. However, it will accomplish more than this.
For one, putting his work in a modern context is crucial to understanding his
increasing popularity among a modern readership. Sufism has gained popular
appeal in both Eastern andWestern societies and several of the most promin-
ent Arab intellectuals of the 20th century have turned to Sufism as a source of
inspiration for amodern philosophy. Looking at howAbderrahmane and other
modern philosophers have used Sufism to shape their thinking will enable us
to better understand what it is that modern readers find in Sufism that helps
them cope with the exigencies of modern life.
Finally, one should keep in mind that even though the direct aims of this
chapter are narrowly exegetical, its effect will likely exceed these bounds.
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Sufism is central to Abderrahmane’s entire philosophical project. By redefining
the role that Sufism plays within this system, the entire epistemological and
ontological apparatus that underlies his philosophy will have to move along
with it. In particular, it will be argued that the role of the individual and his
relation to society are greatly affected by themore individualistic modern con-
text in which Sufism is employed. A detailed examination of how this ought to
influence our perception of Abderrahmane’s ethical positions lies beyond the
purview of this article, but that it ought to play a significant role in our assess-
ment of his theory of ethics lies beyond doubt.
1 Abderrahmane’s Sufism
Taha Abderrahmane’s interest and involvement in Sufi practice dates back to
his youth, when his father introduced him to a local sheikh (ʿAbd al-Raḥmān
2017, 9.00 min). He is known to follow the Budshishiyya order and has talked
in some detail about the influence that Sufism has had on his life and thought
(Bāṭṭawī 2013). This influence is palpable in his writing, both in its structure
and its content. One could point, for instance, to the way he uses the triliteral
structure of the Arabic words to conceive of different interrelated terms stem-
ming from the same roots and ascribing a special, immanent meaning to these
relations. It is evident also in his fondness for inventing tripartite classifications
to define mystical states,2 in his idiosyncratic vocabulary and in his references
to Sufi learning and poetry.3
In terms of the content of his philosophical project, Abderrahmane’s Sufi
orientation leaves its mark on his analysis of reason. For Abderrahmane the
analysis of reason has been a central preoccupation from the very start of his
career as a philosopher.4 Already in his doctoral thesis, written at the Sor-
bonne, we see a young thinker interested in explaining how a culturally spe-
2 This is characteristic of Sufi literature (Schimmel 1975, 13).
3 For example, Abderrahmane’s creative, idiosyncratic and therefore much-discussed trans-
lation of the Cartesian cogito with unẓur tajid carries a distinct Sufi flavor as it stems from
a poem ascribed to the 13th century Andalusian Sufi Abū al-ʿAbbās al-Mursī. (The entire
hemistich reads “look and find in you existence in its entirety”—unẓur tajid fīka al-wujūd
bi-asrihi.) In an interview, Abderrahmane indicated that he found this line referenced in a
work by Ibn ʿAjība, but only after having comeupwith this translationhimself (ʿAbd al-Raḥmān
2013a, 77–78). The title of the book referenced in a footnote as the source of Abderrahmane’s
find, namely Ibn ʿAjība’s Taqyīdān fī Waḥdat al-Wujūd, does not contain the name of the
author of this line. It is another book by Ibn ʿAjība that ultimately refers us to Abū al-ʿAbbās
al-Mursī (Ibn ʿAjība 2006, 295).
4 On several occasions Abderrahmane has recalled that he was spurred to study what he terms
the West’s “reason” (ʿaql) following the Arab defeat in the Six DayWar of 1967 in an effort to
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cific reason is formed by language (Abderrahmane 1979). In his later books,
starting withThe Religious Practice andThe Renewal of Reason (al-ʿAmal al-Dīnī
wa-Tajdīdal-ʿAql), published in 1989, he goes further and establishes a hierarchy
between different kinds of reason. This book is Abderrahmane’s first attempt
at articulating an alternative to two distinct ways of viewing the world: that of
the West and of modern non-/anti-Sufi Islam. As alluded to above, Abderrah-
mane associates eachof thesewith aparticular formof reason and then goes on
to propose a third kind that encompasses the other two, yet also goes beyond
them in important ways, fixing what is wrong with both.
According to the framework presented in The Religious Practice, reason is
not a single, stable entity, but a continuous activity that has different stages
of development. Abderrahmane follows Sufi doctrine by describing these dif-
ferent stages as steps in a single journey. One ascends through the different
forms of reason, starting at the lowest rungs of the ladder and climbing ever
higher with the aim of attaining a perfect form of understanding. The most
basic stage is defined by Abderrahmane as that of abstracted reason. Abstrac-
ted reason refers to the kind of demonstrative reason that he thinks is typical of
Western culture. It portrays reason as a faculty, present in each human being,
the sole purpose of which is to relate ideas and impressions to each other. This
is essentially the kind of reason associated with empirical science. It takes the
appearances at face value, as an indication of the ultimate nature of reality and
tries to give a true and exhaustive description of this reality.5
Abstracted reason offers a limited perspective on the world, according to
Abderrahmane. Try as it might, it cannot go beyond the limits of what is given
in experience. Importantly, it lacks any moral dimension. In theWestern ima-
gination,manhasbecome themeasureof all things.Westernphilosophershave
severed the link between ethics and religion,6 thereby removing any limits to
man’s practical engagement with the world, leaving it entirely up to his whims
how he decides to act. As consciousness of the deeper, meaningful dimension
of nature recedes, the world is turned into a sterile place that is only knowable
insofar as its goings-on can be brought under scientific laws. Given this out-
look, only that remains valuable which serves the needs of man. The empirical
sciences that are based on the use of abstracted reasonmay increase his ability
to predict andmanipulate nature, but he is left without any purpose outside of
his own arbitrary will.
find out how to counter Western dominance of the Muslim world (ʿAbd al-Raḥmān 2013, 17;
ʿAbd al-Raḥmān 2017, 17.30 min).
5 For a definition of abstracted reason, see: ʿAbd al-Raḥmān 2009, 17.
6 See hismore recentwork for a thorough analysis of this phenomenon (ʿAbd al-Raḥmān 2014).
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The concept of abstracted reason serves as the starting point for Abder-
rahmane’s critique of Western modernity. In fact, one may discern in Abder-
rahmane’s portrayal of the effects of abstracted reason a basically Weberian
analysis of the modern predicament. When he describes the Western outlook
as without value or meaning, he essentially refers to what Max Weber (1864–
1920) has described as the gradual process of disenchantment characteristic
of Western modernity. Like Weber, Abderrahmane considers this a sorry state
of affairs. He goes further, however. According to him, abstracted reason goes
against the essential nature of mankind. Man is essentially, he says, an ethical
creature. What distinguishes him from animals is not his capacity for reason,
but his ability to engage in ethical practice (ʿAbd al-Raḥmān 2013, 147). Modern
Western man has become ignorant of this fact. He has put (abstracted) reason
on a pedestal, forgetting about his moral duties. This is the source of the ills of
modernity that he discusses more in his later, full-fledged critiques of Western
modernity (Ibid., 76).
One step up from abstracted reason is guided reason (al-ʿaql al-musaddad).
The main difference between this form of reason and abstracted reason is that
it focuses on practice, not on theory. In following the rules contained in the
divinely revealed law, it leads man towards happiness and away from harm.7
Thus, in contrast to abstracted reason, which aims to provide a picture of
what the world is like, it guides man according to a divinely sanctioned moral
framework. Guided reason does not go against the essence of man, because it
acknowledges the central role that practice plays for a being whose essence it
is to be ethical.
Acknowledging the practical dimension of human life, guided reason has
some clear advantages over abstracted reason. It relates our actions to values
(qiyam), instead of merely to our personal goals (ghāyāt). By turning towards
eternal values, man enters a realm of meaning. The sterile environs of abstrac-
ted reason get imbued with value, independent of man’s particular predilec-
tions. Guided reason serves as a bridge that leads man beyond the limits of
appearances, showing him the contours of the moral framework that under-
girds Creation.
Yet, guided reason also has some defects, or ills (āfāt) as Abderrahmane
refers to them. Living according to the rules set by the revealed law does
not necessarily require any insight into their rationale or deeper meaning. It
only requires that one abide by the superficial meaning of these rules, which
7 See for the formal definition: ʿAbd al-Raḥmān 2009, 58.
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may cause people to perform their religious duties in the wrong way and for
the wrong purpose. This defect of superficiality (āfat al-taẓāhur) may cause
believers to put in only the most minimal effort necessary to comply with
Sharia, instead of dedicating one’s whole life to the worship of Allah. It may
induce them to bemore interested in impressing other people with their devo-
tion, either deserved or undeserved. Or, by contrast, they may become overly
concerned with their own actions and disregard the other, as well as God’s
role in enabling them to perform these actions (ʿAbd al-Raḥmān 2009, 79–
83).
Moreover, guided reason can lead to believers merely imitating others, in-
stead of judging for themselves what is demanded of them—which Abder-
rahmane calls āfat al-taqlīd, or “the defect of mimicry” (ʿAbd al-Raḥmān 2009,
83–89). This is not cured by a return to the original texts, as is presumed by
adherents of Salafism. Salafis may rely less on the example of others, but their
readings of these texts are essentially of an abstracted kind (ʿAbd al-Raḥmān
2009, 99–100), as they pay no heed to the spiritual side of Islam. Moreover,
their approach to Islam is liable to lead to politicization (tasyīs) and extrem-
ism (taṭarruf ), as was demonstrated by the sometimes violent politicization of
Islam that has affected theMiddle East in particular frommore or less the 1970s
until this day.8
If abstracted reason is associated with Western modernity and guided reason
with the Islamic revival (al-ṣaḥwa al-islāmiyya) that occurred during the sec-
ond half of the 20th century, then the third type of reason discussed by Abder-
rahmane is that of Sufi practice and it presents a correction to both.9 It there-
fore presents the final stage of development; reason in its complete, perfect
form.This reason,whichhedubs ‘supported,’ inquires into the essenceof things
through engaging in the practice of divine law and going beyond the necessary
requirements of this law.10 By engaging in the kind of spiritual practice associ-
ated with supported reason, man not only inquires into the outer appearance
of how the world is—as is the case with abstracted reason, nor does he try
to determine the right kinds of actions in light of the revealed law—as with
8 It should be remembered that many strands within Salafism have demonstrated a partic-
ularly fierce animosity towards Sufism. Abderrahmane’s specific defense of Sufism against
Salafi opponents should be understood within this context (Knysh 2017, chap. 6).
9 Abderrahmane explicitly positions his work as an alternative both toWestern reason and




guided reason. Rather, with spiritual practice man adopts a new view on the
world around him that allows him to perceive the inner essence of what sur-
rounds him.Hewho commits to this practical experience (al-tajriba al-ḥayya11)
realizes that the truth addresses him in every thing he encounters, in himself
and in all of God’s creations and that all of this is suffused with a meaningful
dimension dependent on Him (ʿAbd al-Raḥmān 2009, 128). The practitioner
moves from amere superficial (ẓāhir) following of the rules set by the revealed
law, to an understanding of their hidden (bāṭin)meanings. Themoral demands
placed on the believer are enlivened. Rather than being abstract dos and don’ts
they turn into aesthetic values that he can experience directly in nature (ʿAbd
al-Raḥmān 2013c, 88–89). Faith is thus turned from an ascetic duty into a con-
tinuous, pleasurable experience of how all God’s creatures relate to Him (ʿAbd
al-Raḥmān 2013a, 19–20).
This intimate acquaintancewith the essential structure of nature has impor-
tant ethical consequences. To understand why, we need to realize that Abder-
rahmane does not see actions as discrete events that allow for only one kind
of description. Actions can be performed in many different ways. They have
different dimensions, depending on the context as well as on the person who
performs the action (ʿAbd al-Raḥmān 2013c, 81–84). Changes in these aspects
change the character of the action and it is only through a process of con-
stantly attuningoneself tonewsituations thatman learns tobe aperfect ethical
being.
This is precisely the point at which supported reason goes beyond guided
reason.Whereas both subscribe to rules laid down in the Sharia, guided reason
merely follows the letter while the supported reason implements these general
rules according to the specific personal demands of each situation. Echoing
similar arguments made byWestern philosophers like Charles Taylor (b. 1931),
Paul Ricoeur (1913–2005), and Alasdair Macintyre (b. 1929),12 Abderrahmane
stresses that ethics is not to be conceived of as a systemof commandments, but
as a way of being in which your actions are consonant with your personality.
One should not judge acts individually, but as part of a narrative that defines
someone’s personality ( fa-takūn akhlāq al-insān hiya qiṣṣatuh allatī tuḥaddid
huwiyyatah, ʿAbd al-Raḥmān 2013c, 157). Consequently, the question of what
one ought to do—the question of ethics—cannot be decided on a general
11 In Abderrahmane’s rather idiosyncratic vocabulary the term ḥayy, which would normally
be translated as “alive,” is defined in opposition to theoretical (naẓarī) and conceptual
(taṣawwurī), as meaning practical (Ibid., 122, n. 41).
12 Abderrahmane in fact refers to Macintyre and Ricoeur in making this point (Abderrah-
mane 2013c, 157, n. 21).
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basis. It differs for each person and is particular to someone’s personality and
the particular situation that he is in. Supported reason is, essentially, a process
in which man attunes himself to the changing flow of the world (taghayyur)
and to the changing states of his own self.
More than a correction of the non-Sufi practice of Islam, supported reason
offers a position fromwhich to criticize and correct the ills that beset themod-
ernworld. If the central problemof modernity is theway inwhich it rids nature
of allmeaning, in otherwords itsdisenchantment, thenAbderrahmane’s appeal
to supported reason can be read as a form of reenchantment. Through Sufi
practice, he claims, man learns to discern what is hidden behind the surface
of experience, which in turn allows him to reconnect to values that inhere in
nature and arenot derivative of man’s personal desires.Where themodern con-
dition is characterized by a lack of certainty (ʿadam al-yaqīn) and of quietude
(ʿadam al-iṭmiʾnān) supported reason alleviates this deep-felt anxiety by tak-
ing away its root causes, namely man’s estrangement from nature, ethics, and
religion (ʿAbd al-Raḥmān 2009, 223).
2 Two Other Modern Receptions of Sufism
Abderrahmane is by nomeans the only contemporary Arab intellectual to have
turned to Sufism for inspiration in confronting themodernworld. Having given
a brief outline of the role that Sufism plays in his philosophy we will take a
detour to see how other contemporary Arab intellectuals have benefited from
Sufi learning to defend the concept of the modern individual. The aim of this
comparison is to show, byway of examples, how Sufism has been used to shape
their ideas; what kinds of questions these writers try to answer andwhy Sufism
in particular has appealed to them as a traditional basis for a modern philo-
sophical outlook.
To be clear, this comparison is not meant as an assessment of who is more
in line with the Sufi tradition. The aim is to show how modern uses of Sufism
exhibit certain affinities, due to the fact that they are articulatedwithin a shared
modern context. Far from being a stable, coherent set of teachings, the Sufi
tradition is vibrant, ever-changing, and often inconsistent. Despite at times
very vigorous opposition, it has survived through the centuries by adapting
to new circumstances, spreading the world over and fusing with local tradi-
tions. Rather than try to pinpoint a supposedly orthodox Sufism in order to
judge whether moderns are following this orthodox line or corrupting it, it is
more fruitful to regardmodern intellectualswho articulate new interpretations
of Sufism as continuing the process of re-articulation and adaption. They too
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bring out certain aspects within the Sufi tradition, while obscuring others in
response to questions that matter to them.
Naturally, considering their shared environment, modern receptions of Su-
fism reveal certain general trends. For example, Alexander Knysh notes that
“Sufism’smodern-day advocates have tended tominimize or evendeny its asso-
ciation with such “objectionable” beliefs and practices,” like “grave worship”
and “popular superstitions.” Moreover, modern interpretations of Sufism tend
to emphasize the individual aspects of mystical practice. In order to appeal to
modern sensitivities, “Sufism has become subtly “privatized”.” As part of this
process of elevating Sufism above the level of the quotidian,more philosophic-
ally minded interpreters have come to “foreground its gnoseological andmeta-
physical aspects,” expanding the notion of Sufism to include falsafa (Knysh
2017, 47–48).
Privatization and intellectualization are, indeed, two aspects of themodern-
day, philosophical receptions of Sufism that will be discussed here, namely
those of Abdurrahman Badawi and Adonis. For both of them, Sufism offers
resources to analyze and critique what they see as a deficient mode of being
in modern society. In response to the superficial, positivistic worldview they
associate with modernity, they tout a new philosophy of life, centered on the
individual.Their receptionof Sufi insight reflects this orientation, as their inter-
pretations of some of its central doctrines emphasize the central role of the
individual as a source of value in an otherwise meaningless world.
2.1 Abdurrahman Badawi
AbdurrahmanBadawi (1917–2002) iswidely considered tobe the father of exist-
entialism, if not of modern philosophy, in the Arab world. His PhD defense in
1944 at the University of Cairo was a “national event” that was covered in the
nationalmedia.Noneother thanṬahaḤusayn (1889–1973) hailed it as “thebirth
of modernArab philosophy” (Di-Capua 2018, 52). Badawi’s exposure to existen-
tialism started under the tutelage of the French phenomenologist Alexandre
Koyré (1892–1964). During the latter’s stint at the University of Cairo, which
started in 1933, he introduced his students to the works of Edmund Husserl
(1859–1938) and Martin Heidegger (1889–1976). Upon being introduced to this
new and exciting branch of philosophy, Badawi became convinced that Heide-
gger’s existentialist philosophy was the way of the future. Being Koyré’s most
promising student, he set himself the ambitious task of founding anArab exist-
entialism that could function as the philosophical framework for a modern
Arab society.
Badawi is too intelligent and creative a thinker to be pinned down as amere
copyist and interpreter of European existentialist philosophy. He hasmade ser-
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ious efforts to further develop existentialist thought. So confident was he of
his own ability to take existentialism to a higher plane that he describes his
work as complimentary to that of Heidegger (Di-Capua, 272, n. 30). Nonethe-
less, the kernel of his philosophical project is the French existentialist tradi-
tion and its introduction to the Arab world. One major question for someone
who, like Badawi, was also steeped in the Arab philosophical, theological, and
legal tradition, was how to weave existentialism together with Arab culture in
a way that would give it its own, authentically Arab character. Here, Badawi
turned to Sufism. Already as a student, Koyré had prodded him to explore
the link between existentialism and Sufism. His philosophical project during
the next decades would be to merge these two strands, Sufism and existen-
tialism, in order to create an Arab existentialism, rooted in the local tradi-
tion.
To a large extent, this project of merging existentialism and Sufism consisted
in finding equivalent terms and ideas in Sufi and existentialist philosophy. An
excellent example of this is a talk he gave in Lebanon entitled al-Insāniyya
wa-l-Wujūdiyya fī al-Fikr al-ʿArabī. In this talk Badawi starts out from the obser-
vation that both Sufism and existentialism are rooted in subjective existence
(al-wujūd al-dhātī). In both cases, the different states in which the individual
subject may find himself are the foundation for the general categories of exist-
ence. Both therefore subscribe to the existentialist adage that existence comes
before essence (Badawi 1982, 73). Sufism, like existentialism, is a form of ana-
lysis of subjective existence. The only real existing entity is the subject. The
outer world is only derivative of this subjective existence (Ibid., 74). In light of
their shared starting point, it should not come as a surprise that Sufism and
existentialism share a number of central ideas. Badawi’s purpose in this paper
is to flesh these out. He explains, for instance, that the notion of the perfect
man (al-insān al-kāmil) resembles Søren Kierkegaard’s (1813–1855) notion of
the unique or One (Ibid., 75), that the Arabic term for ego (āniyya)—central to
existentialist thought—is of Sufi origin (Ibid., 80), and that Heidegger’s notion
of Angst resembles the Sufi idea of qalaq (Ibid., 88).
Through these equivalences, Badawi aims to demonstrate that Sufis have,
much earlier, explored problems similar to those that concern modern-day
existentialists. This then offers a way for gaining a sense of cultural authen-
ticity. In the eyes of Badawi’s generation, the faithful transmission of European
ideas and styles had lasted long enough. Now was the time for Arabs to find a
distinctive voice of their own. As he writes in an early work, with the revealing
title ‘The interests of the youth’ (humūm al-shabāb): “This time our role is to
be creators and not representatives, transmitters and guardians of (someone
else’s light)” (Di-Capua 2018, 50).
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Still, one may ask, if the Arab youth is interested in being “creators” instead
of “transmitters,” then why not do away with existentialism? As long as exist-
entialist thought remains the leitmotif of modern Arab philosophy, it may be
hard to lay claim to it as a specifically Arab frame of thought. The answer is, of
course, that Badawi’s primary allegiance is to existentialism, not Sufism. For
him, Sufism is “the starting point for our Arab existentialist school that we
would like to make our new philosophy for life and existence” (Badawi 1982,
99). The goal is “to furnish the existentialist school with roots (uṣūl) from our
spiritual history” (Ibid., 100).
In short, the interest in cultural authenticity is trumped by the substantive
appeal of existentialism.This is fair enough, of course, butwhatwas it that gave
existentialism such appeal to Badawi? First of all, it must be recalled that exist-
entialismpresents a forceful rejection of a previous generation of philosophers.
Frenchexistentialismarose as youngFrench intellectuals becameenthralledby
phenomenology and the existentialist writings of Heidegger, partly, because it
offered away of going beyond the neo-Kantian positivism and Bergsonian spir-
itualism that had dominated French thought until the 1930s (Kleinberg 2005,
5–8). In this sense, the interests of the new French that turned to existential-
ism dovetailed with those of Badawi and the flourishing Arab existentialist
movement. The latter, too, were at odds with the kind of positivist, Cartesian-
ism, represented by Ṭaha Ḥusayn as well as the more Anglophile empiricism
propagated by someone like AḥmadAmīn (1886–1954). However, they shared a
distaste for outdated mystical thinking and rigid traditionalism. The new gen-
eration to which Badawi belonged was looking for a third option.
It is not only for contrarian reasons, however, that existentialism appealed
to someone like Badawi. Particularly in its French (Sartrean) formulation, to
which Badawi tends, existentialism propagates a radical notion of freedom.
Instead of viewing man in terms of his background, he is viewed as a creature
always at liberty to change his life and himself. This ability to wrest oneself free
from the identity and circumstances that one has been saddled with explains
part of the appeal to intellectuals in the (previously) colonized part of the
world. As Yoav Di-Capua notes, the turn from a view of man in terms of fixed
racial and cultural categories to one inwhichmanmade his own identity “from
theperspective of the colonized […] announced the possibility of being human
in the universal sense of the word” (Di-Capua 2018, 9). The propagation of the
self-reliant individual, moreover, has shown itself to be a powerful rallying cry
in opposition to the kind of all-powerful state that continued to rule most of
these countries, even after their erstwhile colonizers had left.
However, important as anticolonialism may have been to the intellectual
context in Egypt during the 1940’s, it would be wrong to read the appeal of
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existentialism merely through the lens of a burgeoning anti-colonial move-
ment. Existentialism presents a powerful quintessentially modern outlook in
its own right. It embodies a 20th century restatement of the romanticist dis-
illusionment with the Enlightenment ideals of rationality, universalism, and
progress. In amodern world in which “God, Reason, Society, Improvement and
the Soul are being quietly carted off,” in which “the individual is more genu-
inely frightened and alone,” existentialism offers a solution (Murdoch 1997,
223). The emphasis it places on the individual, self-reliance, and private con-
science presents an antidote to the meaninglessness that besets modern man.
Aware of the absurdity of life in aworld that has lostmeaning, the existentialist
presents us with a new kind of subject, one that makes his ownmeaning in life
by committing himself to a way of living it that is particular to him. He, in a
sense, follows the individualistic orientation of modernWestern thought to its
logical conclusion, raising the individual to become the fountain of all value.
Whenwe turn to Badawi’s dissertation, it is this central thrust of existential-
ist thought that stands out.His aimhere is to distinguish twoways of being: that
of the self (dhāt) and of the object (mawdūʿ). The former is the authentic (aṣīl)
way of being for humans and it is characterized in the first place by utter free-
dom. The object, on the other hand, behaves according to deterministic rules
that are described using what Badawi calls logical reason (al-ʿaql al-manṭiqī).
Ethics ought to be determined by the tension between these twoways of being,
the free and the determined, and cannot be the preserve of logical reason.
Therefore, logical reason cannot be “the only faculty that man is able to use
to understand the reality of living being” (Badawi 1973, 148–149).
In light of this philosophical outlook, it is clear why Badawi turned to Sufism
for support. An alternative to sterile determinism, emphasis on individual
experience, and the conclusion that logical reason alone cannot reveal all of
whatmatters to human beings, a kernel of all these ideas can be found in some
way or other within the Sufi tradition. Turning to Adonis, we will see that sim-
ilar elements attracted him to Sufism, even though he uses them differently.
2.2 Adonis
Though not himself a Sufi, the well-known Syrian-Arab poet Adonis, born as
Ali Ahmad Said Esber (b. 1930), has drawn inspiration from the Sufi tradi-
tion in formulating his own revolutionary, aesthetic, and humanist outlook.
Adonis comes to Sufism from a poetic angle and his appreciation of it remains
of a rather aesthetic kind. He views Sufis, for instance, as the forerunners of
prose poetry, a form of poetry that he has championed since the 1950’s as a
modern alternative to the regimented classical style. According to him, prose
poetry allows for the expressionof important truths that neither regular speech
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nor highly stylized and regimented classical poetry is able to convey. This was
acknowledged long ago by Sufi poets, who used it to give expression to mystic-
ally induced insights in forms that go beyond socially accepted schemas.
A similarly aesthetic and anti-conventional bent is evident in Adonis’s per-
ception of Sufism as a forerunner of surrealism. Like the surrealists, Sufis look
on “existence as somethingmysterious” (Adonis 2013, 44) rather than as aworld
of the logical contradictions that “constitute the apparel of social conservat-
ism” (Ibid., 73). Sufi aesthetic sense “rests on contradictions” (Ibid. 120) and it is
these contradictions that push the artist to go continuously forward, to renew
himself constantly using figurative language. God, according to Sufis, is not an
entity distinct fromexistence, but is part of this world. He is a “continuousmys-
tery” and therefore to knowhim requires “continuous revelation” of a symbolic,
aesthetic kind (Ibid., 119). Like the surrealists, Sufis regard imagination as carry-
ing man beyond the realm of logical consistency, beyond “material or natural
reality” (Ibid., 134). Both reject the modern scientific treatment of “existence
as a problem that must have a solution” that is deduced through reason and
logic and aims at “exerting control over existence” (Ibid., 44). They rather look
to the unconscious as offering a route to truth. “The states of Sufism,” accord-
ing to Adonis, “do not actually depend on proof but on seeing and taste and
occur when a person is not conscious” (Ibid., 106). In Adonis’s view of Sufism,
it is the delirium produced by the experience of divine love that allows man to
experience true reality.
As is the case for Badawi’s existentialist Sufism, Adonisian Sufism is highly
individualistic. It encourages the individual to look for truth through personal
experience (tajriba shakhṣiyya) (Adūnīs 2016a, 137). Instead of searching for
truth outside of himself, the Sufi “becomes the source of knowledge” (Adūnīs
2016b, 108).This quest for individuality and theneed tobreakwith conventions,
to constantly renew oneself, to quarrel with the powers that be, in order to get
at the truth and strive for justice, is where we see another strand in Adonis’s
thought rear its head, namely his advocacy for revolution. He views Sufis as
not only breaking with “traditional aestheticism” (Adonis 2013, 16) but also as
forming a subversive answer to the rigid laws of mainstream Islamic society.
Sufism is presented by Adonis as a bastion of freethinking, inspired by a small
group of creative individuals who thrived on going against the grain. Noting
the aversion to Sufism of thinkers like Ibn Taymiyya (d. 728/1328) and al-Shāfiʿī
(d. 204/820), whom Adonis associates with traditionalist, conservative Islam,
he interprets their disparagement as a form of praise. Somewhat ironically, he
therefore agrees with Ibn Taymiyya’s assessment that “Sufism is worshipping
God without following orders or laws” (Ibid. 15).
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2.3 Some Remarks on Badawi and Adonis
Clearly, Adonis is attracted to some of the same features of Sufism that Badawi
brought out in his existentialist reading of Sufi heritage. Both espouse a decid-
edly humanist Sufism in which the individual takes pride of place. Whether
it is Adonis’s artistic genius, or Badawi’s self-reliant, authentic subject, the
individual is the original locus of rights, values, and freedom. Moreover, their
Sufism is highly secularized. Its Islamic pedigree is acknowledged, but the val-
ues and ideas they distill from it have a universal, non-religious claim. This is
apparent in the parallels they draw between Sufism and existentialism and sur-
realism, respectively. They approach Sufism as a holistic philosophy of life. In
their eyes it forms amore or less coherent,metaphysically substantiatedworld-
view. Evenwhere theymay flirtwith its ‘irrational’ sides—Adonis is particularly
fond of this—the intention is not to advocate forms of magic or anything else
thatwould fly in the faceof a scientificworldview.Rather, the irrational is celeb-
rated in its romantic guise as that which lies beyond the realm of science, that
which is not discursive and which can only be “derived from experience/taste”
and finds its sole expression in art.
For the most part, these cursory observations confirm the points made
by Knysh about modern-day receptions of Sufism. Its private dimension is
emphasized at the expense of its publicmanifestations. Its coherentmetaphys-
ical underpinnings are brought out to give it an air of philosophy, while its
inconsistencies and anti-scientific aspects are pushed aside. Yet, their similarit-
ies go deeper than amere playing intomodern secular and scientific sensibilit-
ies. There is a more fundamental reason why these two authors turn to Sufism.
They clearly subscribe to a form of humanist individualism and they see this
embodied in Sufism. Their humanism, however, is not that of the 16th century
confidence in the independent use of human reason. Nor is it the kind of sec-
ular humanism that arose as a neutralizer of religious conflict in Europe one
century later. Their individualism, rather, is forced upon them. It is born out of
the Romantic anxiety that—in an ever more rationalized world, in which all
happenings tend to be reduced to fundamental physics, in which governments
grow increasingly powerful, and globalizing forces crowd out local identities—
man’s link to nature, to meaning, to God has become unhinged. In order to
continue to feel at home in the world, the modern individual requires a new
way of relating to it.
IrisMurdoch (1919–1999) has observed that 20th century literature produced
two kinds of novels that rise to the task of fulfilling this demand: the existen-
tialist and the mystical novel. The former, she writes, “shows us freedom and
virtue as the assertion of will.” It presents the reader with a figure with the
“lonely brave man,” someone who is deeply critical of society, a godless adven-
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turer (Murdoch 1997, 225). This character epitomizes the kind of individualism
that is the “natural mode of being of the capitalist era” (Ibid., 224). Capitalism,
modern science, anddemocracy require an ethic that seesman as an individual
who moves freely and makes his own decisions, an ethic reflected in the Prot-
estant picture of man as being endowed with a free conscience, not enslaved
to authority.13 This picture of a free individual did not in itself imply a form
of existential anxiety, that is, not as long as his trust in God, Reason, and Soci-
ety was maintained. It was only during the 19th century, when his confidence
in these father figures of the Enlightenment began to slacken, that the modern
individualwas confrontedwith the fact that the only thing he could fall back on
for comfort was the curious entity put at the center of modern society: himself.
Modern man now “finds his religious and metaphysical background so impov-
erished that he is in some danger of being left with nothing of inherent value
except will-power itself” (Ibid., 224).
The mystical novel finds itself confronted with a similar kind of anxiety, but
it seeks a different solution to it. Instead of grappling with an individual who
might do anything, the mystical novel “shows us freedom and virtue as under-
standing, or obedience to the Good.” Man is pictured as divided “between a
fallen nature and a spiritual world” (Murdoch 1997, 225). The mystic has lost
his confidence in the traditional structures of religion, but does not want to let
go of religion as an idea. Mystics are also individuals, but not in the sense that
they are radically free to do whatever they want. Rather, they are free to invent
their own religious imagery. They are, more often than not, artists.
Although these labels are not a neat fit with either Badawi or Adonis—
such broad categorizations hardly ever are—Murdoch’s categorization offers
us an interesting way of tracing their philosophical projects. Both are con-
cerned about the position of man in the modern world. They fret about the
relationship between the individual and an overpowering force, whether in the
concrete form of an oppressive government, or the more ephemeral garb of a
world without moral bearings. In response to this anxiety, both turn towards
the individual.
Their different orientations are reflected in their viewsonSufism.Yet,where-
as Sufism, for Badawi, is a tradition that has committed itself to understanding
man’s existential condition and emphasizing his freedom, for Adonis, it is not
only ananalytical tool, but also a sourceof inspiration.He viewsmystical exper-
ience as akin to the kind of aesthetic experience that opens up new vistas of
13 For a more detailed description of the origins of modern individualism see: Taylor 1991,
chap. II; Guignon 2004, chap. 3; Taylor 1989, pt. II; Macintyre 2013, chap. 3.
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what lies beyond the materialistic universe. It opens up a world of meaning
that man ought to explore in endlessly creative ways. Murdoch describes the
mystic as someone wanting “to invent new religious imagery (or twist old reli-
gious imagery) in an empty situation” (Ibid. 226). As a description of Adonis’s
ambition as a poet this is quite accurate.
The flipside of their shared focus on the individual is a deeply felt anxiety,
particularly pronounced in Adonis’s account, about the equalizing power of
society. The individual human being is oppressed by the power of themajority.
Tradition, which functions as a tool to suppress the revolutionary sentiment, is
used to prohibit innovation and outlaw anyone who dares to express his indi-
vidual nature and do things differently.
It is not hard to see why modern intellectuals would turn to Sufism. Islamic
mysticism has a history of exploring the internal human experience.Moreover,
one can see why its ascetic, solipsistic strands would lend themselves to a
defense of the private sphere against the generalizing tendencies of the pub-
lic.Within the Islamic tradition, Sufism is eminently suited for articulating the
kindof individualisticworldviews espousedbyBadawi andAdonis using a clas-
sical vocabulary.
This, however, should not mislead us into thinking that these intellectuals
present no more than a restatement of ancient insight into the nature of the
self. It may be, as Talal Asad (b. 1932) argues, a “mistaken assumption thatmod-
ernity introduced subjective interiority into Islam.” But it would equally be a
mistake to deduce from this that modern receptions do not add anything new
to the Sufi idea of the individual subject. Modernity does, after all, introduce
“a new kind of subjectivity, one that is appropriate to ethical autonomy and
aesthetic self-invention—a concept of “the subject” that has a new grammar”
(Asad 2003, 225).
This, indeed, is what we see in Badawi and Adonis. In their thinking, the
self-fashioning individual takes pride of place. He becomes the locus of mean-
ing in a disenchanted world. Sufism, with its appeal to the non-materialistic,
non-scientific dimensions of human experience, fits this project. It presents
a tradition, internal to Islam, that appears to support more recent critiques of
modernity. In reading Sufism from this point of view, its vocabulary is redefined
to fit a particular idea of the individual. From a tradition that teaches “that
one’s ultimate fulfillment lies in transcending one’s self,” Sufism on these mod-
ern readings is recast so as to undergird “a new relation to the ground of one’s
being” (Loutfy and Berguno 2005, 152).
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2.4 Comparing Abderrahmane with Badawi and Adonis
At first blush, it would seem a long shot to find any convergence between
Abderrahmane and two intellectuals who differ as much from him as Badawi
and Adonis. They represent the very things that Abderrahmane is against.
Since the earliest publication he has explicitly opposed the Badawi’s exist-
entialist philosophy as an unwarranted introduction of ontological thinking
to the Arab tradition (Abderrahmane 1979, 172). Meanwhile, Adonis’s radic-
ally secular worldview is hardly likely to count on Abderrahmane’s endorse-
ment.
Some clear points of contention stand out. Obviously, Abderrahmane’s phi-
losophy does not evince the same humanist orientation. He views humanism
as an ideology, rooted in abstracted reason, that severs the link between ethics
and religion. It puts man instead of God at the center of creation and thereby
licenses him to do with the world as he sees fit. His idea of ‘supported reason’
is meant as an antidote to such presumptuousness. It allows man to become
aware of the meaning that suffuses all of creation and how each and every one
of its creatures has its own rightful place in it and thereby transformsman from
a ruler in his own right to a viceroy for God on earth. This conceptualization
of man’s role as God’s ‘trustee’ is central to Abderrahmane’s ethical project,
which has been summarized by Mohammed Hashas in terms of the ‘trustee-
ship paradigm’ (Hashas 2015, 102).
For this reason, Abderrahmane’s Sufi outlook is also self-consciously reli-
gious. The kind of mystical experience that he describes is only possible within
a religious (and specifically an Islamic) framework. Supported reason, after all,
is the final stage within a progressive development of reason that includes the
observance of the rules laid down by the Sharia. This is not the case for Badawi,
whoviews the existentialist insight of Sufismas equivalent to that of aChristian
thinker like Kierkegaard, and certainly not for Adonis, who onmany occasions
has given vent to his dislike for any form of organized religion.
Because Abderrahmane views Sufism as a practice rooted in Sharia he is also
not interested in finding equivalences between Sufism andmodern intellectual
movements, like existentialism or surrealism. The kind of mystical experience
achieved in Islam is of a very special kind. It is not merely one instantiation
of an insight into the human condition that can be achieved through differ-
ent means. Relatedly, he also puts greater emphasis on Sufi practice. Where
Badawi and Adonis emphasize the philosophical and perhaps the artistic side
of Sufism, they are not very much concerned with the relationship between its
more abstract worldview and the observance of either Sharia or of practices
associated particularly with Sufism.What it comes down to is that Badawi and
Adonis approach Sufism from the outside, as intellectuals with a philosoph-
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ical project. Abderrahmane, however, approaches Sufism from the inside, as a
practitionerwho is convinced that its teachingshold the key tounlockingman’s
moral essence.
Notwithstanding their differences, there is one crucial thread that runs through
and motivates all of the modern interpretations of Sufism discussed here.
Whether in the existentialist appeal to the radical freedom of the individual
person, or the ability of the poetic genius to find meaning outside the sterile
confines of scientific discourse, or the Sufi path to experience the hidden
essence of God’s creation, eachhas turned to Sufismas an antidote towhat they
perceive to be the nefarious effects wrought on Arab society byWestern mod-
ernity andby an overly rigid, impersonal interpretation of Islam. Existentialism
is, as noted earlier by Murdoch, “the child of the Romantic movement.” It both
squares with the individualist ethic of a capitalist, democratic society and at
the same time it offers a defense against the anti-individualistic tendencies of
the bureaucratic state and the deterministic claims of modern science. Sim-
ilarly, Adonis’s aesthetic-secular mysticism stresses the role of the individual
as a bastion against the positivistic generality proclaimed by scientists and the
oppressive force of both the state and the masses. Both are critical of modern-
ity in a way that is reminiscent of Abderrahmane, who chides the abstracted
reason for causing the kind of juridification and bureaucratization that char-
acterizes modern society,14 as well as themarginalization of human values due
to the dominance of what he terms the “techno-scientific order” (al-niẓām al-
ʿilmī al-tiqnī) (Ibid. chap. 6).
This critical stance vis-à-vis the excesses of modernity also underlies a
shared fascination with Sufi attempts at articulating what lies beyond logic.
When Badawi critiques the sole reliance on “logical reason” found in many
Western thinkers, or when Adonis rejects Western technology/progress (tiqn-
iyya/taqaddum), because it is incapable of going beyond the bounds of the
empirical, of what is visible on the outside (ẓāhir), they follow in the foot-
steps of a Romantic tradition of modernity critique. In doing so, neither of
them is very far off from Abderrahmane’s fundamental criticism of Western
society that has made the quest for the spiritual subservient to that of mater-
ial progress, and that the modern man requires a way of reconnecting with
what lies beyond empirical reality (ʿAbd al-Raḥmān 2014, 17). For example,
when Adonis avers that, while the East may lack this technology, it has pre-
14 See the section on the modern defect of ossification (āfat al-tajmīd) (ʿAbd al-Raḥmān
2013c, 78–79).
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served a conception of what lies beyond appearances (bāṭin) (Adūnīs 2014,
283), he is quite in tune with a central line of argument in Abderrahmane’s
works.
Despite the common aversion to the excesses of modernity, none of these
thinkers wants to abolish it altogether. Theirs is not an illogical, anti-rational
critique, but a corrective model for an alternative modernity. None of them is
persuaded by a worldview that clearly opposes modern science. Badawi and
Adonis both want to make room for the non-rational to function side by side
with what Badawi calls logical reason. As to Abderrahmane, he is at pains to
demonstrate that supported reason is not an alternative to logical reason, but
instead represents the most rational form of reason (ʿAbd al-Raḥmān 2009,
223). Thiswould appear to confirm the tendency amongmodern interpreters of
Sufism to downplay themagical strands in the Sufi tradition in favor of present-
ing it as a holistic philosophy of life.
Their rejection of the magical does not mean, however, that these writers
have ruled out any form of worldly enchantment. Harking back to the category
of the modern mystic introduced by Iris Murdoch, the projects of Abderrah-
mane and Adonis can, in their own particular way, be described as projects
of reenchantment. As radically opposed as they may be on many points, their
basic intuition is the same.They see amodernworld, devoid of meaning,which
they wish to enliven, one through his art, the other throughmystical practice.15
A further question is whether the fact that Abderrahmane shares a target with
Badawi andAdonis similarly affects thewayhe confronts the challenge of mod-
ernity. We have seen that Badawi and Adonis, in their own way, give voice
to a modern subjectivity that Talal Asad judges to be “appropriate to ethical
autonomy and aesthetic self-invention.” In addition, this new, individualistic
ethic could be understood as connected to the modern condition, since it
provides a new basis for ethics in a disenchantedworld that ismainly governed
by institutions that favor individualism. The question is whether this is also the
case for Abderrahamne.Dowe find a similar formof ethical autonomy and aes-
thetic self-invention in his philosophy?
At first glance, it would seem obvious that this question should be answered
in the negative. If anything, Abderrahmane’s main arguments are targeted at
individualistic conceptions of ethics. He argues forcefully against the kind of
15 It is perhapsnot entirely coincidental thatAbderrahmane’s first ambitionwas tobecomea
poet.He viewspoetry as the vehiclepar excellence for conveyingwhat cannot be expressed
in regular speech.
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individualism ( fardāniyya) typical of Western modernity. He claims, further-
more, that this is not a necessary component of modernity and that we should
therefore try to conceive of an alternative form that does not depend on this
idea (ʿAbd al-Raḥmān 2013b, 62). Society should not be built on the abstrac-
ted individual, but proceed from the fact that people are all connected to each
other as human beings under one God. For similar reasons, he has been critical
of the sheer idea that one should think of one’s action as being one’s own and
not ultimately dependent on the will of God, as this is apt to cause an undue
regard for the self and contempt for the other (ʿAbd al-Raḥmān 2009, 82–83).
Moreover, Abderrahmane’s ethics is anchored in Sharia. Unlike Badawi or
Adonis, who hail the individual as the modern fount of value, he is adamant in
his claim that any ethics should start from Scripture. Putting it in the strongest
possible terms, he claims that “there is no religion without ethics and no eth-
icswithout religion” (ʿAbd al-Raḥmān 2013c, 52). Being so intimately connected
to religion, it would seem that this leaves little room for fashioning a personal
ethic.
Yet, there is also another side to Abderrahmane’s philosophy, one that is
more personal and, in its own way, emphasizes the role of the individual. The
spiritual journey he proposes is centered on the self. Attunement with nature
is gained through knowing yourself, your states, and how they relate to both
Scripture and the particular situation in which you find yourself at any given
moment. In contrast, the genuinely impersonal ethic is represented by guided
reason. The mainstream modern practice of Islam is deficient, according to
Abderrahmane, because it does not spare any room for a personal connection
that binds man to God.
One may, of course, point out that this personal dimension is hardly new to
Sufism. From the very start it has represented a strand within Islam that was
focused on establishing a stronger, more personal bond between the believer
and the Divine. Considered in this light, what is so very new or especially mod-
ern about Abderrahmane’s approach to Islam?
FollowingCollingwood’s logic of question-and-answer, oneof the things that
this paper has tried to show is that, in assessingAbderrahmane,weneed to take
into account what he says—the answers—together with why he says it—the
questions. Especially when looking at how an author self-consciously relates to
a particular tradition, we cannot content ourselves with pointing out isolated
resemblances, because these resemblances onlymake sensewithin a particular
context. Sure enough, Sufism lends itself to modern articulations of individu-
alism. The reason for this is that this tradition has grappled with a pervasive,
age-old philosophical problem.Man is a conscious being, endowedwith a body
that moves and acts in a world of objects and other beings that are (presum-
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ably) similarly conscious of their own existence. This basic condition throws
up innumerable questions, which Buddhist monks, Sufi sheikhs, and 21st cen-
tury cognitive scientists have all tried to answer in their own way. The mere
fact that they have all grappled with similar problems, however, does notmean
that the questions that they have posed and the answers that they have given
are entirely commensurable. The kind of question you ask will always depend
on your background assumptions. The context that gave rise to questions about
the self a thousand years ago is unlike the one that governs the imagination of
contemporary scientists, intellectuals, or artists. As we saw, Badawi and Adonis
both turned to Sufi texts, but the views that they distilled from them had a
decidedlymodern ring to them, because they use old ideas to answer newques-
tions.
Similarly, we should acknowledge the different role that the individual plays
within aphilosophy likeAbderrahmane’s. The Sufi’s stated goal of getting closer
to Allah may not have changed very much, but the impetus for this mystical
journey in a modern context is different and much more urgent. The mystical
path is now meant to fend off the encroaching meaninglessness that besets
modern man. Given the exigencies of modern life, which make it harder and
harder for Muslims to lead a virtuous life, the need for the more exacting prac-
tice and the qualitatively deeper religious experience offered by Sufism has
become greater (ʿAbd al-Raḥmān 2009, 154–155). As a consequence, the mys-
tic’s path is no longer optional, but necessary. Without it, society is likely to
fall into the kind of moral void associated with theWest or the submissive and
superficial obeisance that Abderrahmane sees in the modern-day practice of
Islam.
This central fact influences the character of Abderrahmane’s appeal to Su-
fism.The self is no longer a sphere for spiritual exploration and ethical training,
but a necessary link in a process that brings out themeaningful structure inher-
ent in nature. Value may not be dependent on him in the sense of being con-
structed by him—as would be the case for the existentialist. However, nature
is dependent on human reason for it to be recognized. Only humans are essen-
tially ethical beings.Only ahumanbeingwhohas developedhis aesthetic sense
through worship of God is able to recognize value in nature and take care of it
as befits a worthy trustee.
The indispensability of the Sufi path,moreover, implies a democratizationof
Sufism. No longer can Sufism be thought of as merely a strand within Islam. It
is now the only way in which one can practice Islam in its true form. By implic-
ation, it cannot be the preserve of an elite. It must be open to all. Together
with its democratization, Sufi practice in this context acquires amoremundane
focus. The goal is no longer merely to put man at ease in this world, or to reach
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beatitude in the next. Once Sufism is used to argue for an alternative mod-
ernity, it becomes a tool for social critique as well as a source of inspiration
for social improvement. Abderrahmane’s trusteeship paradigm consciously
engages with this world and tries to change and preserve it. It cannot afford
to be quietist and it is no wonder, then, that Abderrahmane explicitly rejects
claims that Sufism is an essentially quietist strand of mysticism (Ibid., 175).
There is another way in which the modern context affects Abderrahmane’s
philosophy. As was mentioned earlier, the kind of freedom that gives rise
to modern anxiety is not only of the metaphysical sort, i.e. the result of a
deterministic and meaningless view of nature. It also results from more con-
crete forms of oppression. Both the much-enlarged ability of the nation state
with its powerful bureaucracy and the everyday oppression of the individual
through the greater role of public opinion cause modern intellectuals to be
more sensitive to issues surrounding the relation of the individual to society,
like liberty, autonomy, and personal authenticity. Existentialism is exemplary
in this regard, with its call for radical freedom and individual authenticity as a
means to confront the tyranny of public opinion, as are Adonis’s concerns for
the revolutionary qualities of Sufism and his touting of the creative artist who
opposes tradition.
ThoughAbderrahmane lacksAdonis’s revolutionary vigor, he is aware of this
threat. This is particularly evident when he discusses the problems associated
with guided reason. Although he commends guided reason for following an
Islamic moral framework, he also chides it for its tendency to breed blind imit-
ation of authorities or tradition, as well as superficiality in performing one’s
religious duties. Once the individual believer himself becomes aware of the
hiddenmeanings that have heretofore remained uncovered, he will realize the
sense of what God commands and once he realizes this, he will no longer need
to heed the interpretations of others to dowhat is right and refrain fromwhat is
forbidden. In other words, Abderrahmane recognizes the problems associated
with the strained modern relationship between the individual and society. He
feels the need for an autonomous individual who can withstand the pressures
of society, and here too he thinks Sufism offers a solution. Like his contempor-
aries, he turns to the autonomous, authentic individual. Yet this autonomous
individual is not the outcome of an existentialist’s radical choice, or an act of
aesthetic self-creation. Rather, he is a trustee of God who performs this role by
devoting his life to a mystical practice.
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Conclusion
This chapter was written with the intention of exploring how Taha Abderrah-
mane’s Sufi advances are not only an integral part of the Sufi tradition, but
also a reaction to a modern context with its own set of problems. Be that as
it may, the questions that this chapter raises go beyond this mere exegetical
concern. The modern Sufism employed by Abderrahmane reserves a central
role for the individual practitioner. This recognizably modern element carries
with it a host of ethical, social, and political implications. After all, concep-
tions of the self obviously hang together with conceptions of freedom, which
in turn affect the scope for social and political cooperation. What this will
mean in detail for the ethics implied by Abderrahmane’s philosophical pro-
ject is a question that requires more detailed and extensive study. This chapter
can be read as its prolegomenon. For, in order to assess the question of Abder-
rahmane’s ethics, we first need to acknowledge the modern sensibilities that
influence his ideas and allow him to speak to the moral concerns of the mod-
ern reader.
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In order to explain the world that they study and propose hypotheses on,
anthropologists and sociologists are able to develop concepts and theories in
their own rights that might turn into new philosophical trends. They might
also work with philosophers’ concepts and theories. Clifford Geertz (1926–
2006)developedhismain concept in cultural anthropology, “thickdescription,”
fromGilbert Ryle’s (1900–1976) ordinary language philosophy, and the concept
of “family resemblances” from LudwigWittgenstein’s (1889–1951). Pierre Bour-
dieu (1930–2002) was tremendously influenced by the philosopher of science
Gaston Bachelard (1884–1962), particularly by his idea of “epistemological ob-
stacle” in The Formation of the Scientific Mind (1938). Likewise, Talal Asad (b.
1932) has developed “the idea of an anthropology of Islam” (1986) based on
Alasdair MacIntyre’s (b. 1929) understanding of tradition and virtue and on
Michel Foucault’s (1926–1984) definition of power and discourse.
The latter example is interesting in many regards, primarily because Asad,
who has deconstructed the abstract category of “religion” (1993) as so deeply
indebted to protestant theological emphasis on the inner life of believers, is
apparently drawing his analytical framework to study Islam and Muslim prac-
tice on ideas, discourses and ontologies outside the realm of Islam as a discurs-
ive tradition. This is not to insinuate, as I will show in this chapter, the need
to “be a Muslim” in order to study the Muslim subject or to refuse resourcing
the anthropological analysis in traditions other than Islam. Rather, it is to show
how neglecting Islam at the level of analysis can downplay important and cru-
cial aspects of the reality of faith—particularly the modalities of Muslim-God
relationship.
In this chapter, through Taha Abderrahmane’s “Trusteeship Philosophy”
which is rooted in the Qurʾanic idea of trust (amāna)1 that bonds the divine
1 Qurʾan (33:72): “innā ʿaraḍnā al-amānata ʿalā al-samāwāti wa-l-arḍ, fa-abayna an yaḥmilnahā
wa-ashfaqnaminhā,wa-ḥamalahā l-insān, innahukānaẓalūman jahūlā” (Weoffered theTrust
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and the human (see Hashas 2019, 209–233), I intend to reread Asad’s anthro-
pology of Islam and analyse anthropological works categorised as belonging
to the “ethical turn” (Fassin 2014), called also “piety turn” (Osella and Soares
2009), which is focused on moral subjects and their subjectivities, particu-
larly Saba Mahmood’s (1962–2018) Politics of Piety (2005). Interestingly, this
attempt does not contradict Talal Asad’s view of what seems to be the main
characteristic of modern anthropology, that is, “the comparison of embed-
ded concepts (representations) between societies differently located in time or
space” (Asad 1993, 17). I agree with Joel Robbins on his observation that “theo-
logians might well feel mocked by anthropologists’ ability to easily discover
and prove lived differences” (Robbins 2006, 288), but I do not think Abder-
rahmane’s philosophy2 does neglect the diversity of Muslims’ practices and
worldviews. It, rather, acknowledges their “aspiration to coherence” (Moumtaz
2015) in their relationship with God to different degrees and at different stages
of their life.
After showing some of the similarities between the two intellectual projects,
and looking beyond the Asadian understanding of orthodoxy as a relationship
to power—a discussion of which could be the subject of another article—,
I will scrutinize the concept of “discursive tradition” that has produced an
“ethical turn” in—and beyond—the discipline of anthropology in the sense
of focusing on ethical self-making (see Fassin 2014; Katz 2015). And, through
Abderrahmane’s “trusteeship paradigm,” I will question Asad and Mahmood’s
use of MacIntyre’s Aristotelian philosophy by unpacking the notion of the “cor-
rect model” or “apt performance” that Asad uses in his conceptualisation as a
way to explainwhatMuslims seek to achieve in order tohave ethical coherence.
My choice of the Asadian framework does not stem from a will to promote
his conceptualisation that is already aggrandised, but rather to demonstrate
the gaps in its philosophical roots that have led to downplay important aspects
of the reality of Muslim faith in various anthropological studies. Therefore, this
article is not addressed only to the Asadian conceptualisation, but also to all
the following works that are based and focused on ethical self-making (e.g.
to the heavens, the earth, and themountains, yet they refused to undertake it andwere afraid
of it; mankind undertook it—they have always been inept and foolish). In this chapter, I use
Mohammad Abdel Haleem’s translation (2004).
2 Although I am discussing in this article Taha Abderrahmane’s philosophy, he cannot be cat-
egorised according to the Western categorisation of disciplines. Abderrahmane is a philo-
sopher, a logician and a theologian (not in the Christian sense) at the same time; he is an
Islamic scholar, and not only a Muslim scholar, i.e. he builds his scholarship from within an
Islamic discursivity rooted in a doctrine, a language, and an epistemology.
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Mahmood 2005; Hirshkind 2006; Agrama 2010; Jouili 2015), many of which
belong to the anthropology of piety. Moreover, this article acts as an introduc-
tion to a philosophical discussion that is sorely lackingwithin the ethnographic
debate between the proponents of the “ethical turn” and those calling to focus
on the “everyday.”
1 Trajectorial Similarities
Before starting our conceptual analysis of the Asadian “discursive tradition”
and how Abderrahmane’s “trusteeship paradigm” could help to develop, and
even adjust, various aspects of this concept, it is important to briefly outline
the background of both intellectuals, particularly the moments that represen-
ted a political awakening for each of them,moments which explain a lot of the
similarities in their intellectual trajectories; what might seem a coincidence is
in reality an intellectual choice rooted in a strong critique of modernity and its
colonial secular origin.
Without doubt, the year 1968 is historically distinct, after which the face
of anthropology started to change. The big rise of revolutionary movements
around the world, the access of European working-class children to the uni-
versity, and the independence of numerous countries from European colo-
nialism led many scholars to question the status quo: modernity. Back then,
“ethnography [was] in the midst of a political and epistemological crisis” (Clif-
ford and Marcus 1986, 1), and a new era of young anthropologists started to
go beyond the Straussian structuralism and to challenge the dichotomy mod-
ern/traditional to talk about the end of modernity and the emergence of the
postmodern.
But before that, the 1967 War known as the Six-DayWar, represented a crit-
ical juncture in the life of manyMuslim scholars whowere students back then.
Among them are the Pakistani-American anthropologist Talal Asad and the
Moroccan philosopher Taha Abderrahmane. In addition to his bright intellec-
tual lineage—his father was Muhammad Asad (born Leopold Weiss, d. 1948),
the famous Muslim intellectual and ambassador—, Talal Asad was marked
enormously by the 1967 war that he describes as “traumatic (…) in the sense
that [he] couldn’t understand the reaction of so many people in Britain: a kind
of exaltation on the part of the British which [he] thought was inexplicable to
[him]” (Asad 2008). In a more engaged way, Taha Abderrahmane, while study-
ing at the university, was extremely shocked and disappointed by the humiliat-
ing defeat of the Arab armies (ʿAbd al-Raḥmān 2015; see also Hashas 2015; 2019;
Bevers 2017). This event pushed him to stop writing poetry and learn Western
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languages (French, German, English, Latin and Ancient Greek) as necessary
tools to focus on philosophy, particularly logic, in order to study the power of
‘reason’ and to know the reasons behind the failure of theArab-Islamic reason.3
Althoughdisciplinarily different, there are various similarities betweenAsad
and Abderrahmane’s works and the way in which they are both conceived and
received. First, it is interesting how both Abderrahmane and Asad challenge
the Western idea of the oblivion of the divine (insāʾ or tansiyya), one from a
philosophical angle that points out the fallacy of “abstract reason”, the other
from an anthropological angle that deconstructs the orientalist way of look-
ing at Muslims as actors who do not speak, do not think, and only behave (Asad
1986, 8). Second, both works engage with the Western canon in a postcolonial
way.WhileAbderrahmane intends to displace the focus onWestern philosophy
as the sole valid one, towards dusting off the Islamic tradition which is able,
according to him, to propose an alternativemodernity, different from the “real-
ity of modernity,” based on the “spirit of modernity” (2006), Asad develops
his concept of discursive tradition by deconstructing the conceptual evidences
that constitute the pillars of the discipline of anthropology in its colonial con-
struction meant to justify colonial domination. Finally, both approaches are
criticized, to a large extent by some scholars with a secular liberal affinity,
mainly because of their focus on ethics/piety and positioning it in opposition
to liberal and secular notions about the state and the self. For example, Sindre
Bangstead (2009; 2011) rejects fiercely, in the works of Asadian scholars such as
Saba Mahmood, the emphasis on “piety” as a “radical alterity” in opposition to
theWestern secular ideal. He rejects also the conflation of secularism and lib-
eralism in a similar way toHadi Enayat (2017, 92)who accuses Asadian scholars
of “essentialising secularism” in the sense of committing the “genetic fallacy” to
consider liberalism and secularism as essentiallyWestern ideologies.
3 For almost the same reasons, another Moroccan philosopher, Mohammed Abed al-Jabri had
the same objective, and ended up classifying the Arab-Muslim reason into: al-ʿaql al-burhānī
(deductive reason), al-ʿaql al-bayānī (rhetorical reason) and al-ʿaql al-ʿirfānī (mystic reason)
(al-Jabri 1982; 1986). Abderrahmane criticises this categorisation in al-ʿAmal al-Dīnī wa-Tajdid
al-ʿAql (Religious Practice and the Renewal of Reason) (1997) and classifies reason into three
types: al-ʿaql al-mujarrad (abstract reason), al-ʿaql al-musaddad (directed reason), and al-
ʿaql al-muʾayyad (supported reason) that encompasses both previous ones. Later, in his book
al-Lisān wa-l-Mīzān (Language and Balance), he talks about al-takawthur al-ʿaqlī (the trans-
formative reproduction of reason), pointing out the unlimited types of reasons.
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2 The Asadian Anthropology of Islam
In recent years, there has been an increasing interest in the Asadian “anthro-
pology of Islam” (see Anjum 2007, Bowen 2012, Moumtaz 2015, Grewal 2016,
Mahmood and Landry 2017; also interviews with Asad: Ahmad 2015, Iqbal 2017,
Anjum 2018). An important reason behind this interest is its strong critique
of orientalist approaches that essentialise Islam (Said 1978), its ability to ques-
tion the concepts and dichotomies used by Western anthropologists to study
Muslims, the centrality it gives to questioning the anthropologist’s positionality
and preliminary prejudices, and the way it fosters the emic perspective start-
ing from the subjects’ worldview. One might argue that many anthropologists
beforeAsadwould consider theseprinciples asprerequisites before anyanthro-
pological study, but Asad is the first one who has tried to make them coherent
with the study of Islam. It is true that Abdul Hamid El-Zein has attempted to
conceptualise an anthropology of Islam in his article “Beyond Ideology and
Theology: The Search for the Anthropology of Islam” (1977), but he ended up,4
according to Asad, recognising a multiplicity of Islams, i.e. not recognising
Islam as an analytical category (Asad 1986, 2).
Asad’s aim in his acclaimed article “The idea of an anthropology of Islam”
(1989) was to make the indigenous discourse vocal and to reject the pater-
nalist/colonial viewpoint wherein Muslim subjects do not speak, do not think,
and only behave. By introducing the concept of “tradition”, Asad challenges
both the structuralist prejudice derived from Ferdinand Tonnies’s dichotomy
Gemeinschaft/Gesellschaft (community/society) and promoted by Gellner,
wherein Muslim practices are first and foremost the result of a structure, and
the ontologicalmaterialist prejudice wherein change inMuslim societies is the
outcome of the position of the actors only.
In his seminal article, Asad develops the idea to study Islam as a “discursive
tradition.” This concept means that “Islam is neither a distinctive social struc-
ture nor a heterogeneous collection of beliefs, artefacts, customs and morals”;
“[i]t is a tradition” (Asad 1986, 14) inwhichdiscourses are related to conceptions
of the Islamic in the past and the future, through a present. Clearly rooted in
Foucault’s conception of power and discourse, this concept is also based on
MacIntyre’s understanding of tradition that sets the ground for the historicisa-
tionof the actors’ actionsdue to their orientation to thepast and to thediversity
of retellings that a narrative of the tradition might have due to its discurs-
ive continuity (MacIntyre 2007 [1981], 222). Hence, the concept of “discursive
4 He could not realize his work and respond to Asad’s critique as he died soon after, in 1979 at
the age of 44 (see Eickelman 1981).
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tradition” is heavily based on the idea of the “correct model” or the “apt per-
formance” (Asad 1986, 15)whichmeans that all institutedpractices are oriented
to a conception of the past based on the foundational texts: Qurʾan and Sunna.
The Asadian framework enables to study Muslims through the analysis of
their tradition; it privileges the focus on piety and ethical self-making.Without
proposing an alternative conceptualisation of Islam, some scholars criticised
it in the sense that “there is too much Islam in the anthropology of Islam”
(Schielke 2010, 2). Hence, I argue that criticising the Asadian framework is only
possible through the ethical turn it enhances, in which anthropology of piety
is predominant, i.e. through the critic of works based on his conceptualisation
of Islam. In what follows, I will attempt to critique the philosophical roots of
the Asadian anthropology of Islam by focusing on the anthropology of piety,
namely through the main anthropological work belonging to the ethical turn:
Mahmood’s Politics of Piety (2005).
3 The Aristotelian Behavioural Philosophy in Light of the
“Trusteeship Paradigm”
Before engaging with the explanation of Abderrahmane’s “trusteeship para-
digm,” let us discuss what has incitedme in part towrite this chapter, that is the
philosophical base behind the Asadian concept of discursive tradition. Asad
(1986, 14) argues that “If onewants towrite ananthropologyof Islamone should
begin, as Muslims do, from the concept of discursive tradition that includes
and relates itself to the founding texts the Qurʾan and the Hadith,” but he does
not himself root his conceptualisation of Islam in an Islamic philosophical or
theological ground.5 Rather, he indebts his concept, as mentioned previously,
in the work of the Scottish ethicist Alasdair MacIntyre, particularly his famous
book After Virtue (1981) where he viewed modern moral and political philo-
sophy from the standpoint of an Aristotelian moral practice.6
5 Given the centrality of ‘praxis’ (ʿamal) in his conception of intellectual exercise, Abderrah-
mane agues that “it is with certainty thatwe know that the self can find no perfectionwithout
the complementarity of the tradition, and that no complementarity is ever possible without
an indigenous methodology [… which] brings into a unity theoretical knowledge and praxis”
(Abderrahmane 2015, 70, in Hallaq 2019, 52). Following this epistemological remark, it is time
for anthropologists to not only question their positionality as part of the long anthropological
reflexive tradition but, starting from their own positionality and praxeology, to question the
positionality of anthropology itself in relation to other sciences, primarily metaphysics.
6 One cannot deny that aspects of the Aristotelian philosophy were incorporated in what
Abderrahmane calls the Islamic tadāwulī (discursive and practical) field. Abderrahmane
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Many scholars, from various disciplines, working on Islam have found in
MacIntyre’s understandingof tradition and critiqueof thephilosophical root of
modernity—Enlightenment—an interesting ground for their work. Wael Hal-
laq acknowledges that his project proposed in The Impossible State (2013) was
going to be exactly the same as what MacIntyre had proposed if the moral
resources that he [Hallaq] intends to dust off in the premodern were not
only reflecting a philosophical ground but also a “way of living” (Hallaq 2013,
6). Accordingly, MacIntyre’s work has also revived the use of the Aristotelian
framework in order to study the “ethical” in various disciplines, notably the eth-
ical self-making of individuals in anthropology. Saba Mahmood’s book Politics
of Piety (2005), considered as the most important anthropological work influ-
enced by theAsadian framework, draws also on theAristotelian understanding
of virtue, through a Foucauldian definition of ethics “not as an idea, or as a
set of regulatory norms, but as a set of practical activities that are germane to
a certain way of life” (Mahmood 2005, 27). In what follows, I will read Saba
Mahmood’s work through Taha Abderrahmane’s critique of the Aristotelian
philosophy.
It is true that Saba Mahmood does not aim to generalise her description of
pious practice to allMuslims, but she uses one exclusive theoretical framework
to analyse her subjects, that is the Aristotelian tradition of moral practice com-
bined with the Foucauldian genealogy of ethics.7 This framework privileges
extensively the practical activities of individuals in the anthropological ana-
lysis, since it gives importance tomorphology of moral action (Mahmood 2005,
25); it considers “ethics as always local andparticular, pertaining to a specific set
of procedures” (Mahmood 2005, 28), and it is based on a series of material sep-
arations: praxis/techne, ethical practice/morals, code oriented/ethics oriented,
and even ʿaql (reason)/rūḥ (spirit).8
does not reject Aristotelian philosophy in its totality but analyses its usage according to two
categories of interpenetration (between foreign and indigenous sciences): “external approx-
imate” which occurs when an imported science, like Aristotelian logic accommodates itself
to the tadāwul of the indigenous sciences, and the “remote external” which occurs when an
indigenous science enters upon a foreign one to find refuge and legitimacy, which is the case
of the Rushdian philosophy (i.e., philosophy of Ibn Rushd) in relationship to the Greek philo-
sophy andmetaphysics, see Abderrahmane (2007, 126–138). One can argue that Asad’s use of
the Aristotelian moral practice through MacIntyre’s ethics is part of the latter type of inter-
penetration.
7 Both used by Asad. In his article “The Idea of an Anthropology of Islam” there is no mention
of the Aristotelian moral practice, but it is present through MacIntyre’s moral philosophy. In
addition, Asad uses “discourse” in the Foulcauldian sense as a relationship to power, which is
exactly the difference, according to SabaMahmood, betweenAsad andMacIntyre’s definition
of “tradition” (Mahmood 2005, 115 n. 56), being inherently discursive for Asad.
8 In her analysis of the work of Mahmood, and drawing on the Foucauldian paradox of self-
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Although this framework goes against the Kantian understanding of moral
action as emanating only from the critical faculty of reason, it is centred on
the “abstract reason” and embodied form of practice. This framework has
driven Mahmood (2005, 29) into considering “the importance of these prac-
tices [residing not] in the meanings they signify to their practitioners, but in
the work they do in constituting the individual.” She goes further by consider-
ing the body “not as amediumof signification but as the substance” (Mahmood
2005, 29). Asad cannot disagree with her since he has reviewed his concept of
“discursive tradition” based on the same ground, moving from the excessive
focus on discursive argumentation to the embodied practice.9 For him, “Tradi-
tion, of course, is not just a matter of argument—indeed argument is mostly
peripheral to it. Tradition is primarily about practice, about learning the point
of a practice and performing it properly and making it part of oneself” (Asad
2006: 234).10 Mahmood’s aim to demonstrate that the mosque participants do
also have an agentival capacity based on a voluntary ability to be taught rather
than a resistance to the norm has pushed her to consider the embodied form
as the main element of ethical analysis. It was clear for Mahmood that such
a conclusion could be perceived in contradiction with some women’s under-
standing of bodies, hence shementions unexpectedly in a footnote (Mahmood
2005, 157 n. 3): “it is interesting to note that the women I worked with did not
actually employ the body-mind distinction I use in my analysis.”
Before explaining Taha Abderrahmane’s “trusteeship paradigm” and pro-
posing an anthropological use of it, let us question the previous frameworks
used by Asad, and later by Mahmood, through his philosophy. Abderrahmane
deconstructs conceptually the use of the notion of “reason”, notably byMuslim
scholars and philosophers who applied the Greek conceptualisations to
Islam without questioning their epistemological roots in the classical period.11
denial, Werbner concludes: “Their [Cairo Mosques’ dāʿiyāt] subjectivity and agency are
surely anchored in this world of sacred learning, in ʿaql (intellectual reasoning) rather
than in rūḥ (spiritual inspiration)” (Werbner 2018, 86).
9 I would not say that this aspect was silenced and marginalised, but was absent in his
seminal article (1986). One could hardly deny the importance of embodiment and per-
formativity when Asad says: “practice is Islamic because it is authorized by the discursive
traditions of Islam, and is so taught to Muslims—whether by an ʿalim, a khatib, a Sufi
shaykh, or an untutored parent” (Asad 1986, 15).
10 Asad reiterated this move in his recent book Secular Translations (2018, 5): “discursive
tradition is not merely a verbal process; it is also and primarily an implicit continuity
embodied in habit, feeling, and behavior that one acquires as a member of a shared way
of life that is translated from one time to another.”
11 Abderrahmane addresses his critique to various classical Muslim philosophers, particu-
larly to Ibn Rushd who “imitates Aristotle” (Abderrahmane 2000, 125), as well as modern
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According to him, “if the word reason (ʿaql) in Arabic language refers to a name
of a meaning (ism maʿnā) that engenders a description localised in the heart
just like auditory or sight, the translation has transformed it into the nameof an
object (ism dhāt) meaning a specific quintessence localised in brain” [emphasis
added] (ʿAbd al-Raḥmān 1995, 174; see ʿAbd al-Raḥmān 2012a, 63–74). In other
terms, in Arabic, ʿaql is an action similar to hearing or observing; it is an activ-
ity of the various parts of the body, including the heart, rather than a material
object operating in the brain. Instead of attributing to reason a pure cognit-
ive function, and to the heart an emotional/reactionary one, Abderrahmane
argues for the non-separation between reason and heart,12 similarly to the non-
separation between reason and the various senses, as there is a reason in the
sense and a sense in the reason (Abderrahmane 2012a, 67). Such a definition
has a whole impact on the way in which we conceive reasoning and meaning,
inner state and outer conduct, performative behaviour and inward disposition.
Abderrahmane classifies reason13 into ʿaql mujarrad (abstract reason) which
recognises the attributes throughobservation, ʿaqlmusaddad (directed reason)
which aims at moving from the world of conception to that of realisation
centred around action, and ʿaql muʾayyad (supported reason) which combines
action and observation together, leading to “al-mulābasa” (one is a garment of
the other and vice versa); the latter is described by him as an “alive practical
observation” (naẓarun ʿamaliyyun ḥayy) (ʿAbd al-Raḥmān 1997, 122) in which
reason is not contradictory to revelation.
Drawing on this classification, Abderrahmane criticizes two Aristotelian
maxims regarding the importance of practice, besides a maxim that goes
against it.
First, he criticises the Aristotelian ethicists who consider “concretisation”
(mulāmasa) impossible without starting to act/practice. He considers their
Muslim scholars who almost idealise Ibn Rushd and his work, notably Mohamed Arkoun
(d. 2010) and Mohamed Abed al-Jabri (d. 2010) whose objective, according to Abderrah-
mane, is to “spread the spirit of secularism” (Abderrahmane 2000, 121). To understand the
intellectual project of al-Jābrī andArkoun, but alsoAdonis,ḤasanḤanafī, andNaṣrḤāmid
Abū Zaydwhich is criticised by Abderrahmane because it resulted in the dilemma of aim-
ing at “riding the back of the turāth” to adapt it to the modern system, see Hallaq (2019,
15–25).
12 Based on this observation, Abderrahmane points out that fiqh (jurisprudence), while fiqh
(literally means comprehension), ʿilm (knowledge) and ʿaql (reason) are all actions of the
heart according toQurʾan: “…lahumqulūbun lāyafqahūnabihā” (…withhearts theydonot
use for comprehension) (7:179) and “…wa-ṭabaʿa Llāhu ʿalā qulūbihim fahum lā yaʿlamūn”
(God has sealed their hearts: they do not understand [know]) (9:93), and “… fatakūna
lahum qulūbun yaʿqilūna bihā …” (… with hearts to understand [reason]) (22:46).
13 Asmentioned previously, this classification is not exclusive as he talks about al-takawthur
al-ʿaqlī (rational reproductivity).
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definition of the “tangible” (malmūs) wrong, because either they mean the
“crude tangible” (khām)whichdoesnot achieve the level of profoundobserving
(naẓar), or the “transformed tangible” (muḥawwal), which is transformed
through the projections of the act of observing. Therefore, concretising pre-
cedes observing in the former (“crude tangible”), while it is at the same level
with it in the latter (“transformed tangible”). In both cases, reason does not
depend on practice; it remains purely abstract (ʿAbd al-Raḥmān 1997, 123).
Second, he criticizes the Aristotelian idea that the act of concretising
through practice is more beneficial to reason than the act of observing. The
problemhere lies in themeaning given to practice, which is limited to directing
the senses towards the outward toworkmaterially with it. As a logician, Abder-
rahmane asks the question ‘how could that be possible?,’ knowing that practice
is simply about acting with the senses (al-ʿamal bi-l-jawāriḥ), while observing
tends to extract the abstract fromdata of the sensual practice, in addition to the
fact that it aims to values much higher than what is achieved through practice
(ʿAbd al-Raḥmān 1997, 124).
Finally, in opposition to the Aristotelian model, some argue that abstract
reason does not contain any aspect of concretising, which, according to Abder-
rahmane, is totally inaccurate since theprojectionsof reasonare taken fromthe
sensual. In this regard, even the qualities of reason that the senses do not pos-
sess, such as analysing, deducing, classifying and composing, cannot be put in
practicewithout their conjunctionwith the sensual (ʿAbd al-Raḥmān 1997, 123).
The two first critiques correspond exactly to Mahmood’s continuous at-
tempt to emphasize the idea that cultivation of virtues among women of the
mosque movement is mono-directional, i.e. “exteriority as a means to interi-
ority” (Mahmood 2005, 134). This is not to argue that Mahmood considers the
relation between inner states and outer conduct in one directional way, that is,
from the external to the internal; but she considers both directions as opposite
and exclusive. In other terms, cultivating inward ethical dispositions by habitu-
ating oneself throughbodily acts is opposite to developing the practice through
inner reasoning. Mahmood opposes explicitly Muhammad Said al-Ashmawi’s
(d. 2013, liberal thinker, prominent Egyptian judge and former head of Egyp-
tian Court of State Security) liberal stance about modesty as an inner virtue
that affects external practice to women of the mosque movement for whom “a
modest bodily form (the veiled body) did not simply express the self ’s interior-
ity butwas themeans bywhich it was acquired” (Mahmood 2005, 160). In order
to foreground her conception of agency, based on the Aristotelian notion of
habitus, Mahmood concludes that “it is through repeated bodily acts that one
trains one’s memory, desire, and intellect to behave according to established
standards of conduct” (Mahmood 2005, 157).
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Such a dichotomous worldview is highly problematic for Abderrahmane
who talks about the axiom of “dual self-ethicisation” (al-takhalluq al-muzda-
waj) (ʿAbd al-Raḥmān 2014, 32), i.e. the process of ethicisation can happen in
both directions, outward to inward and vice versa; they can happen both at the
same time, depending on the status of the individual in its closeness to fiṭra
(innateness).14 For instance, in the work of Mahmood, Amal’s account about
the status of her shyness as an “incomplete learning” does notmeannecessarily
that “action does not issue forth from natural feelings but creates them” (Mah-
mood 2005, 157 [original emphasis]); it means also that Amal is “synchronizing
her outward behavior with her inward motives until the discrepancy between
the two is dissolved” (Mahmood 2005, 157). It is this contradiction insinuated
in Mahmood’s two previous quotes that Abderrahmane resolves through his
critique of the Aristotelian behavioural philosophy.
When analysing this critical aspect of Mahmood’swork, onemight invite the
on-going debate between proponents of the focus on the ethical and those of
the turn towards the everyday in the study of Islam (see Fassin 2012; Schielke
2012; Fadil & Fernando 2015, Deeb 2015). It is widely acknowledged that Saba
Mahmood is one of the proponents of the ethical as she focuses on piety.
Besides the dichotomy piety/everyday that became the main characteristic
of this anthropological debate, one might question the dichotomy internal/
external that characterise herwork. I argue that in the sameway that the “every-
day” is still a hollow category that needs further theoretical and analytical dis-
cussions, the external is not exclusively a positive area of material apparent
practices. In other terms, both dichotomies emerge from a certain conception
of the human life that I consider the core question behind the everyday/ethical
debate, that is, life either as a list of separations, or as awhole, as a unity. On the
one side, some consider human life as composed of a set of arenas—although
not clearly determined and defined by its proponents—, where the ethical is
a single aspect separated from others or at least in interaction with the eco-
nomic, the political, the social,15 while, on the other side, others perceive the
ethical as encapsulating the actions of the subject all the time.
14 The concept of fiṭra in the Islamic tradition refers to the origin of the creation, partic-
ularly the pure divine ethical teaching. In Abderrahmane’s philosophy fiṭra is inherent
to the nature of every human. It finds root in the Qurʾan (30:30): “fa-aqim wajhaka lil-dīn
ḥanīfā fiṭrata Llāhi al-latī faṭara al-nāsa ʿalayhā” (So direct your face toward the religion,
inclining to truth. [Adhere to] the fitrah of Allah upon which He has created [all] people.
So [Prophet] as a man of pure faith, stand firm and true in your devotion to [set your face
to] the religion. This is the natural disposition God instilled in mankind).
15 This separation “economic, political and social/cultural” used often by social scientists is
itself a modern separation (seeWallerstein 1991). The dichotomy economy/culture is con-
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4 The Anthropological Use of the “Trusteeship Paradigm”
In this part, I would develop anthropologically the five pillars of the “trustee-
ship paradigm” in regard to the Asadian anthropology of Islam illustrated in
Mahmood’s work on piety. The idea is not to claim a Muslim exceptionalism,
but rather to argue that the embeddedness in modernity as a “historical con-
dition” does not mean its exclusivity as an ideal way of life for the Muslim self-
making; “The variety of traditional Islamic practices in different times, places,
and populations indicates the different Islamic reasonings that different social
and historical conditions can or cannot sustain” (Asad 1986, 16). Hence, the
contradictions that Muslims live in the everyday are an aspiration to coher-
ence with the “apt performance” (Asad 1986, 15) and to the world of trusteeship
(ʿAbd al-Raḥmān 2014; 2016; 2017) rather than a rejection of the norm through
the strict adoption of the modern dichotomous thought of the secular versus
the religious.
The “trusteeship paradigm” (al-unmūdhaj al-iʾtimānī) is based on five prin-
ciples: the principle of requisition, i.e. returning deposits (mabdaʾ al-īdāʿiyya),
the principle of signification (mabdaʾ al-āyātiyya), the principle of innateness
(mabdaʾ al-fiṭriyya), the principle of wholeness (mabdaʾ al-jamʿiyya), and the
principle of testimony or witnessing (mabdaʾ al-shāhidiyya). It is derived from
the trusteeship philosophy based on supported reason (al-ʿaql al-muʾayyad),
avoiding the corruptions of the abstract reason (al-ʿaql al-mujarrad) and the
obstacles of the directed reason (al-ʿaql al-musaddad) (Abderrahmane 2014,
14). Theorising trusteeship based on these types of reasons does not mean cat-
egorising reason strictly in these three. Abderrahmanepoints out theunlimited
number of types of reasons that vary depending on the spatio-temporal con-
texts. He calls this process of continuous variation: “al-takawthur al-ʿaqlī” (the
multiple reproduction, or multiplication, of reason)16 (ʿAbd al-Raḥmān 1998).
Abderrahmane argues for the inexistence of a fixed rationality, both tempor-
ally, as what is rational todaymight be irrational tomorrow, and spatially, since
what is perceived as rational in a fieldmight be considered irrational in another
(ʿAbd al-Raḥmān 2000, 54). Hence, talking about the singularity of the abstract
reason is simply a reduction of the entire human rationality into one category
of reasoning.
sidered by some scholars as a “chicken-egg dilemma” that can be resolved through notions
of “entanglement” or “intersectionality” (see Grosfoguel 2002; 2011).
16 According to Abderrahmane, this process is always the outcome of a “rational, intentional
and beneficial action” (Abderrahmane 1998, 23).
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It is important to mention that Abderrahmane in his critique of secularism
adopts three axioms (musallamāt). The first one concerns the divine com-
mandment (al-āmiriyya al-ilāhiyya) that anythingGod asks for is good and just.
The second one concerns the process of “dual self-ethicisation” (al-takhalluq
al-muzdawaj), either from the internal to the external or the opposite. And
the last one, very important in what follows, is the “religious interchangeab-
ility” (al-tabaddul al-dīnī) according to which the revealed religion has two
manifestations: an innate manifestation (ṣūra fiṭriyya) that inhabits the ori-
ginal message revealed to the prophet in accordance with the innateness of
the human, and a temporary manifestation (ṣūra waqtiyya) that, due to its dis-
tance from theprophet, contains “doctrinal and representative residues, aswell
as legal and institutional influences that distance it,moreor less, from its innate
origin (aṣlih al-fiṭrī), and limits its innovative spirit and enlightening message”
(ʿAbd al-Raḥmān 2014, 32).
These two aspects al-tabaddul al-dīnī and al-takawthur al-ʿaqlī are essential
to understand the anthropological use of the “trusteeship paradigm.” Although
one might understand Abderrahmane’s categorisation as normative in the
sense that it positions some people closer to the original message compared to
others—which is empirically valid—, it corresponds perfectly to the Asadian
framework where Islamic traditions and practitioners, within their diversity,
seek coherence. For practitioners, coherence is about “the molding of the self
into the ideals of the tradition”, while for traditions it is “the attempt to define
and enforce correct practice” (Moumtaz 2015, 124). According toAsad, and sim-
ilarly to Abderrahmane, they do not achieve it, “due asmuch to the constraints
of political and economic conditions to which the traditions are related as to
their inherent limitations” (Asad 1986, 17). Hence, the “trusteeship paradigm”
does not go against the Asadian objective to focus, within the anthropology of
Islam, on the study of “the historical conditions that enable the production and
maintenance of specific discursive traditions” (Asad 1986, 17).
In other terms, the “trusteeship paradigm”, although normative in its philo-
sophical orientation, does not impeach the anthropological recognition of the
diversity of Islamic discourses andpractices. Borrowing Joel Robbins’s formula-
tion (Robbins 2006, 287), itmight even “lead anthropologists to revise their core
projects.” The idea behind this article is to show a novel relationship between
an Islamic philosophy (rooted in a theology) and the anthropological study of
Muslims. The following use of the trusteeship paradigm’s principles demon-
strates the extent of malleability that each Muslim actor has regarding each
principle.
First, the principle of trust or requisition (īdāʿiyya). Abderrahmane argues
that “things are deposits (wadāʾiʿ) in the hands of the human” (ʿAbd al-Raḥmān
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2014, 98) based on the idea that the human is divinely honoured to carry the
divine message in this world as a form of inheritance (istikhlāf ). He develops
this argument as a critique of the Durkhemian divinisation of ‘society.’ The
social formulation of the secular paradigm is based, according to Abderrah-
mane, on a relation of domination between the divine and the human where
the latter takes society as its God. Such a claim would not be refuted by Émile
Durkheim (d. 1917) since “god and society are one of the same”, that is, “the
god of the clan […] can be none other than the clan itself” (Durkheim 1995,
208 [1965, 236]). In addition to the dichotomy profane/sacred rooted in the
Christian experience (Asad 2003), the Durkhemian conception of society has
constituted a base for sociological and anthropological study of religion for a
long time. Furthermore, this dichotomy, alongwith theWeberian rational/irra-
tional and scientific/magical, is what would afterwards produce the thesis of
secularisation or “disenchantment of the world” (See Gauchet 1999; cf. Joseph-
son 2017). Hence the ideal type that has been used by many sociologists for a
long period of time, regardless of the population studied and its worldview, is
the “modern” that has at its core the separations secular/profane, political/reli-
gious, rational/irrational, scientific/magical, public/private, and of course the
most encompassing one modern/traditional. The principle of requisiting does
not recognise any separation between the world and religion. It goes totally
against the humanwill to dominate things,whether individually or collectively.
The witnessing Creator is the only one able to deposit things to the human,
becoming therefore an intermediary between the thing and the human (ʿAbd
al-Raḥmān 2014, 99).
Second, the āyātiyya (signification).17 Since there is no separation between
the world and the divine/thematerial andmetaphysical, the principle of signi-
fication conceives the relationship between religion and the world, through a
“connexion of signs” rather than a “connexion of phenomena” (Abderrahmane
2014, 95). God is present through His signs, which are of two types, “formative
signs” (āyāt takwīniyya) that concern the world, and “chargeable signs” (āyāt
taklīfiyya) that concern religion. Both types of signs refer to the existence of a
Creator, which goes in contradiction with the postulate established during the
formation of social sciences, according to which any transformation happen-
ing to the material world is within the realm of the “phenomenon.” Such an
understanding has led to one of the most used dichotomies in social sciences
when studying religion: scientific/magical, rational/irrational.
17 I am translating āya as “sign” although I am aware (and critical) of its use in social sciences
rooted mainly in the Saussurean semiotics and the Straussian structuralism.
anthropology of islam in light of the trusteeship paradigm 211
In the world of trusteeship, both reason and religion are signs, and they are
not in contradiction with one another. This is exactly the idea defended by al-
Rāghib al-Iṣfahānī (d. 422/1038): “religion is an outward reason, and reason is an
inward religion, and both are synergic, even united” ( fa-l-sharʿu ʿaqlmin khārij,
wa-l-ʿaql sharʿ min dākhil, wa-humā mutaʿāḍidān bal muttaḥidān) (al-Iṣfahānī
1988, 117). Hence, for Abderrahmane, there is no separation between inner
states and outward performance, in the sense that there is not one direction in
the process of takhalluq (self-ethicisation). They aremutually synergic because
of their unique origin. Reason is a creation and dīn (religion)18 is a charge that
the individual has to bear, and both are signs, as well as divine deposits.
Third, the fiṭriyya (innateness or natural disposition). This is one of the cent-
ral concepts in Islam that we find totally absent in the anthropology of piety.
For Abderrahmane (2014, 100), “ethics come from fiṭra.” He explains this by dis-
cussing the humanist philosophy, represented by the French philosopher Luc
Ferry (1990, 1992, 2002), which is based on the materialisation of the relation-
ship between the human and the divine since the human can also be a Cre-
ator. Abderrahmane sees fiṭra andmaterialisationasdichotomous, because the
former refers to the original covenant, that is the memory in which the human
bore witness that there is no God but God (shahādat an lā ilāha illā Llāh).
In Saba Mahmood’s work, it is easy to consider practice and habituation
of bodily acts as the source of the formation of the inner state, because it is
based either on the conception that the human is void of any original ethics, or
indirectly on the temporal distance between the women of the mosque move-
ment and the time of the covenant. Abderrahmane summarises this dilemma
in the opposition between the temporal and the original manifestation of reli-
gion, itself rooted in a specific understanding of time. According to modern
historicity, as Hussein Agrama (2010, 8) clearly explains: “there is the assump-
tion of a fundamental rift between the past and the future, in that the future
generally brings on fundamentally new situations and circumstances, not just
different from past ones but always potentially containing elements that are
irreducibly different.” Abderrahmane does not consider the past as “mythical”
in total contradiction with the “real” present. He does not consider the differ-
ence between the two manifestations of religion as necessarily temporal (in a
developmentalist sense). In other terms, the present practiced religion does not
mean necessarily an erasure of its previousmanifestation. The original Islamic
message was sent to all people who can come back to the fiṭra, disregarding
the secular time when they act.
18 Again, I am cognizant of the tensions around the use of this term and how it does not fit
in easily when talking about Islam due to its genealogy in opposition to the secular (See
Asad 1993).
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Fourth, the jamʿiyya (wholeness). This is one of the main principles on
which the whole critique of the modern secular continuous actions of disag-
gregation and separation is based. This principle refers to the global dimension
of ethics: “The revealed dīn in its wholeness is ethics” and “ethics prevail all
human actions” (ʿAbd al-Raḥmān 2014, 103). This joins what I have discussed
earlier: all aspects of human life are connected, the body/senses and reason,
the internal and the external, the ethical and the everyday. The divine com-
mandment is not a set of apparent duties that the individual has to fulfil, but
an internal commitment towards the “correct model.”
The principle of jamʿiyya derives from the concept of “original unity” be-
tween taʿabbud (worship) and tadbīr (management) (ʿAbd al-Raḥmān 2012b,
509), hence between ethics and politics, ethics and aesthetics, ethics and eco-
nomics, and so forth. Therefore, the separation between the ethical and the
everyday has no place in the world of trusteeship. This does not mean that all
Muslims do not believe in any of these separations, but it means that they are
looking within the discursive tradition to achieve the “apt performance” loc-
ated in the world of Trusteeship.
Finally, the shāhidiyya (Testimony/Witnessing). Through Abderrahmane’s
“trusteeship paradigm,” we can understand how the “divine testimony” (al-
shāhidiyya al-ilāhiyya)—which refers to a divine witnessing of the Muslim’s
deeds and spiritual states that might engender divine protection and close-
ness—is neglected in the anthropological inquiry. Abderrahmane makes the
point that despite the strong relationship between the “human ethicisation”
(al-takhalluq al-insānī) and the “divine testimony”, we pay almost no attention
to the latter and great attention to the “divine commandment” (al-āmiriyya al-
ilāhiyya). Since becoming Muslim is about witnessing the unity of God, acting
within a world of trusteeship requires the faith in/ embodiment of/ feeling
of the divine testimony. Moreover, Abderrahmane develops this idea further
by explaining the line of difference between a person forgetful of God’s testi-
mony and a person who remembers that. He says that the latter “abides by the
commandment while evoking—testifying to his heart—that the Almighty is
witnessing him; and the attachment of the individual’s testimony to the testi-
mony of God raises his ethicisation a degree, because the Almighty who does
not miss anything witnesses this testimony related to His testimony and test-
ifies it, hence it becomes for the person a purification over the purification of
his action” (ʿAbd al-Raḥmān 2014, 94).
Some anthropologists of the “everyday” consider any ethical Muslim action
duringwhich the person does not evoke its ethical origin or objective an action
that belongs to the “everyday”, or to “grand schemes” other than “commitment
to Islam” (Schielke 2010, 14; 2012). For them, any contradiction in performing
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is an opposition to the norm (see Fadil and Fernando 2015) or an indicator
that “norms and boundaries are not absolute” (Schielke 2009, S28). Lara Deeb’s
medium position that we must “think piety and the everyday together” (2015)
is not resolving this dilemma since it is still based on an opposition, or at least
a parallelisation, between the ethical and the everyday; this contradicts Asad
and Abderrahmane’s portrayal of Muslims as seeking coherence. As Mitter-
maier observes in her fieldwork: “my interlocutors are not capitalist subjects
at one moment and pious Muslims the next. Capitalist modes of being-in-the-
world merge and converge with states of piety” (Mittermaier 2013, 279–280).
Hence, the contradictions that a Muslim can have in his practice are not out-
side theworld of trusteeship since it starts for Abderrahmanewith the shahāda
(there is no God but God), and it is not outside the discursive tradition since,
for Asad, Muslims are looking to reach the “apt performance.”19 Furthermore,
Abderrahmane makes the difference between the ordinary divine testimony
applied to all creatures and the specific one attributed to some people, and
according to which the relation between the human and the divine becomes a
relation of “proximity” within which striving to abide by the divine command-
ment becomes enjoying the divine love (ʿAbd al-Raḥmān 2014, 94).
Conclusion
In this chapter I have tried to propose a new theoretical ground for the anthro-
pology of Islam through, on the one hand, the scrutiny of the works of Asad
(1986) andMahmood (2005), and on the other hand, the reading of the current
debate between proponents of the “ethical” and those of the “everyday.” Bey-
ond the opposition ethical/everyday, this chapter is a starting point to develop
theoretical frameworks derived from the five principles of the “trusteeship
paradigm” in which the divine is central for Muslims. Taha Abderrahmane’s
philosophy offers a rich conceptual toolbox that could help anthropologists to
studyMuslims’ practices and subjectivities. In addition, it offers a new theoret-
ical ground rooted in the “emic,” i.e. in the Islamic tradition, that can draw off
the dichotomic discussion around the ethical and the everydaywhich is origin-
ally based on a secular understanding of reason, self, body, and virtue.
19 According to Shahab Ahmed, it is not even unislamic, because the legal represents only
one paradigm within the realm of Pre-Text, Text, and Con-Text, and because separating
Islam and Muslims serves only to “posit Islam as an un-interpreted Neo-Platonic ideal
beyond the sphere of human activity” (Ahmed 2017, 150).
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The Trusteeship Paradigm in the Social Sciences
Moral Agency as an Islamic Ethical Turn
Mohamed Amine Brahimi
Introduction
Taha Abderrahmane (b. 1944) is a unique voice in the Muslim intellectual
world. Professor Emeritus of philosophy at the University of Rabat (Morocco),
Abderrahmane started his career as a scholar of logic and language. He after-
wards gained prominence thanks to an innovative project which aims to devel-
op amodern ethical theory in linewith Islamic values. The period following the
attacks of September 11, 2001, seesAbderrahmanepublish a series of bookswith
the goal of offering an Islamic response to this new political situation (ʿAbd al-
Raḥmān 2003; 2005; 2006). This involves a critique of Western universalism in
order to produce an alternative vision of modernity. In this project, the iʾtimān-
iyya paradigm, translated as the trusteeship paradigm (Hashas 2015) plays an
important role. This new lexical and intellectualmodel finds as a starting point
a vision of “reason” as cognitive activity producing meaning (ʿAbd al-Raḥmān
1998).
In this chapter, I try to explore the trusteeship paradigm following the en-
gagement of Abderrahmanewithmodern philosophy and social sciences. How
can we establish a dialogue between the philosophical trusteeship paradigm,
rooted in the Islamic tradition, and other contemporary advances inmoral the-
ories and theories of religion? To approach this question, two major figures,
representatives of the “ethical turn”—by which is meant a convergence from
various horizons and traditions of human and social sciences focused on the
moral subjects and their subjectivity (Fassin 2014)—will be examined compar-
atively; i.e., the communitarian philosopher Alasdair MacIntyre (b. 1929), and
the postcolonial anthropologist Talal Asad (b. 1932). MacIntyre understands
“reason” within practice and in a teleological structure; it will be shown how
Abderrahmane’s critique of Western modernity can interact with this type of
philosophical reading. As Asad he proposes to define Islam as a “discursive tra-
dition” and to study together religious ethical practices and the discourses that
underpin them. It will also be shown how close the trusteeship paradigm is
to this definition. Otherwise said, it will also be shown how these theoretical
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advances in the social sciences in general, and in the study of religion andmor-
ality in particular, have answers, or at least theoretical coverage, in some mod-
ern ethical theory rooted in the Islamic tradition, as the trusteeship paradigm
and its comprehensive concepts show.
In the first part of this chapter, a summary of the published literature in the
social sciences regarding the issue of morality is outlined. This will allow us
to reframe the theoretical context that characterizes the ethical turn. In the
second part, the trusteeship paradigm according to Abderrahmane is presen-
ted. This allows us to outline some of the main themes of this ethical the-
ory. Finally, a parallel thread of thought between Abderrahmane, MacIntyre
and Asad will be explored. The purpose of this comparison is to contextualize
Abderrahmane within the ethical turn scholarship and see how the trustee-
ship paradigm can be combined with other socio-anthropological and moral
approaches on religious belief in modern societies.
1 The Ethical Turn in the Social Sciences
For a long time ignored, the issue of morality has in recent years generated sig-
nificant interest in the field of social sciences. Influenced by the Durkheimian
approach,many researchers have interpreted values as being the reflection of a
certain type of social organization.1 Hence, every judgment of an ethical nature
is understood to be an act of participation in themoral structure of society. This
functionalism plays part in establishing morals as having a stake in a system
of norms which sociologists acknowledge and decode. Starting in the 1990s, a
significant body of research, mainly in the field of anthropology, has aimed to
challenge this worldview (Laidlaw 2014).
The renewed interest in ethics in the scholarship of the social sciences stems
from developments in moral philosophy. It draws on approaches that may
be qualified as the “aretaic turn” or “virtue ethics.” Working against the cur-
rents of modern philosophy, its representatives make the issue of virtues cent-
ral to their analyses. Following her article “Modern Moral Philosophy”, Eliza-
beth Anscombe (1919–2001) has become a precursor to this kind of approach
(Anscombe 1958). This British philosopher takes a critical view on the idea of
an autonomous moral subject. According to her, justice implies an instituted
1 It is important to note that Durkheim tried to develop an approach towards morality that
opposes Kantian and utilitarian worldviews. It has, however, gained little attraction among
Durkheim’s followers (see Müller 1986).
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higher social power tasked with inciting people to obey laws. This uncondi-
tional moral duty remains coherent only in the framework of a theological
conception of morals. Anscombe argues in favor of abandoning the concept
of Kant’s categorical imperative. As a substitute, she relies on the clarifica-
tion of a fundamental concept, virtue, as a preliminary definition, before all
discussion of morals. Anscombe makes practice the focus of her concern: vir-
tue allows determining the deeds of a person all the while being continuously
redefined by human activity. These a priori notions return to the issue of mor-
ality, to its collective dimension; the good life is then acquired through the
practice of virtue for its own sake, but also through interactions with virtuous
persons.
This notion of virtue as a central theme of the study of ethics has spawned a
series of philosophical investigations. For example, Philippa Foot (1920–2010)
has attempted to develop a conception of moral action in opposition to indi-
vidual views on ethics (Foot 1978). For her, subjectivismmakesmorality a func-
tion of personal prerogatives: a specific understanding of facts and feelings
pushes one to evaluate our actions as being good or evil. To counter this idea,
Foot identifies virtues as being the result of a practical rationality, reacting
to a given context which motivates good deeds. From the same perspective,
Bernard Williams (1929–2003) refutes the ideals of contemporary reflections
on morality (i.e., rationality, impartiality, generality) (Williams 1985). He criti-
cizes the Kantian claim that people should adopt a neutral and objective point
of view on their behaviors. According to Williams, all moral obligation arises
from collective deliberation. This consensus results in a practical conclusion,
and always applies to an actor with respect to a given action. A major work
that focuses on virtue ethics is After Virtue by Alasdair MacIntyre (MacIntyre,
1984). This author draws out an analysis of the current state of moral discourse
in which he identifies a profound irrationality. Basing his reflections on Aris-
totelian philosophy, he demonstrates that a system centered on virtues allows
for a more coherent view of moral action.
The aretaic turn has influenced a set of anthropological studies on the top-
ics of virtue and freedom, which share a meticulous analysis of moral subjects
and their subjectivity. The goal of these studies is to counter the abstract defin-
ition of a collective by means of a set of norms, as it is the case in functionalist
approaches. They are interested in the processes whereby these individuals
construct the experience of norms in their day-to-daypractice.The first anthro-
pologist to articulate this theoretical renewal is Talal Asad. His genealogy of
Christianity (Asad 1993) insists on corporal discipline and the role of asceti-
cism in the construction of Catholic actors. From a similar viewpoint, Saba
Mahmood and Charles Hirschkind direct their interests towards the religious
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renaissance in contemporary Egypt. Mahmood (2011) studies five mosques in
Cairo which were exclusively attended by women in 1995. She is interested in
the practices they engage in with the aim of cultivating piety in their daily
life. It is through this process of subjectivation that they attain a pious self.
As for Hirschkind (2009), he centers his reflections on the role of audio cas-
sette recordings of sermons in a popular neighborhood of Cairo. This author
describes the effects these instruments have on the preservation of an eth-
ical living tradition in Islam, within a framework of modern technologies and
politics. In both cases, the ethical referent shares a continuity with the daily
practices of a religious lifestyle. Whereas a Eurocentric approach to religion
sees faith as the true locus of religiosity, these studies switch focus to rituals.
Contrary to the liberal conceptions, they put in opposition belief and piety
so as to attain a more precise description of types of religiosity. The scope of
ethics is then redefined as a technology of the body where practice substitute
belief.
This brief overview contextualizes the ethical turn, be it in the philosophic
or ethnographic field. These approaches thus aim to redefine the moral sub-
ject in terms of practice, context and collectivity. It is, as a result, convenient to
examine it with reference to the philosophy of Taha Abderrahmane.
2 The Trusteeship Paradigm according to Taha Abderrahmane
The Paradigm of Trusteeship must be understood within a broad framework
of applied ethics. Indeed, since 2000, Abderrahmane’s attention has become
more and more directed towards moral issues (Hashas 2015, 7), the goal being
to enable Muslims to respond to the challenges of the modern world (ʿAbd al-
Raḥmān 2002). Abderrahmane draws on Islamic ethics to construct a criticism
of values imported fromtheWest under thebanner of universalism.This source
allows him to lay down the path following which the Muslim world can renew
itself. It is a matter of understanding the spirit of Islam (its moral foundation)
as a reaction to the cultural hegemony of theWestern world. This project takes
shape symmetrically: one must have a critical view of the spirit of modernity
to construct the Muslim specificity.
Abderrahmane (2006, 24–26) breaks Western modernity down into three
principles: majority, criticism and universality. The principle of majority is
the transition from the minor status into the major status, i.e. freedom from
guardianship, in the Kantian sense. This principle underlies two essential ele-
ments: autonomy and creativity. The principle of criticism is the transition
from a condition of belief to a condition of doubt. This critical outlook points
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to the impossibility of a metaphysical understanding of God, and is mainly
based on rationalization and differentiation. The principle of universality is
the transition whereby modernity switches from being specifically Western to
being universal. It rests on two pillars: the extendibility of moral principles into
all aspects of social, political and individual life, and a generalization thereof
across all other non-Western societies, without regard for cultural and histor-
ical differences.
As such, the spirit of modernity can be defined as “major, critical and univer-
sal” (ʿAbd al-Raḥmān 2006, 29). Based on these premises, Abderrahmane sets
forth the preliminary conditions for the foundation of an Islamic modernity.
First of all, it is necessary to avoid the negative effects of the West’s applica-
tion of the spirit of modernity. Second, one must consider modernity as being
a transformation that is internal to Islamic societies; and, third, it is essential to
perceive modernity as a creative process that does not limit itself to imitations
of pre-established models (ʿAbd al-Raḥmān 2006, 35).
The analytical foundation necessary to establish this alternative modernity
is found in the trusteeship paradigm, which is based on three cardinal prin-
ciples: (1) shahāda, (2) amāna, and (3) tazkiya (i.e., testimony, trust, and self-
purification, respectively). First, the shahāda principle (testimony or profes-
sion of faith) “allows the individual to reconnectwith his or her original nature”
(ʿAbd al-Raḥmān 2014, 14–19). Contrary to the conception of a completely
autonomous subject, the principle of shahāda implies the testimony of others.
The trusteeship paradigm thus rests on the behavior or amanner of thinking—
an attitude—which tends to focus on others through one’s own actions. The
shahāda in its multiple forms presupposes an engagement in shared inter-
action: the shahāda in facing God, the shahāda in facing the Prophet, the
shahāda in facing close relatives, the shahāda in facing distant strangers (ʿAbd
al-Raḥmān 2014, 14). As to the amāna principle (trust, or deposit), it incites to
free the human being from the spirit of appropriation. This principle makes
its actor responsible regarding the impact of their actions. All that exists in
the world represents an amāna (trust) to the human being. This principle
ties reason to a duty of responsibility towards human, animate and inan-
imate beings. The harmony produced by this responsibility allows individu-
als to preserve their environment from that which is harmful to existence
(ʿAbd al-Raḥmān 2014, 15). As to the tazkiya principle (self-purification or self-
discipline), it incites the realization of moral values and spirituality of the com-
munity in the long term.The tazkiya calls upon the individual tomaterialize the
moral values and the spirituality required to satisfy the Almighty Creator. This
both personal and collective education ensures the personal development of
individuals together with society as a whole. The tazkiya determines themoral
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norms and provides people with the tools to enact them. Through its medi-
ation, the collective perpetuates its moral and spiritual potential, thanks to the
mutual interaction of individuals (ʿAbd al-Raḥmān 2014, 16).
Abderrahmane uses the principles of trusteeship as prescriptive guides to his
work; they allow him to offer an alternative to the spirit of modernity. These
principles lead him to elaborate a project of renovation which sees the human
being as the driving force of change and development in society. They reject
all separation of ethics and religion, with the aim to participate in a contex-
tual universality. The latter consists in a commonly shared thought process
which respects the specific traits of every culture (ʿAbd al-Raḥmān 2006, 66).
In what follows, I will explore the ways in which the principles of the trustee-
ship interact with virtue ethics light of thought. The analysis below will rest
upon two important contributors to this movement: Alasdair MacIntyre and
Talal Asad.
3 Taha Abderrahmane and Alasdair MacIntyre: The Trusteeship
Paradigm as a Critique of Modernity
Abderrahmane andMacIntyre join hands in a critique of modernity. The book
After Virtue (1984) has confirmed MacIntyre as a major figurehead of moral
philosophy. He analyses the dissolution of practical reason under the influ-
ence of liberal atomism, and argues for the reconstruction of a communit-
arian spirit. MacIntyre draws his inspiration from a critique of atomism put
forth by Ludwig Wittgenstein in his Philosophical Investigations (1976). Based
onWittgenstein’s analysis, he puts much effort to demonstrate that, in order to
define freedom, one cannot follow an empiricist or mechanical description of
action. The absence of constraints only takes shape through finalities, practices
and a conception of the world. However, modern philosophers place moral
issues into the private sphere, a space in which everyone can do as they please
without facing exterior intervention (MacIntyre 1984, 52). Indeed, the modern
project of the Enlightenment was to endow individuals with a fundamental
freedom by establishing the rational norms of good behavior as the autonom-
ous subject. Criticizing this conception, this philosopher holds that freedom
does not come about through an absence of exterior obstacles, but through
the absence of interior obstacles (MacIntyre 1988, 355). Freedommust include
a juncture where a conception of good is instituted, allowing one to withdraw
theseobstacles.Thesemorals areprofoundly anchored inpractice: it represents
places of expression and of deployment of its norms (MacIntyre 1984, 177). In
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this sense, the essence of practice rests upon internal goodness that shapes the
foundation of its coherence, and gives meaning to the rules one must follow.
These virtues allow one to achieve excellence in the performance of an activ-
ity, and they come before the institution of collective morals (MacIntyre 1984,
182).
As previously discussed, Abderrahmane outlines three principles of mod-
ernity (majority, criticism, universality), the goal being the establishment of
an Islamic modernity based on the trusteeship paradigm. It is in his criticism
of the principles of Westernmodernity that Abderrahmane sharesMacIntyre’s
viewpoint.
With a basis in the specificities of Islam, Abderrahmane readdresses the con-
cept of majority. For him, the cultural autonomy of Muslim countries results
from their desire not to imitate the West (ʿAbd al-Raḥmān 2006, 37). Thus,
for him, freedom does not rely on the isolation of the religious aspect of life
since it represents the moral pathway of Islam. As in MacIntyre, Abderrah-
mane’s view is a vision of positive freedom that results in the possibility of
performing an action. Freedom is thus immediately put to use in the capa-
city of actors to accomplish an ideal that surpasses them. For Abderrahmane,
this conception is reflected in the inversion undergone by the question of
autonomy.Themain force that thwarts theMuslimworld’s flourishment comes
down not to Islamic norms, but toWestern imperialism, i.e.Western guardian-
ship.
As to the principle of criticism, Abderrahmane (2006, 43) perceives critical
thinking as beingWest-centric. Its interpretation remaining one-dimensional,
it keeps western minds from addressing the true concerns of Muslims. Indeed,
moral values cannot be understood as a function of doubt, but rather of faith
and of good conduct. This spiritualist path echoes MacIntyre’s line of thought.
For MacIntyre, individual autonomy does not rely only on the exercise of crit-
ical reason, but also on ideals that allow citizens to achieve their comprehens-
ive maturity. To do so involves maintaining an inner voice that all humans are
endowed with. For MacIntyre, this moral sense depends on a substantial con-
text and can only affirm itself through criticism.
As regards the principle of universality, Abderrahmane rejects the separa-
tion of modernity and turāth (tradition). For him, religion is not to be relegated
as an incoherent line of thinking; rather, it reflects a particular rationality. Sac-
redness is indispensable tohuman life and can rescuehumans throughout their
journey on Earth (ʿAbd al-Raḥmān 2006, 48). MacIntyre is likewise critical of
the separation of values and actors. If restricted to a vision of the subject inde-
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pendent of all philosophical traditions, we lose the foundations of a practical
rationality. Truth only becomes apparent in the framework of the development
of existing intellectual traditions.
From the parallels betweenMacIntyre and Abderrahmane, one shared view
comes to the fore: the impossibility of interpreting moral issues through a
modern framework. This observation comes from modern moral philosophy’s
denial of social underpinnings and practical rationality, as well as its rejection
of all external moral authority. Whether deontological or utilitarian, this type
of philosophy assumes the existence of autonomous subjects relying only on
their individual conscience for guidance. For their part, the two philosophers
understand knowledge and truth as being the results of a collective interaction
in the framework of a philosophical tradition. They counter modernity foun-
ded on a completely autonomous critical subject with a social life that is not a
sum of individuals. For them, the human being is driven by a natural desire to
live in society; morals thus acquire meaning from this ontological presupposi-
tion. The goal of the trusteeship paradigm is to regain the principles whichmay
restore the natural order to man; it therefore transits through a critique of the
limits of Western morality.
4 Taha Abderrahmane and Talal Asad: The Trusteeship Paradigm as
the Practical Dimension of the Islamic Tradition
The juncture point between Asad and Abderrahmane take place in their rela-
tion to tradition. For Asad, Islam does not have the properties of an individual
belief, but rather of a disposition to be and to act in conformity with the Divine
Will. Faith (īmān) is a virtue; it is cultivated by repeating acts of devotion (Asad
2003, 90). Asad defines Islam as a “discursive tradition”, i.e. an educational
process for the faithful, which takes place in a specific constellation of mean-
ings (Asad [1986] 2009). The tradition is kept alive by practices, and it allows
the faithful to act and to think as part of a community. Rituals build moral
character, the goal being to shape and to exercise certain forms of subjectiv-
ity.
For Asad, Islamic jurisprudence ( fiqh) must be understood within this
framework. It cannot be dissociated from themoral duty (to do good) and from
social issues (the call upon the believer to do good) (Asad 2003, 243). Islamic
morals are then, so to speak, interlaced with social relations that construct a
religious community. The Sharia thus depends on the moral ability to judge
behavior as being good (both for oneself and for others). This virtue is acquired
through a learning process that starts in childhood and lasts through all adult-
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hood (Asad 2003, 248). The ability tomake judgments on given situations often
takes a collective shape: it assumes the intervention of authorities, of close
ones, or of friends.
Abderrahmane likewise views religious experience as a synthesis of the law
and moral duty. He interprets religious practices as having two phases: an
external or formal expression,which takes the shapeof legalism, and anexpres-
sion that manifests itself through the internal subjectivity of the believer (ʿAbd
al-Raḥmān 2002). The religious act is therefore a response to a temporal reality,
fiqh, and a spiritual preoccupation, the goal being the production of an action
in accordance with the Divine Will. Within this framework, religion is not
exclusively experienced in terms of the private sphere; it globally merges into
all aspects of human life. Islam transcends mere judicial matters: it enjoys an
ontological role that emerges from the gooddeeds that humanbeings/believers
accomplish (Abderrahmane, 2000).
For Abderrahmane, the three pillars of the trusteeship paradigm (shahāda,
amāna, tazkiya) (ʿAbd al-Raḥmān 2014, 14–19) allow the faithful to follow the
Sharia as a moral path. Describing this view of Islam, Abderrahmane’s work
runs parallel to that of Asad. For the latter, the concept of shariʿamust beunder-
stood as a body of recommendations and reflections on the moral conduct of
Muslims that is appropriate according to different religious schools of thought.
In the samemanner, Abderrahmanemaintains that the practice of good is built
around a rationality that materializes morals by drawing on a source of reli-
gious heritage. The Sharia is therefore represented as a way of being and of
acting within one’s environment.
The shahāda principle (ʿAbd al-Raḥmān 2014, 14) corresponds to the com-
mon beliefs that are shared by the faithful. It represents a common relation
to sources of knowledge, and therefore refers Muslims to the different divine
prescriptions that they are tasked with interpreting. The shahāda is a prelim-
inary step in the historical construction of the moral path, and constitutes
the basis of the belief system within divine and prophetic teachings. Asad
endorses the same premise when considering the Qurʾan and the Sunna as
foundational pillars of the tradition.He also insists on thehistoricity of the con-
cepts, practices and debates that underscore this tradition (Asad [1986] 2009,
14).
As to the amāna principle, it represents for Abderrahmane a moral dimen-
sion of Islam as well as the duties that result in just practices (ʿAbd al-Raḥmān
2014, 14). Thus, not only are human beings responsible for their own little
worlds and concerns alone, but they also are responsible for the vast world
surrounding them. In a similar manner, Asad insists on the importance of a
proper model to define practice in Islam. This model keeps the tradition alive
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in Muslim people’s everyday life, showing it to be the vessel of morals that
Muslims must respect. In this way, the two scholars agree on a conception of
morality that is capable of constructing the behavior of the faithful in accord-
ance with their environment.
As to the tazkiya principle, it represents the act of recommendations: it
includes all forms of moral correction, treatment, and prevention from evil,
its purpose being the development of moral tendencies within the community
of believers (ʿAbd al-Raḥmān 2014, 16). Asad likens tazkiya to the concept of
orthodoxy; for him, it is the domain within which Muslims adjust, exclude, or
replace certain practices. In both cases, a council is constructed in accordance
with tradition, in the development of a general framework of interaction. Each
Muslim thus has the duty to call others to do good deeds, as well as the power
to condemn evil actions.
From the comparison of Asad and Abderrahmane, it becomes apparent
that Islam cannot be analyzed as a mere belief system. It operates with a
strong moral and practical dimension, inside which sources of authority play
an important role. Thus, within their own religious space, Muslims are not
simply constrained to performing good acts, they are also responsible for car-
rying about their environment.
Thematter is for all Islam’s adherents to rectify their behavior as well as that
of their peers by relying on normative sources of Islam: the Qurʾan, the Ḥadīth,
Consensus (ijmāʿ), and analogy (qiyās). The Sharia then becomes significant as
a system of morals that acquire meaning in prescribing well, as well as in pro-
hibiting evil (al-amr bi-l-maʿrūf wa-l-nahy ʿan al-munkar). This duty, which can
be an individual duty ( farḍ ʿayn) or a collective one ( farḍ kifāya), depending on
the interpretation, is then accomplished through either a competent authority
if collective or a moral agent if individuals.
5 Virtue Ethics and the Trusteeship Paradigm: A New Approach in
the Social Sciences?
The parallelism shown between virtue ethics and the trusteeship paradigm
demonstrates agreeing visions on the subject. It refocuses our representa-
tion of the human being around moral issues. Thus, we deal with Homo Ethi-
cus, endowed with a duty that transcends their mere personal interests. The
comparison of Abderrahmane’s writing with those of MacIntyre reveals many
points of intersection. Indeed, the two philosophers identify the limits of mod-
ern Western philosophy in addressing moral issues. Asad and Abderrahmane
approach Islam in similar manners, by stressing the importance of tradition
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in understanding the religious practice of Muslims. This theoretical intersec-
tion can be a significant contribution to research in the social sciences. It
pushes scholars to question multiple analytical assumptions. To conclude, I
will outline three theoretical directions that demonstrate the contribution of
Abderrahmane in the theoretical comprehension of Islamic practices and sub-
jectivity: (1) the critique of Cartesian materialism, (2) the rejection of indi-
vidualism and holism as sole alternatives, and (3) the consideration of the
agency.
First, virtue ethics and the trusteeship paradigm are opposed to Cartesian
materialism (Descartes 1936 [1637]), specifically in the way they treat the rela-
tionship between mind and body. Descartes identifies the existence of two
types of substance: the mind or soul (res cogitans) and the body (res extensa).
Further, in his view, each of these two substances interacts with the other, and
mental states have a causal effectiveness over physical states. Thence comes to
an understanding of humans as chiefly driven by reason. As concerns virtue
ethics, its proponents give primacy to action rather than to reason. All forms
of cooperative activity socially produce norms of excellence as well as a con-
ception of finalities (MacIntyre 1984, 182). Abderrahmane offers a critique of
the Cartesian thinking subject. Facing the Cartesian maxim “I think, therefore
I am”, he puts forth the “shahāda principle”, whereby the accomplishments of
a human being are testified by others. As a result, they must engage in a moral
behavior. The constitution of a subject acquires meaning in judgment and in
practice, rather than in speculation (alone).
Second, virtue ethics and the trusteeship paradigm also offer an alternat-
ive path between holism and individualism. The history of social sciences is
often presented as an opposition of these two traditions: the first conceives
of social phenomena as having their own essence, independent of people’s
consciousness and willpower (holism); on the contrary, the second states that
social phenomena result from the layering and combination of the conducts of
rational participants, conceived of as logical “atoms” of the analysis (individu-
alism) (Kincaid 1993). The study of Islam conducted by Asad shows in which
manner discipline generates a pious self by cultivating virtue through spe-
cific practices. However, to be considered Islamic, all practice must gain social
recognition. The individual is inscribed within a collective tradition which
also structures their social conduct (Asad [1986] 2009). Elsewhere, Abderrah-
mane questions the primacy of the individual. In laying out the principle of
tazkiya, he places the moral education of an individual at the core of society.
He rejects the mutual exclusion of the individual versus society, or vice versa.
Themoral efforts put forth by individuals contribute to guaranteeing their self-
development. In turn, the collectivity exploits their moral potential by placing
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them in interaction with others. Far from splitting holism and individualism,
the moral-minded approach leaves space for individual subjectivity all while
accounting for collective socialization.
Third, the trusteeship paradigm reinstitutes the significance of agency in
the understanding of human behavior; therefore, it establishes itself as a cri-
tique of Kantian morals. For Kant, the will of humans is subject exclusively to
moral law, which must be obeyed for the sake of itself and is enforced on us
in the shape of the categorical imperative (Kant 1993). It corresponds to acts
that must be enacted unconditionally, and only acts whose maxims corres-
pond to its principles are seen as moral. Based on this moral law, Kant places
the ability to judge at the center of his conception of an autonomous subject
(Kim 2015, 40). By contrast, the trusteeship paradigm centers its attention on
agency, which represents the capacity to act unto theworld, the objects or with
the other beings, and to transform or influence them (Barker 2007, 448). In
the trusteeship paradigm, all what exists in the world represents an amāna (a
trust, a deposit) for human beings, for which they are responsible before God.
Therefore, they have a duty which transcends their mere judgment, as it also
includes the ends of their actions. Similarly, by subjecting themselves to norms
and rituals, Asad means to show how religious actors form a subject capable
of acting, without becoming autonomous in the Kantian sense (Asad [1986]
2009). MacIntyre likewise criticizes moral consequentialism: in his view, all
ethical consideration should not be focused on finalities rather than on deeds
(MacIntyre 1984).These three incursionsoffer tools to articulate the trusteeship
paradigm in relation to human and social sciences. The concepts of Abderrah-
mane are in dialogue with various contemporary social theories, particularly
around the issue of virtue ethics. This said, not only should the concepts of
Taha Abderrahmane be studied, but the intellectual process of his approach
should be applied to renew our outlook onMuslim societies and better under-
stand the ins and outs of human action.
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264،266–267،288
96،273–95ةوقلاةدارإ
246،248،318وطسرأ
146جاعزإلا
89ةيدبألاةلئسألا
258كرشلاىلعديحوتلاةيقبسأ
305ةيمالعإلاةروصلاةيقبسأ
238وتوألراك،لبآ
108،110رخآلا
287ةيقالخألاةفآلا
293–290سسجتلاةفآ
290دييقتلاةيلآ
325عومجملاغيرفتةيلآ
325لصتملالصفةيلآ
236،273ةيهلإلاةيرمآلا
237ةيتايآلا
280ءاغتبا
265ةيجولوميتسبإ
248،251–247طارقبأ
121،135،138،301نودلخنبا
138ةيزوجلاميقنبا
241ةيوبألا
245روقيبألا
302يريبعتلالاصتالا
302يليثمتلالاصتالا
143–142يحورلالاصتالا
302رصاعملالاصتالا
298ةطاسولاوةينقتلاتايعامتجا
140،143،290–88،139داهتجالا
139يلقعلاداهتجالا
266يفاقثلاعامجإلا
268،278ضاهجإلا
241ةمداقلالايجألا
94،238نوناقلامارتحا
338ةقيقحلاراكتحا
94هلإللقلطملاناسحإلا
237ةّلزنملاماكحألا
سرهفلا 351
300يمالسإلامالعإلا
265نطاوملاوناسنإلاقوقحنالعإ
315،319ةيملاعقالخألجأنمنالعإ
287مهوتلايفقارغإلا
279ةرسألاغارفإ
119ةيثادحلاراكفألا
107،143دمحم،لابقإ
234داصتقالا
104رارقإلا
340رارقتسالا
300ةيمالسإلا
245،318ساموت،ينيوكإلا
246يقطنملاراحتنالا
336راوحللةيلآلاةيمهألا
257،267،269،274مازلإلا
267ةداعسلا
141ةدايسلا
297ةيرئاعشلا
،82،94،115،134،138،141،232،234ةيناملعلا
237،245،256–261،263،265–266،269–
271،274،276،283
270ةنملعلا
331مالسإلايففنعلا
257ةملوعلا
268بألاةطلسءاغلإ
112ةمواقملا
135،274،337ةيهولألا
121،141،232،253،294،337ةنامألا
97ةيسفنلاةيباصعلاضارمألا
94يهلإلارمألا
94يعطقلارمألا
239،242،321قلطملارمألا
329ةدحتملاممألا
306–305ركفلاةيقبسأ
148–136،143،147–135دادبتسالا
93ةيلقعتاحلطصمبةينيدلاتاحلطصملالادبتسا
239،280فالختسالا
246ايلارتسأ
326داهشتسالا
140،244،253لالغتسالا
333رارقتسالا
321،333ةيددعتلا
327نيدلانعقالخألالالقتسا
250صخشلاةيلالقتسا
291رخآلاءاوهتسا
256،260،263لالط،دسأ
،271–267،269–257،266–256ةثيدحلاةرسألا
273–274
234،266،270ةيبرغلاةرسألا
270ةدتمملاةرسألا
131،137،141،144يسايسلامالسإلا
139ةيمالسإلا
136،295،301،337ىنسحلاهللاءامسأ
258يوغللاقاقتشالا
278ةيجوزلاةقالعللىرخألاكشأ
242تايولوألابيترتةيلاكشإ
340داهشإلا
272،276ةرسألاحالصإ
256يتناتستوربلاحالصإلا
277عمتجملاحالصإ
272مكاحملاحالصإ
242ةيحالصإلا
270ةلاعإلا
122،124–119،121لادتعالا
،118،120–113،117–105،109،112–104فارتعالا
122–125،127–128،146
352 سرهفلا
278ةيحابإلا
292نوكيتبونابلا
318ملاعلانايدأناملربب
281ةيتناتستوربلا
332سرطب
99ينايندلايداملادعبلا
99يدوجولادعبلا
105يواوزلا،هروغب
124يغبلا
246اكيجلب
244عاديإلاأدبمب
104ءانبلا
246ماتنب
240،318يميريج،ماهتنب
143ةيشيشتوبلا
297،299ناج،رايردوب
272،278رييب،ويدروب
324اليسيس،كوب
277راك،يينالوب
245،250،253،320،338–232،234،239ةئيبلا
،100–91،95–81،83–78تزعيلع،شتيفوجيب
102،142
268ةيطارقوريب
245سيسنارف،نوكيب
96ايجولويبلا
287تاردقلايذأت
297لاصتالاخيرات
119برغلليفرعملاخيراتلا
257،260–256زلراشت،رليات
242–241لوب،روليات
327نيدللقالخألاةيعبت
327قالخأللنيدلاةيعبت
278تابزاعلاتاهمألا
246–97،245راحتنالا
277ةيداصتقالاتاقالعلاعازتنا
301ةفاقثلالاقتنا
290ةيصوصخللكاهتنالا
95قالخألاطاطحنا
109ىلعألاناسنإلا
105يدومعلاناسنإلا
109،114يلبقلاناسنإلا
113عوضومكناسنإلا
97ايدوجودرشتمناسنإ
324ةنسنألا
105سفنلافاصنإ
147ةيلومشلاةمظنألا
247قافنإ
261نيدلانعنوناقلالاصفنا
146بالقنالا
133داجونا
250رارقلاذاختاةيلهأ
336راوحللةيجراخلاةيمهألا
336راوحللةيلخادلاةيمهألا
ميحرلالتقلارظناايزاناتوأ
257تسغوأ
120،245،264نيطسغوأ
133درفلاةيولوأ
324،327سوتيإ
279راثيإلا
142يئاعرلاعاديإلا
237ةيعاديإلا
–238،251،262–79،94،124،140،237ناميإلا
264،337
316يحلاناميإلا
93–92فيزوج،رلتاب
سرهفلا 353
،122–115،121–106،108،110،114–104ديستلا
124–125،127–128،136،139–140،146–
147،282
142،260داحلإلا
259ُديستلا
242مؤاشتلا
98–97ةيمؤاشتلا
287فنعلابعبشتلا
138ةيناملعتاعيرشت
94ريغللهلإلاعيرشت
94تاذللناسنإلاعيرشت
136–126،133ديهشتلا
134ديهشت
116موعن،يكسموشت
147فنعلافيرصت
264نطاوملافينصت
236–235نماضتلا
111،124عيبطتلا
85يجولويبلاروطتلا
256ةيناملعلليخيراتلاروطت
321شياعتلا
315نايدألانيبيملسلاشياعتلا
332تانايدلانيبرمثملاشياعتلا
147،232،234–84،86،140،142،144دبعتلا
259ُدبعتلا
140قحللدبعتلا
321ةيددعتلا
319ينيدلابصعتلا
ةرسألاءاضعأنيبيعيبطلالصاوتلالعفليطعت
279
136،144قلعتلا
271نوناقلاةغلميمعت
َّوغت 278يداصتقالاةملوعلاجذومنلُ
107نيدلاديدجت
84ةيدرفلاةيحورلاةبرجتلا
86–85ةيناميإةبرجت
268ةينيدلاميقلانمقالخألادرجت
–293،299،303–290،292–287،289سسجتلا
306،309
290يملعلاسسجتلا
108عمقلانمررحتلا
279ةيداعلاةغلليجيردتلاميطحتلا
290يداصتقالامكحتلا
290يملعلامكحتلا
119تاذلايفمكحتلا
304،308–113،123،303يسفنلاليلحتلا
112سنجلابيطخت
،262،280–86،143،243،261–78،83قلختلا
291،294–295،337
86يوبنلاقلختلا
270ةماعلاةايحلاقيلخت
142،144،146ريبدتلا
283يعامتجالاريبدتلا
143ينيدلاريبدتلا
139،140يحورلاريبدتلا
139،146يسفنلاريبدتلا
244ةئيبلاروهدت
242يئيبلاروهدتلا
85،90،256–83نيدتلا
235،243محارتلا
309ةيقالخألاةيبرتلا
85ةيقلخلاةيبرتلا
108بيكرتلا
118ةيكزتلا
329نايدألاملاست
260،297،315،321،332حماستلا
354 سرهفلا
317نويعوسيلاءابآللةعباتلاانايروجيرجلاةعماج
317نوبروسلاةعماج
317ةيكيلوثاكلاةعماجلا
138نيدلاةيعماج
113ةيومألاةيربـجلا
108،110تايلامجلا
237ةيعمجلا
94ةنجلا
117سنجلا
–120،122–104،107،109،112،117،119ةيناسنجلا
123
109،117نونجلا
331داهجلا
292،309هينور،راريج
82ةعيبطلابناسنإلاقاحلإ
250ةمئادلاةيرضخلاةلاحلا
291تاذلابح
291دوجولابح
298ةيلاسرإلاةجحلا
78ةيبرغلاةثادحلا
107ةيمالسإةثادح
101ةينيدلاةثادحلا
101–100ةيحورلاةثادحلا
–101،232–82،91،96–78،81ةيبرغلاةثادحلا
233،236،239،252
139–121،138نيدلاةسارح
83ةمئادةكرح
83،89،114ةيرحلا
332ةينيدلاةيرحلا
320ةيتاذلاةيرحلا
267ةدشارلاةيرحلا
245ةيدرفلاةيرحلا
134،136،259،337–133بييغتلا
121لضافتلا
،304،306–288،292،299،303–286جرفتلا
312
87يعيبطقوفريسفت
97،100يداملامدقتلا
140يندموينيدىلإميسقتلا
272يداملاميوقتلا
121لماكتلا
304،306–292،299،303–287،291فشكتلا
294فيلكتلا
267عمتجمللكسامت
146درمتلا
112سنجلادرمت
287تاروصملاكلمت
133يسايسلاعزانتلا
85،90،272،276ةئشنتلا
133دجاوتلا
104،125ةبوتلا
303روصلاطسوت
287روصلابطسوتلا
320يداصتقالاعسوتلا
85ةودقلابلسوتلا
99،236،262،272،275–80،98ةفاقثلا
287،306روصلاةفاقث
98حورلا/دسجلاةيئانث
83،101ةداملا/حورلاةيئانث
101ةيدوجولاةيئانثلا
112،146ةروثلا
140،143–139ةيطارقويثلا
110،132دباعدمحم،يرباجلا
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316تافاقثلانيبراوحلا
329تانايدلانيبراوح
332ةينيدلازفاوحلا
124ءايحلا
248ةيلمأتلاةايحلا
248ةيلمعلاةايحلا
80،84،87،120،241ناويحلا
87لقعوذناويح
274يلصألاقلاخلا
279نييسفنلاءاربـخلا
262ةفارخ
247،250–246فرخلا
309بصخلا
98ةيحورلاميقلاةصخصخ
147ةباطخلا
331–330باعيتسالاةطخ
330نصحتلاةطخ
330ةقرافملانمفيفختلاةطخ
120،122ةئيطخلا
113صالخلا
139–113،121،125،138ةفالخلا
89،252،269،275دولخلا
147يحورلاءاوخلا
242فوخلا
267ةماعلاةرئادلا
97–96نيوراد
106ةيخيراتلاتاساردلا
259،325،339–258ةينايندلا
259،261،266،273،325ةينارهدلا
297،299،306سيجير،يربود
262–133،261ليمإ،مياكرود
92يقالخألاسحلا
93،95–92كرتشملاسحلا
93–92يقالخألاكرتشملاسحلا
94ةدارإللقلطملانسحلا
301ينالترولانيسحلا
99،233–80،83،98–79ةراضحلا
336ةينوكـلاةيناسنإلاةراضحلا
268ةناضح
125طيقللاةناضح
108يهلإلاروضحلا
338ةئيبلاظفح
338ةيرذلاظفح
338ةعيبطلاظفح
88،95ةيقالخألاقئاقحلا
116ةينوكقئاقح
ًقح ّيعيبطاّ 267اً
269حافسلاقح
269نييلثملاقح
269حاكنلاقح
251ميركـلاشيعلايفقح
253ةئيبلالقح
265،278ناسنإلاقوقح
265،274ةيعيبطلاقوقحلا
–99،102،109–88،91،98–81،87–80ةقيقحلا
110،112–113،116–117،122–123،128،134،
138،143،278
81،87،91،102،329ةينيدلاةقيقحلا
110ةيلاعتملاةقيقحلا
245،250–240،242ةئيبلاةيامح
268لمح
317،329راوحلا
316،332،337–315ينيدلاراوحلا
331ينوكسملاراوحلا
356 سرهفلا
131،323ةيدوجولاةيؤرلا
299ةيرئاعشةيبوروأةيؤر
140رماعنبيعبَر
137،146–136ةيبوبرلا
124قراخلالجرلا
244،253–96،243ةمحرلا
245–243نمحرلا
270ةيعامتجالاةياعرلا
120ةبغرلا
246ناسنإلاةيهافر
257،269ةيرسألاطباورلا
245نويقاورلا
298تيرفإ،زرجور
،102–99،101–89،98–84،88–81،83–80حورلا
106،114–115،118،122،132–136،145–146،
258–259،281
81يهلإلاحورلا
232كلمتلاحور
91ةيهلإلاةيحورلا
262–261كاجناج،وسور
241موت،نغير
140،302ازونيبس
332،338–329،331رارقتسالا
257ةداعسلا
269ةيعامجلاةداعسلا
267ةيعمتجملاةداعسلا
297نييلصألااكيرمأناكس
331ينيدلامالسلا
329ممألانيبمالس
329تانايدلانيبمالس
136،139ناطلسلا
146تاذلاناطلس
138ةلودلا
141–139ةيمالسإلاةلودلا
139ةينيدلاةلودلا
138ةرصاعملاةلودلا
141–139ةيندمةلود
330ةبئاصلاةدحاولاةنايدلا
320ةيئافكناةنايد
116هينير،تراكيد
147ةيطارقوميدلا
262–261يعيبطلانيدلا
262يفسلفلانيدلا
261ّيندملانيدلا
82،95،258،265يحيسملانيدلا
239،253يفباقعلا/باوثلاةيكيمانيد
،118–115،117–106،110،113–104ةيناسنإلاتاذلا
121–122،126–129،143،274
124ةيلوجرلاتاذلا
116ةيعاولاتاذلا
117ةفراعتاذ
117ةفرعمللعوضومتاذ
134،340ةيرطفلاةركاذلا
146ةيبيغةركاذ
268بنذ
117ةيقالخأتاوذ
117نيرخآلايفةرثؤمتاوذ
141ةيلبقلاةطبارلا
251ةمحار
322يلابيفرس،نانشيركاهدار
282–112،281ةيلامسأرلا
118،121،124،126،128–115،117ةينامتئالاةيؤرلا
298لاصتاللةيلاسرإلاةيؤرلا
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279–252،278ربصلا
303نييفاحصلا
278ةيباجنإلاوةيسنجلاةحصلا
141ةنيدملاةفيحص
247ةيفارغوميدةمدص
237هلإلاتافص
262ءاضيبةحفص
328ةيرشبلاحالص
145ماعلاحالصلا
144لعفلاحالص
309،311–305،307ةيمالعإلاروصلا
308ةيئامنيسلاةروصلا
304عقاولاةروص
135ةيعامتجالاةغيصلا
135ةيعيبطلاةغيصلا
135ةيدقنلاةغيصلا
95فعضلا
،84،89،96،135،262،266،275ريمضلا
318
240ءارضخلاتاقاطلا
،88،93،96،116،242–83،86–80،82ةعيبطلا
244،248–249،253،262،269،274،
293
110ةيناسنإلاةعيبطلا
80،99ةجودزمةعيبط
147جاعزإلاةقيرط
144تاذلانايغط
266قالطلا
120ةمراصلاةيرهطلا
82ةثادحلاروط
،124–113،115،117–106،108،111–104ةطلسلا
128،138،140،146–147،268،271،273،
275–276،278،282–283
112،120ةيويحلاةطلسلا
120ةيلوجرلاةطلسلا
276نوناقلاةطلس
268دالوألاىلعةطلسلا
99ميقلاملس
331نايدألانيبملسلا
ّيملاعملس 330اً
96يناسنإلاومسلا
96نامربوسلا
246ارسيوس
272ةدايسلا
145،271–131،134ةسايسلا
112سنجلاةسايس
112ةايحلاةسايس
234داصتقالاةرطيس
235ةينقتلاةرطيس
235ةكبشلاةرطيس
121ةيميهاربإلاةيصخشلا
298ةيرئاعشلا
137تاراعشلا
93يقالخألاروعشلا
96ةقفشلا
93لومشلا
136–135ديهشتلالومش
138نيدلاةيلومش
133لراك،تيمش
301ىروشلا
324ةينيفوشلا
319ةيراضحلاةينيفوشلا
358 سرهفلا
،88،94،97،127–79،83،87–78درجملالقعلا
232،325
288جتنملالقعلا
95ةيناسنإلاةينالقعلا
80ةينيدلاةينالقعلا
325ةيلمعلاةينالقعلا
80ةيداملاةينالقعلا
325ةّديؤملاةينالقعلا
325ةددسملاةينالقعلا
283ةدرجملالوقعلا
277–276ةيعامتجالاتاقالعلا
90،237نيدلابقالخألاةقالع
305–304عقاولابمالعإلاةقالع
292،309فنعلابسنجلاةقالع
266نيجوزلانيببحلاةقالع
146ةسايسلاونيدلانيبةقالعلا
،238،244،252–89،95،109،234–80،86ملعلا
258–259،290،294
298لاصتالاعامتجاملع
106بسنلاملع
،237–94،115،134،138،141،232،236ةيناملعلا
245،256–261،263،265–266،269–271،
274،276،283،324،339
92،232،259،261،263،271ةنملعلا
256،273ةرسألاةنملع
109،117،122ةيناسنإلامولعلا
141دمحم،ةرامع
310يئامسألالمعلا
136،259،324–134ينيدلالمعلا
137،142–134يسايسلالمعلا
145يسسؤملالمعلا
321عماجلاينوكسملالمعلا
329،340فنعلا
81لوهجمولظ
113ىلعألاناسنإلاروهظ
270ىربكـلاةيلئاعلا
114يقفألاملاعلا
105ِقلاخلاملاع
79،83،105ةداهشلاملاع
115،118–109،113يولعلاملاعلا
–79،81،83،105،110،114،126،133يبيغلاملاعلا
136،141،232،274،337
333يليباقلاملاعلا
80،83يداملاملاعلا
333يليباهلاملاعلا
315ةيملاعلا
334مالسإلاةيملاع
81،288–80ةدابعلا
272–271دمحم،هدبع
114–113ةيدوبعلا
322،339–129،321ةيعامتجالاةلادعلا
242ىذألامدع
242لخدتلامدع
108ةيرحلامدع
125لعفلاةدواعممدع
98،109،272–83،97–81ةيمدعلا
265ئراطلايضرعلا
300نمحرلادبع،يزع
121ثيدحلايبرعلارصعلا
245ةضهنلارصع
266ّيندمدقع
327يلآلالقعلا
232،235يفوصلالقعلا
80،232يملعلالقعلا
139،232،235ديؤملالقعلا
سرهفلا 359
290يرامتئالاهيقفلا
296،310–290،293–288ينامتئالاهيقفلا
296،310يبرملاهيقفلا
96ينيورادلاركفلا
119يحيسملاركفلا
119،233،248ينانويلاركفلا
144حالفلا
233ةيمالسإةيقالخأةفسلف
116ةيراقلاةفسلفلا
108ّةيَراقلاةفسلفلا
80ةيداملاةفسلفلا
143هللاتاذيفءانفلا
97نونفلا
–120،122–117،119–113،115–104ليشم،وكوف
124،128،271
235،238،259سكام،ربيف
245روغاثيفلا
262–261كول،يريف
322يماوس،ادنناكيافيف
334–333ليباق
311–310سابعلانبةزمحخيشلا،يرداقلا
324–323ةيبهذلاةدعاقلا
250توملاىلعةدعاسملانوناق
97قالخألاظفحنوناق
97–96ءاقبلاظفحنوناق
–248،250–234،245)ايساناتوأ(ميحرلالتقلا
251،253
248،251ةايحلاةيسدق
86ققحتمةودق
90ةيقالخألاتارارقلا
289ةينورتكـلإلاةنصرقلا
139–137فسوي،يواضرقلا
،281،319،321،324،328–235،277–234ةملوعلا
339
308شطبلابجرفتملانيع
321ةيحورلاةبرغلا
136،147–135يلازغلا
289،295ةبقارملايفولغلا
256ليسرام،هيشوغ
82،98–81ىنعملابايغ
124ءاشحفلا
319ىنعملايفغارف
133عمجلاودرفلا
112،115،123ةيعمقلاةيضرفلا
267نيسنجلانيبقرف
267نيليجلانيبقرف
292،296دنومغيس،ديورف
142داسفلا
259،273نيدلانعقالخألالصف
259نيدلانعةسايسلالصف
259نيدلانعملعلالصف
238ملعلاوقالخألانيبلصف
233سحلاولقعلانيبلصفلا
233بلقلاولقعلانيبلصفلا
249ةليضف
،136،237–93،98،121،135–78،85،89ةرطفلا
269،274–277،325
90،134،237،262،283ةيرطفلا
273يقالخألاسحلانادقف
307ةينالعإتارقف
121هقفلا
287،289،291،294–286يرامتئالاهقفلا
287،291،294–286ينامتئالاهقفلا
360 سرهفلا
299لوب،دليفسرازال
299دلوراه،ليوسال
322،339فنعاللا
117،292–116ناكال
110يعواللا
119ةطاوللا
233،324،327سوغول
246جروبمسكول
296ليج،يكستفوبيل
337ليوناميإ،سانيفيل
133ءاملا
321–82،236،302،317،319ةثادحلادعبام
297نامرأ،رالتام
318نايدألليملاعلارمتؤملا
296لوب،سايتام
83ةدام
339ةيعفنلاةيداملا
268ةيسكرام
238تربره،زوكرام
300لاصتالاتاسسؤم
307–306ةيمالعإلاتاسسؤملا
269جاوزلاةسسؤم
307يلوزيفام
272رياتنكام
301يبننبكلام
238تايئارواملا
114،138يدرواملا
232،244،326ةنامألاأدبم
244،251،274عاديإلاأدبم
251ناميإلاأدبم
232،235،294،326ةيكزتلاأدبم
280فراعتلاأدبم
247طارقبأمسق
114،143يريشقلا
316ةيدوجولااياضقلا
98قلقلا
115،119،122،124،128،137–106،108–105عمقلا
307ةينويزفلتلاتاونقلا
329ةيكولسلادعاوقلا
278ةماوقلا
278ةيلودلاقيثاوملاونيناوقلا
273ةيبيغلاةوقلا
87،126،238،240،247،252،278،298ةميقلا
297سميج،يراك
256هيسوخ،افونازاك
،109،113،116–95،108–92ليوناميإ،طناك
237–238،241،246–247،261–262،283،
318،320،323
264،322سدقملاباتكلا
122سفنلانعةباتكلا
253–251ةماركـلا
300دروفيلك،زنتسيرك
332–331ايجولوتسيركـلا
96،134،137لامكـلا
246ادنك
319،330ةيكيلوثاكلاةسينكـلا
140ةيتونهكـلا
116وتيجوكـلا
296دولكنوج،نامفوك
256تسغوأ،تنوك
323سويشوفنوك
246كيبيك
340–333،338–324،329–315،318سناه،غنيك
سرهفلا 361
256ةيسنرفلاةيعضولاةسردملا
147تروفكنارفةسردم
125ةعضاخلاةيندملا
278ةرسألاتانودم
319ةيوبابلاةمصعلابهذم
111،262باقعلا
111ةبقارملا
289ةيفاحصلاةبقارملا
312–296،309–295يبرملا
282ةطبترم
140ةينيدلاةيعجرملا
305–86،302،304لسرملا
241ةيويحلاةيزكرملا
274–268،273–257،266ةءورملا
336ةلءاسملا
279نييعامتجالانيدعاسملا
116ةغللاروطتةلأسم
330ةحماسملا
278،316،321ةاواسملا
245،274،337ةيلوؤسملا
337ةقثاوملا
240ةيقالخأةيلوؤسم
333،338فنعلاتاببسم
136يسايسلادبتسملا
302لبقتسملا
،317–98،117،258،262،297،316ةيحيسملا
322–323،330–332
83باهولادبع،يريسملا
289–85،288ةدهاشملا
340–319،339ةيملاعلاقالخألاعورشم
97يبرغلايثادحلاعورشملا
114،124–108،113عمقلارداصم
120تاطلسلاردصم
144دبعتلاأدبم
135لضافتلاأدبم
136–135لماكتلاأدبم
269ةبغرلاأدبم
235،243لومشلاأدبم
232،326ةداهشلاأدبم
235لمعلاأدبم
232ةيريغلاأدبم
259لصفلاأدبم
269ةرطفلاأدبم
273ةيرطفلاأدبم
269بعللاأدبم
244ةيلوؤسملاأدبم
143ةبسنلاأدبم
325ةيوهلاأدبم
310–290،306،309سسجتملا
،304،306–296،303–289،295–287جرفتملا
308
306يبرغلاجرفتملا
305يقلتملا
338دحاوسنجنمناقثاوتملا
125يسنجلالاجملا
104،123،128،259صاخلالاجملا
105،120،123،125،127،259–104ماعلالاجملا
124ءوسلابةرهاجملا
81يبرغلايثادحلاعمتجملا
330يملاعلاسئانكلاسلجم
330يناثلايناكيتافلاعمجملا
271رصمبةيعرشلامكاحملا
339ةبحملا
94هلالاةبحم
120،124–119تامرحملا
121،234يبنلا،دمحم
362 سرهفلا
109،113ناسنإلاتوم
)ايساناتوأ(ميحرلالتقلارظناميحرلاتوملا
308ةيريوصتلاىقيسوملا
147دمحم،ىسوم
133لاتنوش،فوم
109–108اقيزيفاتيملا
293نامتئالاقاثيم
293داهشإلاقاثيم
79،324،328لوألاقاثيملا
233سوثيم
96ةيزانلا
315،329فنعلاذبن
86،121ةوبنلا
125مدنلا
125بسنلا
136ةبسنلا
266ةيعامجلاةبسنلا
142ةيتاذلاةبسنلا
109،270ةيبسنلا
270ءابآلابءانبأللةيبسن
268يلامسأرلاقسنلا
268لسنلا
81،118،134،144نايسنلا
88،122يعامتجالاماظنلا
120يزاوجربلاماظنلا
116لصاوتلاماظن
132مكحلاماظن
110،116يزمرلاماظنلا
276قوسلاماظن
233يملعلاماظنلا
239،252–238ينقتلا-يملعلاماظنلا
140يلادويفلاماظنلا
114ملظللردصم
88ةكرتشملاةحلصملا
147ةضراعملا
248ةاناعم
،107،111،116،128،248،260،279–106ةفرعملا
295،298
325ةدرجمةيلقعةفرعم
82نلقعملاىنعملا
264يحولاىنعم
ّيفاقثلاثوحبلليبوروألادهعملا 316ةَنراقملاةَ
317سيرابيفيكيلوثاكلادهعملا
126نوحلفملا
132ةيخيراتلاةبراقملا
133،143ةيحورلاةبراقملا
147ةمواقملا
246،318تراوتسانوج،لم
280ةيكـلملا
246ةدحتملاةكـلمملا
91ةيقالخألاميقلليلصألاعبنم
117ةفرعميجتنم
282يداصتقالاقطنملا
280ةملوعلليداصتقالاقطنملا
308يلدجلاقطنملا
247ةيملاعلاةحصلاةمظنم
291تيملاروظنملا
،87،233،240،246،249،257،269ةعفنملا
281
124ركنملا
336ةقثاوملا
279ةيلودلاتايقافتالاوقيثاوملا
337–336ةهجاوملا
281ىوقلانيزاوم
83هلإلاتوم
سرهفلا 363
246ادنلوه
267ةيوهلا
233ةينيدةيوه
320ةسينكـلاةنميه
93،95،238–92ديفيد،مويه
–88،93،96،102،108،233،238،247بجاولا
248،267،269،279
269ةيرسأتابجاو
242يعيبطلاملاعلاهاجتةيناسنإلاتابجاولا
93يقالخألابجاولا
257يرسألابجاولا
269ةونبلاوةمومألابجاو
247ةمحرلابجاو
267يلئاعلابجاولا
83ةعيبطلا/ةداملاةيدحاو
91ةيبرغلاةيفسلفلاةسرامملاعقاو
82يعوضوملاعقاولا
268يعانطصالادلاولا
244تياو
233ةينالقعلاةينثولا
92يناسنإلانادجولا
106،110،118،133،248–101،105يناسنإلادوجولا
265–99،101،134،264–83،98–80ةيدوجولا
136–135ةينادحولا
326هللاةينادحو
99ناسنإلاةدحو
98بطقلاةيئانثةدحو
89،93،101،264،267،283يحولا
245راليبأ،يتنادو
305لقعلاةطاسو
120،122،260،274،277،298،305طيسولا
109،322رشعلااياصولا
241طبارتميئيبماظن
116ينوكماظن
144يلقعلارظنلا
99ةيميوقتلاةرظنلا
302ةيمالعإلاتايرظنلا
،143،146،287،299–131،142ةينامتئالاةيرظنلا
311،324،328،335
301ةيميقلاةيمتحلاةيرظن
293َدقعلاةيرظن
143ةيفوصلاءانفلاةيرظن
293ةيقاثيملاةيرظنلا
94ميعنلا
،106،108،110،115–97،105–81،96سفنلا
118–119،122،124–125،127–128،134–136،
140،142–147،235،245،288
88،240،247ةيعفنلا
143ةيناسنإلاتاذلايفن
331تانايدلاصئاقن
،129–115،118،126،128–110،114ينامتئالادقنلا
131،137،141،144،234،283،324–325،339
329،331،333،340يتاذلادقنلا
264سدقملاباتكلادقن
262يحورلاصقنلا
115،118ناركنلا
97،308هتايحطمن
132درفلابضوهنلا
246ةايحلاةيعون
109،113،124،321–97،108–83،95هشتين
235،238نغروي،سامرباه
334–333ليباه
323يبارلا،ليله
299لراك،دنالفوه
364 سرهفلا
262مهولا
242ةعيبطلانهو
84ةيقلخلاةظقيلا
298إدلوراه،سيني
245ةيدوهيلا
332انحوي
239،242،244،252–238زناه،سانوي
298لاصتالافئاظو
110يعولا
306درفلايعو
240يروفحألادوقولا
287صصلتلايفعوقولا
242ءالولا
246،249،297ةدحتملاتايالولا
278ءانبألاىلعةيعرشلاةيالولا
